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INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS IN ACTION, OR INACTION?
In this dissertation, I empirically examine system markets up close. More specifically
I examine indirect network effects, both demand-side and supply-side indirect network
effects. Indirect network effects are the source of positive feedback in system markets, or
so network effect theory tells us. Systems are composed of complementary and inter -
dependent products, such as hardware and software. For instance, a video game system is
composed of the video game console, on the one hand, and video games, on the other hand.
Surprisingly, I find that the positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects is less
pervasive, or at least more complex, than “current wisdom” would have us believe.
Supply-side and/or demand-side indirect network effects, as traditionally operationalized,
are often not present. When present, they display strong heterogeneity. There is often no
positive feedback cycle present in the initial stage of the system’s life cycle. Software
quantity is of little importance, while software products of exceptional high quality (i.e.,
superstars) play an important role. Our empirical studies identify numerous factors
marketing manager can manipulate to influence the positive feedback cycle. Subsequently
marketing managers can incorporate our findings in their marketing strategy, and out -
maneuver competitors (i.e., competing systems, fellow complementors).
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We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
 
    T. S. Eliot,   
        1942. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  Motivation 
 
 In this dissertation, I will examine system markets up close. More specifically I 
will examine indirect network effects, both demand-side and supply-side indirect network 
effects.  Indirect network effects are the source of positive feedback in system markets, or 
so network effect theory tells us.  
Systems are composed of complementary and interdependent products, such as 
hardware and software (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986a). For instance, a 
video game system is composed of the video game console, on the one hand, and video 
games, on the other hand (Chou and Shy 1990; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal, Kende 
and Rob 2000). 
When indirect network effects are present, the increased adoption of the hardware 
by consumers, and thereby the larger hardware installed base, increases the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶VOLNHOLKRRGWRHQWHUWKHV\VWHPDQGVWDUWLQWURGXFLQJVRIWZDUHLHVXSSO\-
side indirect network effects). This larger availability of software increases the utility of 
the system to conVXPHUV WKHUHE\ LQFUHDVLQJ WKH FRQVXPHUV¶ OLNHOLKRRG WR DGRSW WKH
hardware, thus increasing hardware sales (i.e., demand-side indirect network effects), and 
so on (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Church and Gandal 1993 and 1996; Katz and Shapiro 
1994). Figure 1.1 depicts this positive feedback cycle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
Figure 1.1: The Positive Feedback Cycle of Indirect Network Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indirect network effects give rise to the chicken-and-egg paradox. This 
FRRUGLQDWLRQSUREOHPLV WKH UHVXOWRIERWKFRPSOHPHQWRUVDQGFRQVXPHUV WDNLQJD µZDLW-
and-VHH¶ DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV WKH QHZ V\VWHP *XSWD -DLQ DQG 6DZKQH\  .DW] DQG
Shapiro 1994). Complementors delay entry and thus the introduction of software products, 
until enough consumers have adopted the system, while consumers wait to adopt the 
system until enough software firms have entered and introduced their software products 
(Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Gandal 2002; Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney 1999; Srinivasan, 
Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004; Stremersch et al. 2007). Subsequently, sales of the system's 
hardware and software products do not take off.  
While network effects theory has grown extensively during the last 25 years, the 
existing body of empirical research relating to indirect network effects is still very small. 
We know very little about the behavior of indirect network effects in actual markets.  
In addition, as the economy becomes more and more interconnected, the 
importance of markets with network effects increases, thereby increasing its relevance for 
WKH ILUP¶V PDUNHWLQJ VWUDWHJ\ *XSWD -DLQ DQG 6DZKQH\  6ULQLYDVDQ /LOLHQ DQG
Rangaswamy 2004; Yoffie 1997). The financial implications of these marketing strategies 
in system markets are immense. The introduction of a new systemZKHWKHU LW LV6RQ\¶V
PlD\6WDWLRQRU0LFURVRIW¶V9LVWD operating system, is often a multibillion-dollar gamble, 
Consumer's 
Adoption 
Decision 
Software 
Availability 
Complementor's 
Entry 
Decision 
Hardware 
Installed  
Base 
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which will receive massive worldwide media attention. Financial losses can be huge and 
severely affect the ILUP¶V VXUYLYDO. 3DO, Atari and Sega almost ceased to exist because 
their systems failed, while Microsoft lost over $4 billion dollars in just 4 years on its Xbox 
system (Murphy 2005), and that was a reasonable successful system. 
To enhance our understanding of indirect network effects in actual markets, in 
order to alleviate the chicken-and-egg paradox, we undertook the 3 empirical studies 
presented in this dissertation (Chapter 2, 3 and 4). These 3 studies should help academics, 
practitioners, and government agencies, when dealing with system markets. 
 
1.2  Outline 
 
For each of the following 3 chapters I gathered uniquely new data. This process 
alone took over 2 years. This gave us the unique opportunity, to be the first to examine 
demand-side and supply-side indirect network effects across a large number of system 
markets, and examine them in-depth.  
In chapter 2, we focus our attention on both demand-side and supply-side indirect 
network effects across a large number of system markets. We examine the occurrence and 
strength of indirect network effects, the temporal pattern of indirect network effects by 
examining the take-off of software availability and hardware salesDQGWKHµFKLFNHQ-and-
HJJ¶ SUREOHP. We collected data on 9 system markets from their introduction onward, 
without resorting to proxies, and use a takeoff analysis, time series model, and historical 
case analyses to examine indirect network effects. This work was co-authored with Stefan 
Stremersch, Gerard Tellis, and Philip Hans Franses, and published in the Journal of 
Marketing DV³,QGLUHFW1HWZRUN(IIHFWVLQ1HZ3URGXFW*URZWK´ 
In chapter 3, we focus on demand-side indirect network effects. We examine the 
heterogeneity in the effect of demand-side indirect network effects. Do certain superstar 
software products (e.g., Super Mario 64) have a disproportionately large effect on 
hardware unit sales (e.g., Nintendo N64 console sales). We collected 4 million quality 
ratings of around 5,800 software products, and use a Prais-Winsten dynamic panel data 
model to examine demand-side indirect network effects. This work was co-authored with 
4  
Stefan Stremersch, and published in the Journal of Marketing DV³7KH(IIHFWRI6XSHUVWDU
6RIWZDUHRQ+DUGZDUH6DOHVLQ6\VWHP0DUNHWV´ 
In chapter 4, we focus on supply-side indirect network effects. We examine the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUREDELOLW\ DQG WLPLQJ RI HQWU\ 6SHFLILFDOO\  ZH H[DPLQH WKH
heterogeneity in the effect of supply-side indirect network effects. We examine the entry 
behavior of complementors (i.e., independent software firms) in a system market across 
successive incremental technology generations. We collected data on around 2,900 entry 
opportunities during a 35-year period, and use a split-population duration model to 
examine the effects of supply-side indirect network effects and pre-entry experience. This 
work was co-authored with Stefan Stremersch, and is being prepared for submission. 
Each chapter addresses many of the existing shortcomings of prior research, 
combined they greatly enhance our understanding of system markets. Each individual 
chapter presents its findings and implications for academics, practitioners, and government 
agencies at the end of the chapter in the results, discussion and implications sections. 
In chapter 5, we present a short summary of the main findings and implications, 
related to indirect network effects. We conclude by providing directions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
New Product Growth in System Markets1 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 ³A familiar high-tech variation on an age-old conundrum is stalling 
acceptance of the much-heralded computer storage medium known as DVD-ROM: Which 
comes first, affordable hardware or a wealth of software? The installed base or the content 
SURYLGHUV"´  
David Pescovitz in: The LA Times, 1997. 
 
TV sets. CD players. DVD players. Economists regularly claim that such markets 
exhibit indirect network effects2. The expected utility of the primary product ± and thereby 
its sales ± increases as more complements become available, and this availability of 
complements3, in turn, depends on the installed base of the primary product (Caillaud and 
Jullien 2003; Church and Gandal 1993 and 1996; Cottrell and Koput 1998; Hill 1997; Katz 
and Shapiro 1994). Prior research has typically referred to the primary product, such as a 
TV set, a CD player and a DVD player, as hardware and to the product that complements 
the primary product, such as programming (TV), Compact Discs (CD player), and DVD 
movies (DVD player), as software (Church and Gandal 1992b; Ducey and Fratrik 1989; 
Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999).  
                                                          
1 This work was co-authored with Stefan Stremersch, Gerard Tellis, and Philip Hans Franses, and 
SXEOLVKHGLQWKH-RXUQDORI0DUNHWLQJDV³,QGLUHFW1HWZRUN(IIHFWVLQ1HZ3URGXFW*URZWK´ 
2 The phenomenon of indirect network effects is different from the possible interdependence between 
hardware sales and software sales, such as CD Player sales and CD sales (Bayus 1987; Peterson and 
Mahajan 1978). 
3 The literature is inconsistent in terminology. Scholars have used the term availability (e.g. Dranove 
and Gandal 2003; LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001), variety (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a 
and 1993), or both interchangeably (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Frels, Shervani and 
Srivastava 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Katz and Shapiro 1985; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 
2004), in theory development. Most, if not all, of the empirical studies that have used the term 
variety operationalize this construct through counting the total complements available (e.g. Basu, 
Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004). In the 
present study, we consistently use the term availability, as that corroborates with our measures. 
6  
,QGLUHFW QHWZRUN HIIHFWV JLYH ULVH WR WKH µFKLFNHQ-and-HJJ¶ SDUDGR[ FRQVXPHUV
wait to adopt the hardware until enough software is available and software manufacturers 
delay releasing software until enough consumers have adopted the hardware (Caillaud and 
Jullien 2003; Gandal 2002; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999). A recent example is the High-
Definition television (HDTV) market. The expected utility of HDTV sets to consumers 
(and therefore HDTV set sales) increases the more HD broadcasting becomes available. 
On the other hand, broadcasters will make more HD broadcasting available, as the number 
of consumers owning a HDTV set increases. For HDTV to succeed, WKLVµFKLFNHQ-and-HJJ¶
paradox must be resolved (Farrell, et al. 1992; Gandal 2002; Pope 1999). 
In the last two decades, several economists have researched various aspects of 
indirect network effects, including (1) coordination between software and hardware 
industries (Church and Gandal 1992b; Economides and Salop 1992; Farrell, et al. 1992); 
(2) standard setting (Church and Gandal 1992a; Clements 2004; Economides 1989; Katz 
DQG6KDSLURDDQGDQGEX\HUV¶WHFKQRORJ\DGRSWLRQGHFLVions 
(Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Saloner and Shepard 1995; Shy 1996). While most 
research in the first two streams relates to choice between rival incompatible systems, the 
third studies why consumers adopt a given system (Majumdar and Venkataraman 1998). 
Our study fits within this third research tradition. 
Marketing researchers have only recently started to study indirect network effects 
(Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999, LeNagard-Assayag and 
Manceau 2001; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004), although the discipline has a relatively 
longer tradition of studying direct network effects4 (e.g. Brynjolfson and Kemerer 1996; 
Majumdar and Venkataraman 1998; Sun, Xie and Cao 2004; Xie and Sirbu 1995). In 
addition, some marketing studies focus on network effects per se, independently of 
whether they are direct or indirect (e.g. Shankar and Bayus 2003; Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Rangaswamy 2004; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). 
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the prior economics and marketing literature. Table 
2.1 contains all empirical papers on indirect network effects and stipulates whether they 
study demand-side or supply-side indirect network effects or both; whether they define 
                                                          
4 In direct network effects markets, the utility of the product depends directly on the number of 
others using the same product (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
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indirect network effects from only the demand-side, only the supply-side, or both; what the 
focal dependent and independent variables in their inquiry are; whether they use proxies to 
measure focal constructs; how many markets they study; whether they have data from the 
introduction of the new technology; and which markets they study. Table 2.2 contains a 
selection of non-empirical papers on indirect network effects. It illustrates what the main 
focus of this prior work is (whether on indirect network effects specifically or on network 
effects generally); what the method is (whether mathematical or conceptual); whether they 
define indirect network effects from only the demand-side, only the supply-side, or both; 
and which focal dependent and independent variables are included. While this prior 
literature is valuable and insightful, it also shows some limitations. 
First, empirical analysis of indirect network effects is rare and, as evidenced by 
Table 2.1, limited to the study of one, exceptionally two, markets. Of the eighteen 
empirical studies of indirect network effects, seventeen study only one market and only 
one (Gandal 1995) studies two markets. This situation is probably due to a lack of data on 
both hardware sales and software availability. Some authors have even claimed that such 
data is unavailable (Putsis et al. 1997), whereas others (six out of eighteen studies) have 
used distant proxies, such as the amount of advertising (Gandal, Greenstein and Salant 
1999). Still other authors have modeled indirect network effects as if they were direct 
network effects (Hartman and Teece 1990; Ohashi 2003; Park 2004; Shankar and Bayus 
2003). Authors often also do not use data that start at the introduction of the new 
technology either (rare exceptions are Dranove and Gandal (2003) and LeNagard-Assayag 
and Manceau (2001)), leading to potential left-censoring biases. Often, authors also have 
modeled only one side of indirect network effects, most often so the effect of software 
availability on hardware sales (demand-side indirect network effects). Moreover, the 
literature is diverse and inconsistent as to the definition of indirect network effects. Many 
papers do not even explicitly state a definition of indirect network effects, others provide 
(inexplicitly) multiple definitions (see the variation on the definition of indirect network 
effects in Tables 2.1 and 2.2). The literature is also inconsistent as to the empirical models 
employed (see the list of dependent and independent variables in Table 2.1). Therefore, we 
can conclude that the literature lacks a unifying framework to empirically examine indirect 
network effects. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects 
 
 
 
 
Demand 
or 
Supply-
side  
Definition of Indirect Network Effects 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Demand-
side 
Supply
-side 
Both Other  In HW* 
equation 
In SW* 
equation 
Basu, Mazumdar and 
Raj (2003) 
Demand V     HP  
Clements and Ohashi 
(2005) 
Both   V   HMS SA 
Cottrell and Koput 
(1998) 
Demand   V   HP  
Dranove and Gandal 
(2003) 
Demand   V   HS  
Frels, Shervani and 
Srivastava (2003) 
Demand V     RA  
Gandal (1995) Demand   V    SP 
Gandal, Greenstein 
and Salant (1999) 
Both   V   HS SA 
Gandal, Kende and 
Rob (2000) 
Both   V   HIB SA 
Gupta, Sachin and 
Sawhney (1999) 
Both   V   CD CR 
Hartman and Teece 
(1990) 
Demand  V    HMS  
LeNagard-Assayag 
and Manceau (2001) 
Both   V   HIB SA 
Nair, Chintagunta, 
Dube (2004) 
Both   V   HS SA 
Ohashi (2003) Demand   V   HMS  
Park (2004) Demand   V   HMS  
Rysman (2004) Both   V   CD SP 
Saloner and Shepard 
(1995) 
Supply    V   SD 
Shankar and Bayus 
(2003) 
Demand   V   HS  
Shurmer (1993) Demand  V    CD  
This Study Both   V   HS SA 
 
* C: Compatibility, CD: Consumer Demand, CR: Complementor Response, HIB: 
Hardware Installed base, HMS: Hardware Market Share, HP: Hardware Price, HS: 
Hardware Sales, RA: Resource Allocation, SA: Software Availability, SD: Software 
Deployment SP: Software Price.  
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Table 2.1: Overview of Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects (ctd.) 
 
 
  
 Independent Variable  Uses 
Proxies 
Nr. of 
Markets 
Data 
from 
intro-
duction 
Markets 
In HW* 
equation 
In SW* 
equation 
 
Basu, Mazumdar and 
Raj (2003) 
SA  No 1 No CD 
Clements and Ohashi 
(2005) 
SA HIB No 1 Partial Video Game 
Cottrell and Koput 
(1998) 
HMS, SA  No 1 No Microcomputer 
Dranove and Gandal 
(2003) 
SA  Yes 1 Yes DVD Player 
Frels, Shervani and 
Srivastava (2003) 
SA  No 1 No Computer 
Gandal (1995)  C No 2 No Spreadsheet & DMS 
Gandal, Greenstein 
and Salant (1999) 
SA HS Yes 1 No CP/M and DOS  
Gandal, Kende and 
Rob (2000) 
SA HIB No 1 No CD 
Gupta, Sachin and 
Sawhney (1999) 
SA CD No 1 No Television  
Hartman and Teece 
(1990) 
HMS, HIB  Yes 1 No Minicomputer 
LeNagard-Assayag 
and Manceau (2001) 
SA HIB No 1 Yes CD (France) 
Nair, Chintagunta, 
Dube (2004) 
SA HIB No 1 No PDA 
Ohashi (2003) HIB  Yes 1 No VCR 
Park (2004) HMS, HIB  Yes 1 No VCR 
Rysman (2004) SA CD No 1 No Yellow Pages 
Saloner and Shepard 
(1995) 
 HS Yes 1 No ATM 
Shankar and Bayus 
(2003) 
HIB  No 1 No Video Game 
Console 
Shurmer (1993) SA  No 1 No PC Sofware (UK) 
This Study SA HIB No 9 Yes 
B&WTV, CD,  
CD-ROM, CTV, 
DVD, GB,  i-Mode, 
Internet, LD 
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Table 2.2: Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects 
 
  Main  
Focus* 
Method**     Definition of Indirect Network Effects 
  
      Demand-
side 
Supply-
side 
Both Other 
Bental and Spiegel (1995) NE C  V   
Bonardi and Durand 
(2003) 
NE C   V  
Caillaud and Jullien 
(2003) 
INE M   V  
Choi (1994) NE C V    
Chou and Shy (1990) INE M V    
Chou and Shy (1993) INE M V    
Chou and Shy (1996) INE M V    
Church and Gandal 
(1992a) 
INE M V    
Church and Gandal 
(1992b) 
INE M V    
Church and Gandal 
(1993) 
INE M   V  
Church and Gandal 
(1996) 
INE M   V  
Clark and Chatterjee 
(1999) 
NE M   V  
Clements (2004) NE M   V  
Conner (1995) NE C V    
Dhebar (1995) INE C   V  
Economides (1996) INE C    V 
Economides and 
Himmelberg (1995) 
NE C V    
Economides and White 
(1994) 
NE C    V 
Esser and Leruth (1988) NE C V    
Farrell and Saloner (1985) NE C  V   
Farrell and Saloner (1986) NE M V    
Gandal (2002) NE M   V  
Garud and Kumaraswamy 
(1993) 
NE C  V   
Hahn (2003) NE C    V 
Hill (1997) O C   V  
Katz and Shapiro (1985) NE C   V     
 
*: main focus can be on network effects in general, denoted by NE, indirect network effects, denoted 
by INE, or other, denoted by O. **: method can be conceptual (containing verbal or graphical logic), 
denoted by C, or mathematical (containing a mathematical formulation), denoted by M. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects (ctd.) 
 
  Dependent Variable Model  Independent Variable Model 
 
  Hardware*** Software***  Hardware*** 
 
Software*** 
Bental and Spiegel (1995)      
Bonardi and Durand 
(2003) 
     
Caillaud and Jullien 
(2003) 
CU CP  SA HMS 
Choi (1994)      
Chou and Shy (1990) CU CP  SA SA 
Chou and Shy (1993) CU SA  SA HMS 
Chou and Shy (1996) CU SA  SA HIB 
Church and Gandal 
(1992a) 
CU CP  SA SA 
Church and Gandal 
(1992b) 
CU CP  SA HMS 
Church and Gandal  
(1993) 
CU SE  SA HIB 
Church and Gandal  
(1996) 
CU CP  SA SA 
Clark and Chatterjee 
(1999) 
CU   SA  
Clements (2004)  SE   HIB 
Conner (1995)      
Dhebar (1995)      
Economides (1996)      
Economides and 
Himmelberg (1995) 
     
Economides and White 
(1994) 
     
Esser and Leruth (1988)      
Farrell and Saloner (1985)      
Farrell and Saloner (1986) CU   HIB  
Gandal (2002) CU   SA  
Garud and Kumaraswamy 
(1993) 
     
Hahn (2003)      
Hill (1997) CU SA  SA HIB 
Katz and Shapiro (1985)          
 
*** CU: Consumer Utility, CP: Complementor Profit, HIB: Hardware Installed Base, HMS: 
Hardware Market Share, SA: Software Availability, SE: Software Entry. 
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Table 2.2: Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects (ctd.) 
 
  Main  
Focus* 
Method** Definition of Indirect Network Effects 
      Demand-
side 
Supply-
side 
Both Other 
Katz and Shapiro (1986a) NE M  V   
Katz and Shapiro (1986b) NE M  V   
Katz and Shapiro (1992) NE C  V   
Katz and Shapiro (1994) INE C  V   
Koski and Kretschmer 
(2004) 
NE C   V  
Kotabe, Sahay and 
Aulakh (1996) 
O C   V  
Kristiansen (1996) NE C   V  
Kristiansen (1998) NE C V    
Lee and 2¶&RQQRU NE C   V  
Loch and Huberman 
(1999) 
NE C  V   
Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988) 
O C  V   
Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992) 
O C  V   
Postrel (1990) NE C V    
Rohlfs (2001) NE C   V  
Schilling (1999) O C   V  
Schilling (2002) O C   V  
Shapiro and Varian (1998) NE C   V  
Sheremata (2004) NE C   V  
Shy (2001) NE M   V  
Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Rangaswamy (2004) 
NE C   V  
Thum (1994) NE C  V   
Valente (1995) O C V    
Viswanathan (2005) NE C  V   
Wade (1995) NE C   V  
Xie and Sirbu (1995) NE C     V   
 
*: main focus can be on network effects in general, denoted by NE, indirect network effects, denoted 
by INE, or other, denoted by O. **: method can be conceptual (containing verbal or graphical logic), 
denoted by C, or mathematical (containing a mathematical formulation), denoted by M.  
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Table 2.2: Overview of Non-Empirical Literature on Indirect Network 
Effects (ctd.) 
 
  Dependent Variable Model 
 
 Independent Variable Model 
 
  Hardware*** 
 
Software***  Hardware*** Software*** 
Katz and Shapiro (1986a) CU   HIB  
Katz and Shapiro (1986b) CU   HIB  
Katz and Shapiro (1992)      
Katz and Shapiro (1994)      
Koski and Kretschmer 
(2004) 
CU SA  SA HIB 
Kotabe, Sahay and Aulakh 
(1996) 
     
Kristiansen (1996)      
Kristiansen (1998)      
/HHDQG2¶&RQQRU(2003) CU SA  SA HIB 
Loch and Huberman  
(1999) 
     
Matutes and Regibeau 
(1988) 
     
Matutes and Regibeau 
(1992) 
     
Postrel (1990)      
Rohlfs (2001)      
Schilling (1999) HIB SA  SA HIB 
Schilling (2002)      
Shapiro and Varian (1998)      
Sheremata (2004)      
Shy (2001)  SA   HIB 
Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Rangaswamy (2004) 
     
Thum (1994)      
Valente (1995)      
Viswanathan (2005)      
Wade (1995)      
Xie and Sirbu (1995)          
 
*** CU: Consumer Utility, CP: Complementor Profit, HIB: Hardware Installed Base, HMS: 
Hardware Market Share, SA: Software Availability, SE: Software Entry. 
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Second, while the chicken-and-egg paradox is cited a lot, it is unclear how it is 
resolved. Which comes first, the chicken or the egg? Many business analysts (e.g. 
Midgette 1997; Tam 2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994, all in the Wall Street Journal) and 
academics (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and 
Srivastava 2003; Sengupta 1998) have casually observed that a critical mass of software 
titles is required for hardware sales to take off. Take-off is the point of transition between 
the introduction stage and the growth stage of a growth curve (Golder and Tellis 1997). 
Several academics (e.g. Church and Gandal 1992a) have made similar arguments based on 
theoretical models. However, no one ± to our knowledge ± has empirically examined 
whether software availability leads hardware sales or not.  
We aim to fill these voids in the present paper. To do so, the present paper 
examines the temporal pattern of indirect network effects across multiple markets using 
secondary data, based on prior theories developed in economics and marketing. To do so, 
the authors have constructed a database, on both hardware sales and software availability, 
for nine markets, since their inception (the appendix contains a detailed description of the 
data): Black & White Television, Compact Disc, CD-ROM, Color Television, DVD, 
Gameboy, i-Mode, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc.  
The second section of the paper develops the theoretical background of this study. 
The third section details the data we use. The fourth section presents our empirical 
analysis. We conclude by summarizing the results, presenting the implications and 
limitations of our study, and discussing avenues for further research. 
 
2.2  Theoretical Background 
The essence of indirect network effects theory is the understanding that software 
and hardware form a system (Chou and Shy 1996; Economides 1989; Katz and Shapiro 
1994). As they form a system, the supply of software and the demand for hardware may 
affect each other, according to a specific temporal pattern. Both may also be affected by 
other variables. For instance, the supply of software may be affected by the supply of 
software in previous periods and hardware sales may be affected by its price and past 
hardware sales. We next theorize on all these effects.  
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2.2.1  Indirect Network Effects 
The theory of indirect network effects argues that the supply of software and the 
demand for hardware affect each other. The amount of software that is available for a 
certain technology has a positive influence on the utility of the entire hardware-software 
system to the consumer (Church and Gandal 1992a; Katz and Shapiro 1985), which draws 
ever more new adopters to adopt the new hardware (Rogers 1995) and thereby increases 
hardware sales and the installed base of hardware. In turn, the hardware installed base 
SRVLWLYHO\DIIHFWVVRIWZDUHFRPSDQLHV¶GHFLVLRQVWRPDNHVRIWZDUHWLWOHVDYDLODEOH&KXUFK
and Gandal 1993; Gandal 2002). The more consumers that have adopted the hardware 
product, the larger the market potential for software products for that particular hardware 
product and therefore the larger the impetus for software companies to provide software 
titles for the hardware.  
Our in-depth review of the literature of indirect network effects (see Tables 2.1 
and 2.2) suggests at least three forms of indirect network effects, dependent upon the 
conditions authors have imposed to define them. We call these forms: demand-side 
indirect network effects, supply-side indirect network effects and demand- and supply-side 
indirect network effects. Demand-side indirect network effects mean that software 
availability significantly and positively affects hardware utility of an individual consumer 
and therefore, at the aggregate level, also hardware sales. Supply-side indirect network 
effects imply that hardware installed base significantly and positively affects the software 
provision by software manufacturers and therefore, at the aggregate level, software 
availability. Demand- and supply-side indirect network effects imply that both 
characteristics exist. 
 
2.2.2  Temporal Pattern in Indirect Network Effects 
The temporal pattern in indirect network effects is important as it can indicate 
how the chicken-and-egg paradox is resolved. Prior literature has not covered this issue in 
detail. At the same time, academic scholars and business analysts have expressed very 
different opinions on this temporal pattern.  
A first opinion expressed is that, given extensive coordination between hardware 
and software manufacturers, growth of software availability coincides with growth in 
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hardware sales (e.g. Katz and Shapiro 1994). Government intervention may coordinate the 
actions of market participants ± both software and hardware ± to achieve that. The 
guidelines of the FCC towards new broadcasting and radio technologies are an example. 
Hardware manufacturers may also give subsidies, kick-backs, and side payments to 
software manufacturers to fine-tune software availability to the hardware sales evolution. 
In the extreme, hardware manufacturers may even vertically integrate into the software 
LQGXVWU\ $Q H[DPSOH LV 5&$¶V RZQHUVKLS RI 1%& ZKHQ &RORU 7HOHYLVLRQ ZDV
introduced).  
Others have argued that growth in software availability may precede growth of 
hardware sales (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani 
and Srivastava 2003; Sengupta 1998). Church and Gandal (1992a) and business analysts 
(Midgette 1997; Tam 2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994) claimed that software availability 
needs to achieve a critical mass in order for hardware to become a viable alternative, and 
hardware sales can take off.  The reason is that consumers need a sign of sufficient 
software availability, before they start to adopt the hardware a mass. Also, software 
companies may invest in software provision before any marked hardware sales occur. For 
instance, Microsoft invested in the CD-ROM long before any significant sales of CD-
ROM hardware occurred. Because the CD-ROM was the first mass market high capacity 
medium that might prove useful in copyright protection, Microsoft envisioned the dramatic 
advantages it might have for software delivery and installation. 
Still other economists (e.g. Dranove and Gandal 2003) have argued that software 
companies may balk at making software available for new hardware that has not yet taken 
off. In the early years of most new technologies, the benefits of the new technology are 
unclear to the software industry. Moreover, different standards may be fighting for 
dominance, generating even more uncertainty for the software industry. The future mass 
acceptance of the hardware, and therefore the future profitability of software for the new 
technology are highly uncertain. Faced with such uncertainty, software companies are 
unlikely to commit substantial resources to making software available for the new 
hardware, especially if it requires a high upfront lump sum investment (Ducey and Fratrik 
1989). Software providers may only make such investment after hardware sales have taken 
off and grow rapidly, thus signaling the viability of the new hardware.  
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At the same time, a critical mass of consumers that adopt the new hardware may 
develop before a sizeable library of software is available, for several reasons. First, early 
adopters may like the snob appeal of owning new hardware (Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 
2003). Second, cascade effects may prompt consumers to buy new hardware because of 
WKHLU SRSXODULW\ DPRQJ ³RSLQLRQ OHDGHUV´ UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLU LQWULQVLF XWLOLW\ *ROGHU DQG
Tellis 2004). Third, early adopters may create their own content (e.g. i-Mode, Internet 
(WWW), or VCR) after buying the hardware. Fourth, a killer application (a single software 
application of very high quality and popularity) may be available, by which a sizeable 
FRQVXPHU VHJPHQW ³PXVW RZQ´ WKH KDUGZDUH UHJDUGOHVV RI WKH VKHHU QXPEHU RI
applications available (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003). 
 
2.2.3  Other Effects 
When one empirically examines indirect network effects, other considerations 
come into play as well, both at the hardware and the software side. At the hardware side, 
also price of the hardware5 and prior hardware sales need to be accounted for. Hardware 
price will affect the affordability of the new technology, which may affect the adoption of 
the hardware by consumers, and thereby future sales (Golder and Tellis 1998). Prior 
hardware sales may affect future hardware sales for several reasons. The most salient 
reason is probably social contagion, in that past hardware adoptions will influence future 
hardware adoptions, either through learning under uncertainty or status considerations 
(Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). But there can be several other reasons as well, such 
as market inertia. 
At the software side, two variables may affect software availability. First, past 
software availability may have an influence on future software availability, though the 
direction of the influence may be, a priori, unclear (Chou and Shy 1996; Church and 
Gandal 1992a). It may be positive, because higher past software availability likely 
                                                          
5 2QH FRXOG DUJXH WKDW DOVR VRIWZDUH SULFH DIIHFWV FRQVXPHUV¶ XWLOLW\ DQG WKHUHE\ KDUGZDUH VDOHV
While this is valid, software prices are in most cases small (or even equal to zero, such as in 
broadcasting or Internet content), as compared to hardware prices. It is also in most cases, more 
difficult to obtain information on average software price as compared to average hardware price. 
Moreover, variation over time may be less in software price than in hardware price. The production 
of software is likely characterized by high up-front investments and low reproduction costs. 
Combined with intense competition, software prices are likely to be low (Shapiro and Varian 1998). 
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increases the utility of the new hardware, thereby increasing the future software sales 
software providers may expect, consequently encouraging them to make more software 
DYDLODEOH WKH ³QHWZRUN´ HIIHFW ,W PD\ DOVR EH QHJDWLYH EHFDXVH KLJKHU SDVW VRIWZDUH
availability yields more intense competition among software providers, thereby decreasing 
the margins software providers can make on their software, consequently discouraging 
WKHP IURPPDNLQJPRUH VRIWZDUH DYDLODEOH WKH ³FRPSHWLWLRQ´ HIIHFW 6HFRQG VRIWZDUH
costs may affect software availability decisions by software providers. High costs involved 
in providing software for a new technology may discourage software provision by software 
companies. 
 
2.3  Data 
This section describes the data collection and the characteristics of the sample. 
 
2.3.1  Data Collection 
To collect data for the present study, we conducted extensive archival research. 
The data collection took a great deal of time and effort, because for each market we needed 
data on hardware sales (and/or hardware installed base), software availability, and 
hardware price from the time of introduction. As one can see from Table 2.1, prior 
empirical research has most often examined the effect of software availability on hardware 
sales to test for demand-side indirect network effects and the effect of hardware installed 
base on software availability to test for supply-side indirect network effects. We sought to 
obtain exactly these variables, rather than any other proxies, as some prior scholars have 
done (again see Table 2.1).  
We used the following procedure to obtain our data. First, we examined the 
published literature on consumer electronics (e.g. Ducey and Fratrik 1989; Golder and 
Tellis 1997). Second, we examined statistical yearbooks (e.g. the Broadcasting and Cable 
Yearbook, the TV Factbook, the Broadcasting Yearbook, the International TV and Video 
Almanac, and the CD-ROM directory) in the libraries of two large research universities in 
the U.S. Some of these sources are also available electronically, but only for more recent 
years. Third, we contacted organizations directly to assess and access their data archives. 
Our search led us through approximately 30 public institutions and their libraries (e.g., 
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U.N., the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, U.S. Senate Committees, recording 
DQG EURDGFDVWLQJ DVVRFLDWLRQV FRQVXPHU HOHFWURQLFV PDQXIDFWXUHUV¶ DVVRFLDWLRQV DQd 
about 20 private companies that are market research companies, media consultants, 
manufacturers or software providers. For instance, NPD ± a leading research company for 
marketing and sales information ± graciously provided us with hardware sales data and 
software availability data for Gameboy. In addition, we tried to combine different sources 
to check for consistency in the data series.  
 
2.3.2  Characteristics of the Sample 
For this study, we focused on consumer electronics, because economic and 
marketing researchers claim that this class of products shows substantial indirect network 
effects (Church and Gandal 1993; Ducey and Fratrik 1989; Farrell, et al. 1992; Gupta, Jain 
and Sawhney 1999).   
While we tried to gather data on all consumer electronics markets post WWII, we 
were able to gather annual data on nine network markets as follows: Black & White 
Television, CD, CD-ROM, Color Television, DVD, Gameboy, i-Mode, Internet (WWW), 
and Laserdisc. The markets we have data on vary widely from music to video 
entertainment and ICT to broadcasting. These markets also have the nice feature of being 
quite diverse in market structure, e.g. in number of manufacturers (from one (Nintendo) for 
Gameboy to many for television sets and Internet (WWW)), government involvement 
(from relatively high in television broadcasting to low in Compact Disc or DVD), etc. 
All data are from the U.S., except three, namely Compact Disc, Laserdisc, and i-
Mode. CD and Laserdisc title availability data were unavailable for the U.S. from their 
introduction (even after many consultations with the industry and leading publishers), but 
they were available for Compact Disc in the U.K. (which is clearly a lead market in music) 
and for Laserdisc in Japan (which is clearly a lead market in the most popular Laserdisc 
applications, such as Karaoke).6 I-Mode data were not available for the U.S., while it was 
for the lead market for i-Mode, Japan. 
                                                          
6 Note that for the CD market, the main problem with data from the U.S. is that the number of 
UHOHDVHG&'¶VE\LQGHSHQGHQWODEHOVLVXQDYDLODEOHZKLFKLVDERXWWRRIWKH&'PDUNHW 
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Illustration of the Sample 
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Legend: 
The full lines with squares indicate hardware unit sales. Dashed lines with diamonds 
indicate software availability. Dotted lines with triangles indicate the hardware price 
evolution. 
A full arrow indicates hardware sales takeoff. A dashed arrow indicates software 
availability takeoff.  
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Illustration of the Sample (ctd.) 
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Legend: 
The full lines with squares indicate hardware unit sales. Dashed lines with diamonds 
indicate software availability. Dotted lines with triangles indicate the hardware price 
evolution. 
A full arrow indicates hardware sales takeoff. A dashed arrow indicates software 
availability takeoff. 
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Figure 2.1: Graphical Illustration of the Sample (ctd.) 
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Legend: 
The full lines with squares indicate hardware unit sales. Dashed lines with diamonds 
indicate software availability. Dotted lines with triangles indicate the hardware price 
evolution. 
A full arrow indicates hardware sales takeoff. A dashed arrow indicates software 
availability takeoff.  
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The precise measures for all our variables and their sources are provided in the 
Appendix. For some markets, we derived hardware installed base from hardware sales by 
taking the cumulative sales, as data on hardware installed base was unavailable. Such 
derivation assumes there are no replacement sales ± which is likely in many of our markets 
as we study the early diffusion process ± and is in line with prior literature (Clements and 
Ohashi 2005; Dranove and Gandal 2003; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Hartman and 
Teece 1990; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Shankar and Bayus 2003).  
Our measures for software availability are consistent with measures other scholars 
have used in the past. For example, Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé (2004) use the number of 
software titles available for different PDA platforms. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj (2003), 
LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau (2001) and Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) use the 
number of available Compact Disc titles.  
Our measures for hardware prices are the average prices across brands, as is again 
similar to prior literature (LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001; Shankar and Bayus 
2003). For three markets, our measure for price shows specific limitations. In the Compact 
Disc market, we were unable to obtain hardware prices from the U.K. As we assume the 
U.K. market has undergone a similar CD player price pattern as the U.S. ± e.g. because CD 
player brands are global players with global manufacturing capacity that determines their 
prices ± we have included the U.S. CD player price as a proxy. In the i-Mode market, we 
included the average price of i-Mode handsets, which does not include access fees, for 
which we could not obtain data. In the Internet (WWW) market, we included the average 
price of a (fax-) modem, as that is the hardware component, and made abstraction of the 
average price of Internet access. 
We display all our data graphically in the results section below (Figure 2.1), 
where series have been normalized by dividing the values by the maximum value in the 
series. This normalization enables better comparison and graphical conclusions, while also 
retaining confidentiality required to obtain some of the data.  
 
2.4  Empirical Analysis 
One can conceive of two ways in which one can empirically analyze the 
theoretical framework conceived above. First, one can focus on the concept of takeoff and 
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contrast takeoff of hardware sales with takeoff of software availability. Second, one can 
conceptualize a time series model, based upon the notion of Granger causality. We apply 
both techniques and discuss each in turn. We end with relating our findings to the 
historical industry development, lending further credence to the pattern we found. 
 
 
2.4.1  Takeoff Analysis 
This section explores takeoff in indirect network effects markets. It first derives 
the concept of takeoff and develops its usefulness in empirically examining the theory 
derived above. Then it presents the measurement of takeoff, after which it turns to our 
findings. 
 
Conceptual  
Initially, sales of a new product are generally flat. After some time, a critical 
mass7 of adopters may develop, causing sales to show a distinct takeoff (Golder and Tellis 
1997; Rohlfs 2001; Shapiro and Varian 1998). The concept of critical mass was born in 
physics, where it refers to the point of no return, after which nuclear fision becomes self-
sustaining, and it has subsequently been adopted in sociology, where it refers to the 
minimum level of activity needed to make an activity self-sustaining (Schelling 1978). 
Thus, new product takeoff is followed by rapid self-sustaining growth, in which additional 
consumers adopt the new technology, until the market is saturated and sales show a decline 
(Golder and Tellis 2004). Hardware sales takeoff has been recognized as an important 
phenomenon in the marketing literature (Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Golder and Tellis 
1997; Tellis, Stremersch, and Yin 2003). 
Scholars have argued that the critical mass concept ± and thus by consequence, 
takeoff ± is pronounced in markets that are strongly influenced by interdependence of 
players ± as is the case in system markets (Andreozzi 2004; Granovetter 1978; Valente 
1995). This fits diffusion literature in marketing that has found that diffusion curves are 
more pronouncedly S-shaped in markets with competing standards (Van den Bulte 2000; 
Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004).  
                                                          
7 Threshold and critical mass are terms that are used interchangeably in the sociology and economics 
literatures (Witt 1997, Macy 1991). For clarity, we consistently use the term critical mass. 
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In markets with direct network effects, the utility of the product to consumers 
depends upon the number of prior adopters. Thus, the critical mass is a certain number of 
adopters (Katz and Shapiro 1986a). In markets with indirect network effects, there is 
interdependence, between the utility an adopter derives from the system, and the number 
of other adopters of the system, because of the availability of complementary products 
(Katz and Shapiro 1986a; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004). Thus, markets with 
indirect network effects exhibit critical mass not only in consumer adoption of hardware 
(i.e., the demand side), but also in the amount of available software (i.e., the supply side). 
Therefore, software availability may show a pattern similar to hardware sales. At first, 
software companies may balk at providing software, because they doubt the viability of the 
new technology. After some time, a critical mass of software availability may develop and 
software availability will show a distinct takeoff. Prior business analysts (e.g. Midgette 
1997; Tam 2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994) and academics (e.g. Church and Gandal 
1992a) have made reference to such phenomenon without examining it in depth. 
The takeoff in both hardware sales and software availability are important events 
LQLQGLUHFWQHWZRUNHIIHFWVPDUNHWVLQYLHZRIWKH³FKLFNHQ-and-HJJ´SDUDGR[7KHRUGHURI
takeoff of hardware sales and software availability may provide insight into the temporal 
pattern of indirect network effects. As we stipulated in our theoretical framework, prior 
theory is ex ante indeterminate as to what the temporal pattern may be, or in popular terms, 
what comes first: the chicken or the egg? The empirical study of the temporal order in 
which takeoff of software availability and hardware sales occur may provide a preliminary 
answer.  
 
Measurement 
Most prior research has identified takeoff using a heuristic, much like the rules 
used by Golder and Tellis (1997), Stremersch and Tellis (2004), and Tellis, Stremersch and 
Yin (2003) (for the only exception, see Agarwal and Bayus (2002)). The spirit of these 
rules was to call takeoff the first time hardware sales crossed a boundary growth 
percentage, taking into account the base sales (past sales, as in Golder and Tellis (1997) or 
penetration, as in Stremersch and Tellis (2004) and Tellis, Stremersch and Yin (2003)). 
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The reason is that growth of 400% is not that significant when it entails unit sales growth 
from 100 to 500 units, while it is when it entails unit sales growth from 50,000 to 250,000.  
There are two issues we face in applying these rules to our data that encompass 
hardware sales as well as software availability. First, there is no natural base against which 
to benchmark growth of software availability. For instance, 10,000 i-Mode sites may 
actually be very high, while 10,000 Internet hosts may be extremely low. Second, we have 
no prior guidance whether the growth percentages set forth by these prior studies actually 
make sense for software availability, as they were developed as heuristics for consumer 
durable sales. 
We define takeoff of hardware sales as the year in which the ratio of change in the 
growth of sales relative to base sales reaches its maximum before the inflection point in 
hardware sales. To clarify, change in sales growth is akin to acceleration in sales and is 
equal to the second difference in sales. Thus, takeoff is the year in which the ratio of the 
second difference in hardware sales to hardware sales itself is at its maximum. Note that 
this rule is similar in spirit to the rule provided in the appendix of Golder and Tellis (1997). 
We define takeoff in software availability, analogously, as the year in which the ratio of 
change in the growth of software availability relative to base software availability reaches 
its maximum before the inflection point in software availability. 
Earlier studies on takeoff contain four of our nine series on hardware sales. Our 
identification of the year of takeoff is identical or very similar to that of prior studies in 
three cases out of four (for CD player sales identical to Tellis, Stremersch and Yin (2003); 
for CD-ROM sales identical to Golder and Tellis (1997) and for Black & White Television 
Set sales 1 year earlier than Golder and Tellis (1997)). These results provide face validity 
to our method.  For Color Television Set sales, our identification of takeoff is 6 years 
earlier than that of Golder and Tellis (1997). These earlier studies also found that takeoff 
identified through their heuristic coincided with that from visual inspection in more than 
90% of the cases. In our case, the heuristic rule for takeoff matches with visual inspection 
in all cases (see Figure 2.1). 
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Table 2.3: Takeoff Analysis Results 
 
  Hardware Sales  Software Availability 
Market Intro-
duction 
Year 
Takeoff 
Year 
Time to 
Takeoff 
(in years) 
Software 
Availability 
at Hardware 
Sales Takeoff 
  Takeoff 
Year 
Time to 
Takeoff 
(in years) 
Hardware 
Sales at 
Software 
Availability 
Takeoff 
B&W 
Television 
1939 1947 8 7 stations  
on air 
 1948 9 970,000 unit 
sales 
         
Compact 
Disc 
1983 1985 2 5,000 titles  1988 5 770,000 unit 
sales 
         
CD-ROM 1985 1990 5 1,522 titles  1988 3 20,000 unit 
sales 
         
Color 
Television 
1954 1956 2 560 hours  
in color 
 1956 2 100,000 unit 
sales 
         
DVD 1997 1999 2 3,084 titles  1999 2 3,095,654 
unit sales 
         
Gameboy 1989 1991 2 156 games  1991 2 4.4 mln unit 
sales 
         
i-Mode 1999 2000 1 10,000 sites  2001 2 23,039,000 
subscribers 
         
Internet 
(WWW) 
1991 1994 3 2,217,000 
hosts 
 1995 4 25 mln 
subscribers 
         
Laserdisc 1981 1983 2 649 titles  1985 4 229,012 unit 
sales 
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Findings 
Table 2.3 provides an overview of the takeoff in all markets, while Figure 2.1 
displays them graphically. Comparing columns 4 and 7 of Table 2.3 and the arrows in 
Figure 2.1, shows that for five out of nine markets (Black & White TV, Compact Disc, i-
Mode, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc), hardware sales take off before software 
availability does. For three out of nine markets (Color TV, DVD, and Gameboy), hardware 
sales take off at the same time as software availability does. For one market out of nine 
(CD-ROM), hardware sales take off after software availability has taken off. Table 2.3 also 
shows in columns 5 and 8 the amount of available software when hardware sales took off 
and the level of hardware sales when software availability took off. 
We can conclude that, for the nine markets we examined, hardware sales takeoff 
leads or coincides with software availability takeoff (except in the case of CD-ROM). 
Moreover, Table 2.3 shows that hardware sales can take off at very low levels of software 
availability. For instance, we find that sales of television sets took off with only 7 stations 
on air. This level is very low compared to over a 1,000 TV stations today. It is also low 
compared to the 2,000+ radio stations in 1947 (the year of takeoff for Black & White TV 
sets). Color TV took off with even remarkably less software ± again admittedly judgmental 
± namely 560 hours a year broadcast in color for the entire United States. 
However, the analysis of takeoffs provides only a limited picture on indirect 
network effects in these markets for several reasons. First, even though we find a clear 
temporal pattern between takeoffs, it does not prove that indirect network effects actually 
exist in these markets. Second, one has to be cautious regarding the temporal pattern we 
find. As our and prior research shows (e.g. Tellis, Stremersch and Yin 2003), uncertainty 
of several years may surround identification of takeoff. Thus, a difference of one year 
between the takeoff in hardware sales and the takeoff in software availability is statistically 
not very meaningful. Third, while drops in hardware price seem to coincide with takeoff in 
hardware sales (similar to Golder and Tellis 1997), our takeoff analysis is a pure bivariate 
exercise into the temporal pattern of takeoffs. Given all these limitations, our takeoff 
analysis should be interpreted with caution. To address these limitations, we next develop 
a more sophisticated econometric time series model to examine indirect network effects. 
This time series analysis provides other benefits. It allows us to examine the temporal 
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pattern of indirect network effects, while taking the entire history of a market into account, 
rather than merely one point that is takeoff. Also, it allows us to include other variables 
that may affect hardware sales, such as past hardware sales and hardware price.   
 
2.4.2  Time Series Analysis 
This section develops a time series analysis to examine indirect network effects 
and its temporal pattern. It first conceptualizes the modeling framework, after which it 
turns to the model specification. It then presents the findings from estimating the model 
and discusses some further analyses we conducted. 
 
Conceptual 
If one wishes to empirically examine the temporal pattern in indirect network 
effects with aggregate-level secondary data, several considerations should guide the model 
specification.  
First, as we test the model on actual, aggregate-level market data, we need to 
make some further simplifications to the theory. We do not have data on consumer utility, 
because such data can only be obtained through experiments, surveys or panels. We also 
do not have data on the profits software companies expect. Such data would be hard to 
gather using any empirical methodology. Regarding price, one often has data on only the 
hardware price and not on the software price. Software price is often complex and thus it is 
difficult to obtain reliable software price information. Yet, it is often of minor importance 
and its omission may not seriously compromise conclusions of the model. We also do not 
have information on software costs, because it is proprietary to software firms. Thus, the 
empirical model one would wish to specify to empirically examine indirect network effects 
on secondary data reduces to the model in Figure 2.2. This model assumes ± rather than 
tests ± that the influence of software availability and hardware price on hardware sales 
RFFXUVWKURXJKFRQVXPHUV¶XWLOLW\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVZKLOHLWDOVRDVVXPHV± rather than tests ± 
that the influence of past hardware installed base and past software availability on future 
VRIWZDUHDYDLODELOLW\RFFXUVWKURXJKVRIWZDUHSURYLGHUV¶SURILWFRQVLGHUDWLRQV,QDGGLWLRQ
it makes abstraction of both software costs and software prices. 
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Figure 2.2: Graphical Illustration of the Sample 
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Second, given our interest in the temporal pattern of indirect network effects, we 
wish to refer to the notion of Granger causality (Granger 1969). A process xt is said to 
Granger cause a process yt if future values of yt can be better predicted using both the past 
values of process xt and process yt, than merely the past values of the process yt. Or in 
mathematical formulation, one says that xt does not Granger cause yt if: 
 
f (yt| yt-1,xt-1) = f (yt|yt-1)               (1) 
 
In such case, lagged values of xt do not add any information to the explanation of 
the movements in yt, beyond the past of yt itself. The principle of Granger causality rests 
on the extent to which a process xt is leading a process yt. To include this notion of Granger 
causality in our model specification, we lag all independent variables in our models. 
Third, one may expect (see Figure 2.1) non-linearities. Therefore, we should use a log 
transformation to linearize the model in most, if not all, cases. 
Fourth, our model is a growth model and thus as time passes, one may expect that 
the processes we study may approach a certain maximum value (Franses 1998). For this 
reason, our model also needs to capture a non-linear trend, which we can easily obtain by 
including a linear trend in log-transformed data. Prior network effects models also include 
a trend (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Gandal 1994; Shy 2001). We next formally 
specify our model based on these considerations.  
 
Model 
We specify the following model:  
 
1 1 1log( ) *log( ) *log( ) *log( ) *
H H S H
t t t t tS S A P tD E J U G H                   (2) 
 
1 1log( ) *log( ) *log( ) *
S S H
t t t tA A IB tX O K W ]                  (3) 
In which: HtS is hardware sales at time t, 
S
tA is software availability at time t, 
H
tP is price of the hardware at time t, 
H
tIB is hardware installed base at time t, Į and ȣ 
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are intercepts, while į and Ĳcapture the time trend. This model specification is a flexible 
time series model, which we estimate for each market separately, using seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR). 
 
Findings 
Table 2.4 shows the results from estimating equations (2) and (3). The fit statistics 
for all models are satisfactory. The adjusted R2 ranges from 0.75 to 0.99. The models also 
seem to behave well, because there is only one effect that seems implausible, namely the 
negative coefficient for past software availability on future hardware sales, in the Gameboy 
market. We next discuss the results. 
Theoretically, the most interesting result is that we find that past hardware 
installed base significantly and positively affects ± ³OHDGV´LQ*UDQJHUWHUPLQRORJ\± future 
software availability in 5 of the 9 markets we examined: Black & White TV, Compact 
Disc, Gameboy, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc. Only one of these markets shows the 
presence of both demand- and supply-side indirect network effects: Compact Disc. None 
of the markets we study show only demand-side indirect network effects. This result also 
allows to conclude that ± based on the operationalization of indirect network effects 
commonly used in the literature and applied in our model through the quantity of available 
software ± demand-and supply-side indirect network effects are less pervasive in the 
markets we examined than commonly assumed. We graphically represent our results in 
Figure 2.3. 
These results are consistent with our earlier findings on takeoff. Of the five 
markets in which we found supply-side indirect network effects ± LQ *UDQJHU¶s 
WHUPLQRORJ\LQZKLFKKDUGZDUHLQVWDOOHGEDVH³OHDGV´VRIWZDUHDYDLODELOLW\± four (Black 
& White TV, Compact Disc, Internet (WWW), and Laserdisc) show an earlier takeoff of 
hardware sales than of software availability. On the other hand, in markets where the time 
series analysis did not show evidence of indirect network effects, the pattern is diverse: the 
takeoff of hardware sales of CD-ROM lagged the takeoff of CD-ROM software 
availability; the takeoff of hardware sales and the takeoff of software availability coincided 
in the cases of Color TV and DVD; the takeoff of hardware sales preceded the takeoff in 
software availability in one case, i-Mode. 
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Table 2.4: Time Series Analysis Results 
 
 Black & White TV Compact Disc CD-ROM 
 log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  
Intercept 13.38*** 
(4.05) 
-0.71 
(0.62) 
1.40** 
(0.57) 
6.15*** 
(0.38) 
3.10 
(10.21) 
1.41 
(1.62) 
Time 0.00 
(0.07) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
-0.24*** 
(0.02) 
0.23*** 
(0.02) 
0.97 
(0.58) 
-0.13 
(0.35) 
)log( 1
H
tS   
0.69*** 
(0.11) 
 0.51*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.09 
(0.11) 
 
)log( 1
S
tA   
-0.39 
(0.32) 
0.15 
(0.24) 
0.77*** 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.13 
(0.65) 
0.95*** 
(0.25) 
)log( 1
H
tIB   
 0.22*** 
(0.07) 
 0.09* 
(0.05) 
 0.03 
(0.25) 
)log( 1
H
tP   
-1.28 
(0.87) 
 -0.04 
(0.08) 
 0.54 
(1.37) 
 
       
Adj R-squared 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.96 
# observations 
11 11 11 11 8 8 
 
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.10 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 2.4: Time Series Analysis Results (ctd.) 
 
 Color TV DVD Gameboy 
 log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  
Intercept -7.92 
(13.18) 
4.41*** 
(1.00) 
7.04*** 
(1.88) 
-10.65* 
(5.13) 
-2.69 
(14.89) 
4.57*** 
(0.42) 
Time 0.51** 
(0.20) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.19 
(0.31) 
0.19*** 
(0.04) 
)log( 1
H
tS   
0.54* 
(0.28) 
 0.66** 
(0.26) 
 0.58 
(0.44) 
 
)log( 1
S
tA   
-0.87 
(0.60) 
-0.07 
(0.40) 
-0.42** 
(0.18) 
-0.32 
(0.24) 
0.83 
(0.47) 
0.38* 
(0.18) 
)log( 1
H
tIB   
 0.14 
(0.19) 
 1.11** 
(0.41) 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
)log( 1
H
tP   
2.69 
(2.38) 
 -0.13 
(0.61) 
 0.72 
(1.88) 
 
       
Adj R-squared 0.91 0.92 0.77 0.99 0.99 0.99 
# observations 
11 11 15 15 7 7 
 
***: p < 0.01; **: p < 0.05; *: p < 0.10 (two-sided tests). 
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Table 2.4: Time Series Analysis Results (ctd.) 
 
 i-Mode Internet (WWW) Laser Disc 
 log( )HtS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  log( )
H
tS  log( )
S
tA  
Intercept 51.54 
(46.25) 
1.60*** 
(0.22) 
-60.16 
(50.58) 
-0.43 
(1.92) 
-4.69 
(4.90) 
0.33 
(0.69) 
Time -0.30 
(1.70) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.36 
(0.48) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.13*** 
(0.03) 
)log( 1
H
tS   
-0.25 
(2.08) 
 0.86* 
(0.48) 
 0.47* 
(0.23) 
 
)log( 1
S
tA   
3.95 
(20.99) 
0.74 
(0.69) 
1.34 
(1.25) 
-0.04 
(0.41) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
-0.28 
(0.25) 
)log( 1
H
tIB   
 -0.06 
(0.09) 
 0.96** 
(0.36) 
 0.70*** 
(0.19) 
)log( 1
H
tP   
-4.11 
(4.21) 
 8.57 
(6.94) 
 0.75 
(0.43) 
 
       
Adj R-squared 0.82 0.98 0.75 0.99 0.99 0.99 
# observations 
6 6 11 11 9 9 
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Figure 2.3: Indirect Network Effects in Nine Markets 
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We next discuss the effects of the other variables we included. As one would 
expect, many ± Black&White TV, Compact Disc, Color TV, Gameboy, Internet (WWW) 
and Laserdisc ± of our markets show a positive influence of past hardware sales on future 
hardware sales, either due to contagion or other effects, such as inertia. Contrary to what 
one would expect hardware price does not play a major role in hardware sales growth. 
However, prior research has presented similar findings (Bayus, Kang and Agarwal 2006). 
The explanation for these results may be that in many of the markets we study, hardware 
price is generally not prohibitive. The average hardware price for the markets we study, at 
introduction, was $570. Probably, when one considers more expensive devices the impact 
of price will be more pronounced. Finally, we find that in two markets (CD-ROM, and 
DVD) the effect of past software availability on future software availability is positive and 
VLJQLILFDQW FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH ³QHWZRUN´ HIIHFW K\SRWKHVLV ,Q WKH RWKHU PDUNHWV WKH
coefficient is not significant, either because past software availability does not affect future 
software availability, or because past software availability affects future software 
DYDLODELOLW\ ERWK SRVLWLYHO\ WKH ³QHWZRUN´ HIIHFW DQG QHJDWLYHO\ WKH ³FRPSHWLWLRQ´
effect), or because past software availability affects future software availability in a much 
more complex pattern than we modeled. 
 
2.4.3  Further Analyses 
We conducted several other analyses to see how changes to the model may affect 
our conclusions. 
First, one could claim that it would be better to work in first differences. 
However, econometric theory cannot offer clarity whether this approach is appropriate in 
our case, as conducting unit root tests is not informative given the limited number of data 
points (Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock 1996; Franses 1998). The estimates for the lagged 
terms of the models in equations (2) and (3) (see Table 2.4) suggest that differencing may 
be inappropriate. The reason is that these estimates are far from 1, while differencing 
would impose these parameters to be equal to 1. Prior authors in the indirect network 
effects literature typically do not difference either, with the exception of Gandal, Kende 
and Rob (2000), who use it to check the robustness of their model. Nonetheless, we 
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decided to conduct these analyses and compare the estimates with our own from estimating 
the model in equations (2) and (3).  
Our findings were the following. First, we found weaker (= insignificant or 
negative) evidence of indirect network effects, for supply-side indirect network effects in 
the case of Black & White TV and Internet (WWW), for demand-side indirect network 
effects in the case of Compact Disc player. We found stronger evidence of indirect 
network effects, for supply-side indirect network effects in the case of Color TV and for 
demand-side indirect network effects in the case of CD-ROM. Second, we found many 
effects to be implausible. We found one additional case (Compact Disc) in which indirect 
network effects were found to be negative and two cases (CD-ROM and Internet (WWW)) 
in which past hardware sales growth has a negative effect on future hardware sales growth. 
These findings hint that working in first differences is inappropriate. 
Second, we conducted many checks common in time series analysis. As Franses 
(2005) would categorize our model as a descriptive model, we focused our diagnostic tests 
on residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity, and omitted variables. These tests revealed 
relatively few problems, considering the complexity of our model and the small number of 
observations. Thus, none of these tests revealed a need for revisions to our model 
specification. 
 
2.4.4  Historical Industry Analysis 
We next describe each market historically, as it relates to our findings. 
 
Compact Disc. We found strong demand- and supply-side indirect network effects 
in the Compact Disc market. This market has also been empirically examined the most. 
Our findings are in line with prior findings. LeNagard-Assayag and Manceau (2001) find 
WKDWVRIWZDUHDYDLODELOLW\KDVDSRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VXWLOLW\DQG
the hardware installed base has a positive and significant effect on software availability. 
Basu, Mazumdar and Raj (2003) find that software availability has a significant positive 
effect on hardware prices. Gandal, Kende and Rob (2000) find that software availability 
has a positive and significant effect on hardware sales and hardware sales have a positive 
(but not significant) effect on software availability. 
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Black & White TV. We found ± both in the takeoff and the time series analysis ± 
that in this market hardware leads software. The reason for these effects may lie in the 
massive investments involved in starting a TV station. It required large outside revenue 
during the initial years of massive losses. Therefore, many of the early stations were 
owned by television set manufacturers (e.g. GE and RCA). The revenues they used to 
sponsor these early TV stations were generated by sales of TV sets (Sterling and Kittross 
2002). Therefore, the significant and positive effect of hardware installed base on software 
availability need not come as a surprise. On the other hand, the sales of TV sets was not 
much affected by the quantity of software available (as evidenced by the results of our time 
series analysis), but rather by the technological appeal of television. Television was such a 
revolutionary new product, that families gave their new TV set a dominant location in their 
living room and for the first couple of weeks, all members of the family marveled at the 
phenomenon (Sterling and Kittross 2002). 
Gameboy. We found that in the Gameboy market hardware leads ± though the 
takeoff analysis shows simultaneous takeoffs in hardware sales and software availability, 
the time series analysis shows that past hardware installed base positively affects future 
software availability ± and positively affects software availability. Independent software 
providers respond strongly to the adoption of hardware (Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 
2004), as was the case with Gameboy. Therefore, our finding that availability of Gameboy 
games grew as more consumers had adopted the Gameboy seems logical. However, why 
did consumers not react to a growing catalog of Gameboy games? The answer: TETRIS! 
Tetris is considered to have been a killer application for the Gameboy (Allen 2003; Rowe 
1999). Tens of millions of copies of Tetris have been sold since it was introduced 
simultaneously with the introduction of the Gameboy. It was often bundled with the 
Gameboy hardware itself. Thus, rather than the evolution in the full catalog of titles 
available for Gameboy, the availability of one game, Tetris, fueled Gameboy growth. 
Internet (WWW). We found ± both in the takeoff and the time series analysis ± 
that in the Internet (WWW) market hardware leads software. Again these findings seem 
logical when one considers the industry evolution. First, Internet users can easily become a 
software provider by the provision of on-line content (e.g. web pages). Therefore, a 
growing installed base of users will automatically also lead to a growing base of software 
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providers and thus more Internet hosts (e.g. web servers providing web pages). On the 
other hand, why do we not find that Internet content stimulates growth in Internet (WWW) 
adoption? In the first year, the World Wide Web (WWW) already had 80,000 hosts that 
provided millions of web pages to consumers, more than a single human can possibly read 
in a lifetime. Also, people used Internet also for other types of communication. E-mail 
predated the birth of the World Wide Web (WWW) and was already a very important 
application right at the start of the World Wide Web (WWW). 
Laserdisc.  We found ± both in the takeoff and the time series analysis ± that in 
the Laserdisc market hardware leads software. The reason may be very similar to the 
history of the Black & White TV. The most important provider of Laserdisc titles was the 
leading manufacturer of Laserdisc players (Pioneer), because Laserdisc publishing entailed 
a substantial start-up investment (McClure 1992, 1993a and 1993b; McGowan 1994). 
Pioneer used hardware sales as a measure for how strong or weak the Laserdisc market 
was, and accordingly, released a fitting number of titles on Laserdisc. Therefore, we find 
that past hardware installed base positively affects future software availability. On the 
other hand, the number of titles available does not affect future hardware sales. This is 
most likely because most Laserdisc titles released in the 1980s (the time period we study) 
are not very different from their VHS counterpart, lacking digital sound, widescreen, and 
H[WUD¶V 'LFN  7KH SURYLVLRQ RI VXFK WLWOHV GLG QRW SURYLGH ZRXOG-be Laserdisc 
owners with an opportunity to exploit Laserdisc players to their fullest potential. Thus, it 
gave would-be consumers little reason to purchase a Laserdisc player. Until 1993, 
Laserdisc titles could only be bought and could not be rented (McClure 1993a), which also 
made consumers less likely to react to an increase in title availability. 
 CD-ROM. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between software 
availability and hardware sales in the CD-ROM market. We also find that it is the only 
market where software availability takes off before hardware sales take off. These findings 
are in line with the historical development of the CD-ROM market. The early support of 
Microsoft for the CD-ROM is well-NQRZQDQG WKHRXWFU\ RI%LOO*DWHV ³, KDYHQR LGHD
what the future will bring for the CD-ROM, but I am willing to invest 1 billion dollars just 
WR ILQG RXW´ LV QRWRULRXV 0LFURVRIW DOVR KRVWHG WKH ILUVW &'-ROM conferences and 
developed networks with other content and software providers to write for the CD-ROM 
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medium. Microsoft did all this, before a substantial hardware installed base developed. On 
the other hand, the evolution in hardware sales has been independent from that of software 
availability, probably due to technological compatibility issues. The first Multimedia PC 
specifications were only announced at the start of the 1990s ± CD-ROM was introduced in 
1985 ± which also set a standard for connecting CD-ROM drives to IBM-FRPSDWLEOH3&¶V
7KDW HDVHG FXVWRPHUV¶ IHDUV DERXW LQFRPSDWLELOLW\ $IWHU \HDUV RI DQWLFLSDWLRQ WKH &'-
ROM was finally making its way into the home (Alpert 1992). 
Color Television. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between 
software availability and hardware sales in the Color TV market. There may be two major 
reasons for this result. First, during the first ten years of color broadcasting, NBC was the 
only vivid supporter of color broadcasting among the major networks. In 1961, CBS and 
ABC provided their viewers with zero hours of color broadcasting (Ducey and Fratrik 
1989). In 1964, NBC would still deliver 95% of all color broadcasting (Ducey and Fratrik 
1989). Because NBC was the only supporter among the main national broadcasters, 
expansion in color broadcasting (by NBC alone) may not have had a major effect on 
consumers. Second, networks had to invest a massive 30 to 40 million dollars (1960 
dollars!) to purchase the required color equipment, which still excluded additional 
investments in new graphics, costumes, sets and so on, that were needed as well when 
going color (Sterling and Kittross 2002). On the other hand, broadcasters did not perceive 
a major upside of Color TV that would match this massive investment. Broadcasters, such 
as ABC and CBS did not expect it to expand the installed base of viewers or increase the 
number of hours viewers watched television. Therefore, there was little incentive to react 
to growing color television set sales, with increasing color broadcasting, even more as the 
technology was backward compatible with black-and-white broadcasting. It was only 
when the majority of advertising was recorded in color that broadcasters started to invest a 
mass in color broadcasting equipment (Sterling and Kittross 2002). 
DVD. Also for DVD we found no evidence of a significant relationship between 
software availability and hardware sales. Also, Dranove and Gandal (2003) examined the 
DVD market. They use two proxies for software availability in the DVD market: 1) when a 
particular studio committed to releasing movies on DVD, and 2) the percentage of US box-
office top 100 movies released on DVD. Only one (percentage of US box-office top 100 
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films released on DVD) of the two proxies has a positive and significant effect on 
hardware sales. Thus, the reason why we do not find significant demand-side indirect 
network effects may be due to the killer application phenomenon cited earlier when we 
discussed Gameboy history. Consumers may only care about the top titles and on which 
format they appear, rather than the entire catalog of movies supporting a format. The 
reason why we do not find supply-side indirect network effects may be due to the immense 
and early support the DVD technology received from the movie studios (Gandal 2002). 
Within 18 months after the introduction of the DVD format, all the major movie studios 
had adopted the DVD format (Dranove and Gandal 2003) and additional hardware sales 
therefore had no longer any impact on the major movie studios decision to adopt the new 
DVD technology, making the supply of software largely independent of hardware sales.  
i-Mode. Also for i-Mode, we do not find any demand- or supply-side indirect 
network effects. NTT DoCoMo the parent of i-Mode, positioned i-Mode as essentially an 
extension of pre-existing mobile phone services (Ratliff 2002); this may well have 
contributed to the fact that consumers do not seem to react to increases in the availability 
of i-Mode services. New hardware characteristics like a built-in camera, and i-0RGH¶V
³DOZD\VRQ´IHDWXUHPD\KDYHEHHQWKHPDLQGLYHUVEHKLQGKDUGZDUHVDOHVUDWKHUWKDQWKH
total number of i-Mode sites. i-Mode uses C-HTML (Compact Hyper-Text Markup 
Language), a form of HTML with a reduced instruction set, which eases the transition for 
content providers from their already existing HTML web sites to i-Mode-ready content 
(Ratliff 2002). This low barrier to entry makes is very easy and relatively profitable for 
content providers to render their services on i-Mode handsets. With the required up-front 
investment to provide i-Mode services being so small, service providers require only a 
small number of i-Mode users to turn a profit. This fact may make their decision to provide 
i-Mode services largely independent of hardware adoption by consumers. 
 
2.5  Discussion 
This section summarizes our findings and discusses their implications and 
limitations.  
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2.5.1  Summary of Findings 
This study has two main findings. First, we find that indirect network effects as 
commonly operationalized are less pervasive in the examined markets than expected on the 
EDVLVRISULRUOLWHUDWXUH7KLVILQGLQJFRQWUDVWVVKDUSO\ZLWKWKH³FXUUHQWZLVGRP´WKDWWKH
amount of available software is of critical importance to hardware sales growth (e.g. 
Church and Gandal 1992a; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 1986a and 
1994).  
Second, in most of the markets we examined, hardware sales lead software 
availability, while the reverse almost never happens. These findings illuminate the 
temporal pattern of indirect network effects, underlying the chicken-and-egg paradox, 
which was never empirically examined before. They contradict the widely held view that 
software availability should lead hardware sales (Bayus 1987; Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; 
Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Midgette 1997; Sengupta 1998; Tam 
2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994).  
While there may be many reasons underlying our results ± including sampling 
issues and method artifacts ± the most credible, given the variation in the markets 
examined and the consistency of our findings across methods (takeoff ± time series ± 
historical case detail), is that a considerable segment of consumers makes decisions to buy 
hardware relatively independently of the quantity of software that is available. Thus a 
critical mass of hardware adopters may gather before a critical mass of software titles is 
available. One probable reason may be the snob appeal of owning new hardware (Tellis, 
Stremersch and Yin 2003). Other reasons may be cascade effects that prompt consumers to 
buy new hardware because of their popularity rather than their intrinsic utility (Golder and 
Tellis 2004) or the fact that users can create their own content after buying the hardware. It 
may also be that a killer application is available, by which a sizeable consumer segment 
must own the hardware, regardless of the sheer number of applications available (Frels, 
Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Williams 2002). 
 
2.5.2  Implications 
To firms, the most important implication is that hardware manufacturers should 
not overstate the importance of software quantity. Rather, hardware manufacturers should 
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take their fate into their own hands and produce high quality technology with a few (not 
necessarily many) exciting applications, rather than aiming for very wide availability of a 
huge library of software. For instance, our results contradict previous calls for hardware 
manufacturers to pay a lot (in the form of kickbacks and subsidies) to get software 
companies to provide a huge library of titles. 
To public policy, our study is relevant towards government intervention in 
indirect network effects markets. Often, governments or public institutions are under 
pressure to intervene in indirect network effects markets to improve coordination between 
hardware and software companies. Critics claim that the lack of coordination especially in 
terms of availability of software can slow down the takeoff of the new technology. This 
claim is hard to maintain in view of our findings. In contrast, we find that in many markets, 
hardware sales take off before software availability does and, in some markets, at very 
limited quantities of available software. We also found in our time series that hardware 
sales mostly lead software availability, instead of software availability leading hardware 
installed base. Therefore, an important argument for government intervention fades. On the 
other hand, if intervention were necessary, it might take the form of subsidizing the cost of 
new hardware. While such subsidies may not be reasonable for entertainment products, 
they might be appealing for products with social benefits, such as electric or hydrogen 
powered cars. 
To academics, the weak evidence we found ± using traditional operationalizations 
of indirect network effects, based on a very long tradition in economics (Church and 
Gandal 1992a and 1992b; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000) ± fits into new conceptualizations 
of indirect network effects that may prove more powerful. A first conceptualization is to 
examine software quality, rather than quantity. Our case detail already illustrated that in 
some cases (e.g. Tetris in the case of Gameboy), quantity does not matter, but the presence 
of killer applications does. There is very little scholarly research that examines the role of 
killer applications, while the phenomenon is deemed very important, especially in certain 
industries, such as the video game console market. A second conceptualization may 
revolve around the notion that network effects may be more restricted in scope than 
previously assumed (Tucker 2006). As such, the entire catalog of software may not be 
relevant to consumers, but only a very small selection of it may be (e.g. a genre). A third 
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conceptualization may revolve around the notion of thresholds. Software availability may 
need to cross a threshold at introduction to make the technology credible. Research that 
extends indirect network effects in these directions may be very impactful. 
 
2.5.3  Limitations 
This paper examines a complex phenomenon in an area in which data are very 
scarce. It is easy to point at its limitations, which we hope future research will address.  
First, due to data limitations, we could not include other important explanatory variables, 
such as software price, software costs, software and hardware entry, nor could we address 
possible threshold effects (also see Bayus 1987). We were also unable to test the 
underlying theoretical mechanisms ± FRQVXPHUV¶ XWLOLW\ FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DQG VRIWZDUH
SURYLGHUV¶SURILWDELOLW\FRQVLGHUDWLRQV± of our model.  
Second, we study only nine network markets. Although this is a relatively small 
sample, it compares favorably with prior studies in this area that examined only one or two 
markets.  
Third, we study only surviving technologies. Future research that studies the role 
of indirect network effects in new technology failure would be interesting.  
Fourth, we focused on countries that can generally be considered lead countries in 
the given technology. It would be interesting to examine if uncertainty from indirect 
network effects is lower in lag countries than in lead countries. Research that focuses on 
indirect network effects in an international setting would be most fruitful. 
Fifth, the role of consumer expectations is of great importance in indirect network 
effects markets. However, it is not included in our model due to data limitations. 
Incorporating consumer expectations in future models may provide new insights. 
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Appendix: Data 
 
Network 
Market Series Operationalization 
B&W 
Television 
Hardware Sales 
Retail Unit Sales of B&W Television Sets 
to Consumers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of B&W 
Television Sets to Consumers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of B&WTV Set 
 Software Availability Number of TV Stations on Air 
Compact Disc 
Hardware Sales 
Retail Unit Sales of Compact Disc Players 
to Consumers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Compact 
Disc Players to Consumers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of CD Player 
 Software Availability Number of Compact Disc Titles in Catalog 
CD-ROM 
Hardware Sales 
Retail Unit Sales of CD-ROM Drives to 
Consumers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of CD-ROM 
Drives to Consumers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of CD-ROM Drive 
 Software Availability Number of CD-ROM Titles in Catalog 
Color 
Television 
Hardware Sales 
Retail Unit Sales of Color Television Sets 
to Consumers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Color 
Television Sets to Consumers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of Color TV Set 
 Software Availability 
Number of Hours Broadcasted in Color 
(all stations) 
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Appendix: Data (ctd.) 
 
Network 
Market 
Time 
Period Country Data source 
B&W 
Television 
1946-1957 U.S. 
The Broadcasting Yearbook 
 
1946-1957 U.S. 
Own derivation 
 
 1946-1957 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 1945-1957 U.S. The Broadcasting Yearbook and FCC 
Compact Disc 
1983-1994 U.K. 
Philips Consumer Electronics 
 
1983-1994 U.K. 
Own derivation 
 
 1983-1994 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 1983-1994 U.K. The British Phonographic Industry 
CD-ROM 
1985-1993 U.S. 
Peter Golder 
 
1985-1993 U.S. 
Own derivation 
 
 1985-1993 U.S. Peter Golder 
 1985-1993 U.S. CD-ROM Directory 
Color 
Television 
1954-1965 U.S. Consumer Electronics Association 
1954-1965 U.S. 
 
Own derivation 
 
 1954-1965 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 1954-1965 U.S. 
Ducey and Fratrik (1989) 
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Appendix: Data (ctd.) 
 
Network 
Market Series Operationalization 
DVD 
Hardware Sales Number of DVD Players Shipped to Dealers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Number of DVD Players Shipped to 
Dealers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of DVD Player 
 Software Availability Number of DVD Titles in Catalog 
   
 
Gameboy 
Hardware Sales Retail Unit Sales of Gameboy to Consumers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Retail Unit Sales of Gameboy to 
Consumers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of Gameboy Player 
 Software Availability 
Number of Gameboy Games Available to 
Consumers 
 
i-Mode8 
Hardware Sales Number of New i-Mode Subscribers 
Hardware Installed Base Total Number of i-Mode Subscribers 
 Hardware Price Average Price of Advertised i-Mode Handset 
 Software Availability Number of Independent i-Mode Sites 
   
 
Internet 
(WWW) 
Hardware Sales Number of Additional Internet (WWW) Users 
Hardware Installed Base Total Number of Internet (WWW) Users 
 Hardware Price Average Price of (Fax-)Modem 
 Software Availability Number of Internet (WWW) Hosts 
 
Laserdisc 
Hardware Sales 
Number of Laserdisc Players Shipped to 
Dealers 
Hardware Installed Base 
Cumulative Number of Laserdisc Players 
Shipped to Dealers 
 Hardware Price 
Average Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price of 
in year t released Laserdisc Player 
 Software Availability Number of Laserdisc Titles in Catalog 
   
 
  
                                                          
8 i-Mode is a high-speed mobile Internet service (2.5G) introduced first in Japan by NTT DoCoMo. 
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Appendix: Data (ctd.) 
 
Network 
Market Time Period Country Data source 
DVD 
1997-2004 U.S. 
Consumer Electronics Association 
 
1997-2004 U.S. 
Own derivation 
 
 1997-2004 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 1997-2004 U.S. http://www.hometheaterinfo.com/ 
    
 
Gameboy 
1989-2004 U.S. NPD 
1989-2004 U.S. Own derivation 
 1989-2002 U.S. 
NPD and Nintendo 
 
 1989-2003 U.S. Nintendo 
 
i-Mode 
1999-2005 Japan Own derivation 
1999-2005 Japan NTT DoCoMo 
 1999-2005 Japan Ascii24.com 
 1999-2005 Japan OH!NEW i-search (www.ohnew.co.jp) 
    
 
Internet 
(WWW) 
1991-2002 U.S. Own derivation 
1991-2002 U.S. Internet Software Consortium 
 1991-2002 U.S. eBrain Market Research 
 1991-2003 U.S. International Telecommunication Union 
 
Laserdisc 
1981-1990 Japan Philips Consumer Electronics 
1981-1990 Japan 
Own derivation 
 
 1981-1990 Japan 
Variety of sources 
 
 1981-1990 Japan Philips Consumer Electronics 
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Chapter 3 
Superstars in System Markets9 
 
3.1  Introduction 
³You can have the best technology, the most advanced box in the world. But 
without the applications, that box will only collect dust on the retail shelves´-  
 
Kazuo Hirai, president of Sony Computer Entertainment of America  
(Huffstutter 1999) 
 
Systems are composed of complementary and interdependent products, such as 
hardware and software (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1986b; Stremersch et 
al. 2003; Wuyts et al. 2004). For instance, video game systems are composed of the video 
game console, on the one hand, and video games, on the other hand (Chou and Shy 1990; 
Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000). Other examples are plenty. 
7KH&RPSDFW'LVNFRQVLVWVRI&'3OD\HUVDQG&'¶V7HOHYLVLRQFRQVLVWVRI79VHWVDQG
TV programming. Research in economics and marketing has argued that in such system 
markets, hardware sales depend mainly on the available software (Farrell and Saloner 
1986; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 1986b and 1994). To avoid any 
misunderstanding, we should immediately stress that software availability in this theory 
never refers to software sales (= demand), but rather refers to the catalog of software titles 
that is available for a particular hardware (= supply). 
The major importance of software in system markets has made it into the prime 
concern for hardware firms (i.e., system owners). For instance, in the video game console 
industry, system owners spend a fortune on software development to guarantee a sufficient 
supply of software, either through internal development, or through subsidizing 
independent software developers (Coughlan 2004). Microsoft put $375 million in cash on 
the table to acquire just one software development studio (Kent 2002). Sony alone has 14 
                                                          
9 This work was co-authored with Stefan Stremersch, and published in the Journal of Marketing as 
³7KH(IIHFWRI6XSHUVWDU6RIWZDUHRQ+DUGZDUH6DOHVLQ6\VWHP0DUNHWV´ 
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of these software development studios (GamePro 2006). Sony shipped over 10,000 
Playstation 3 development kits, to software developers, before selling even one Playstation 
3 (Guardian 2006), to secure the supply of attractive software titles. 
The main shortcoming of the academic literature on this phenomenon is that 
mathematical and empirical analyses have almost exclusively focused on a single 
dimension of software availability, namely software quantity10, i.e., the number of software 
titles introduced (for an overview, Stremersch et al. 2007). While not substantiated with 
empirical evidence, case illustrations raise that certain individual software titles may have 
had disproportionately large effects on hardware sales (Allen 2003; Dickson 2008; Frels, 
Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Gilroy 1994; Rowe 1999; Shapiro and Varian 1998; 
Williams 2002). We call these individual software titles of exceptional high quality 
³VXSHUVWDUV´11. Prior literature has studied superstars in the music industry (Chung and Cox 
1994), major league baseball (MacDonald and Reynolds 1994), and the movie industry 
(Collins, Hand and Snell 2002). However, the returns software superstars may have on 
hardware sales in system markets remains unexamined. This lack of academic inquiry does 
not match the importance of the role such software titles may play in system markets. The 
present study aims to fill that void.  
We examine to what extent superstars may increase hardware unit sales, in the 
context of the U.S. home video game console industry. We find that the introduction of a 
superstar software title significantly increases hardware unit sales, with on average 14% 
(167,000 units), over and above the effects of other hardware and software attributes. This 
positive effect persists only for the first 5 months after their introduction. Software type 
does not substantially alter this effect. Therefore, the traditional operationalization of 
software quantity (i.e., the number of software titles introduced) may be limited, as it 
                                                          
10 Prior literature also refers to software quantity as software availability or software variety. 
11 There exists considerable confusion between terms such as superstars, and terms such as 
blockbusters, hits, killer applications, or more specifically in the case of the video game industry, 
killer games, or triple A games. Our focus is on software titles of exceptional quality, which yields a 
disproportionate pay-RIIDFRQFHSWPRVWDNLQWRWKH³VXSHUVWDU´FRQcept, as originally introduced by 
5RVHQ  :H WKHUHIRUH ZLOO FRQVLVWHQWO\ XVH WKH WHUP ³VXSHUVWDUV´ WKURXJKRXW WKLV SDSHU
&RQFHSWV VXFK DV ³KLWV´ RU ³EORFNEXVWHUV´ RIWHQ UHIHU WR VRIWZDUH WLWOHVZLWK D KLJK VDOHV YROXPH
rather than high quality. The WHUP ³NLOOHU DSSOLFDWLRQV´ UHIHUV WR VSHFLILF JDPHV WKDW DOORZHG RQH
V\VWHPWR³NLOO´RUGRPLQDWHDQRWKHU 
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overlooks both superstar power, and potential time decays. We also find that superstars 
display increasing returns (i.e., hardware unit sales) to software quality.   
We gather data on 11 home video game consoles in the U.S., between January 
1993 and December 2004. The video game console industry is an appropriate context, as it 
is a system market, in which software (i.e., video games) is thought to be crucial to 
promote hardware (i.e., video game console) sales (Clements and Ohashi 2005; Williams 
2002). 
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. The next section develops the 
theory on superstar introductions and other determinants of hardware sales. The third 
section discusses the video game console industry, and presents the sample, data 
collection, and the measurement of the variables. The fourth section presents the model. 
The fifth section presents the results, and further analyses we conducted. The sixth section 
presents the discussion of the results, their implications, and the limitations of the paper. 
 
3.2  Superstar Introductions and Other Determinants 
This section first explains the concept of software superstars and discusses how 
their introduction may affect hardware unit sales. Second, it argues how this relationship 
may be dependent upon software type. Third, it adds other variables that may also affect 
hardware unit sales, for which we need to control in our empirical testing. We will tailor 
the theory development to our empirical context, the U.S. home video game console 
market, for clarity of exposition. However, the theory we develop is also applicable in 
many other system markets, such as the DVD market (e.g. the effect of superstar 
introductions, such as The Matrix, on DVD sales) or the Satellite radio market (e.g. the 
effect of radio superstars joining a Satellite radio network, such as Howard Stern, on 
Satellite radio sales). 
 
3.2.1  Superstars 
Superstars possess unique and superior attributes or skills that command a 
disproportionately large payoff (Rosen 1981). In a superstar industry, a small number of 
high-quality superstars, demand disproportionately large compensation packages, and 
dominate their respective industry (Rosen 1981). A superstar industry displays increasing 
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returns to quality, due to the scarcity of high quality (Mayer 1960; Rosen 1981). There is a 
monotonic increasing returns relationship between quality and the payoff. Or as Cox and 
.OHLPDQ  SXW LW ³If a golfer, is on average, but one stroke better than other 
competitors then a disproportionate number of tournament championships would be won 
by said athlete´ ,W LV YHU\ KDUG IRU FRPSHWLQJ JROIHUV WR FRS\ 7LJHU :RRGV¶ VNLOOV
Similarly, competitors will find it hard to copy the quality characteristics of other 
superstars, such as The Beatles, Star Wars or Super Mario Brothers, especially after they 
have introduced their products on the market, as often the quality is unknown until the 
product is in the hands of the consumer.  
Illustrations of superstar industries are plenty. Chung and Cox (1994) find a high 
concentration of output among top music performers, the top 10.8% of gold record 
receivers collected 43.1% of all gold records during the period 1958 to 1989. De Vany and 
Walls (1996) report that just 20% of the films earned 80% of box office revenues. 
Exploratory research by Liebowitz and Margolis (1999) suggests that the highest quality 
software titles conquer a disproportionately large part of the total software market. 
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Figure 3.1: The Video Game Industry is a Superstar Industry 
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The video game industry is also a superstar industry. Figure 3.1 categorizes video 
game quality for the Sony Playstation in 20 quality categories from [0-5] to [95-100] (we 
discuss the operationalization of video game quality in the data section). The columns in 
Figure 3.1 represent the number of video games in each quality category. The line with 
diamonds represents the average unit sales of a video game in each quality category. The 
first conclusion we can draw, is that this market shows a disproportionate response of 
software sales to software quality, and that there is a monotonic increasing returns 
relationship between software quality and software unit sales. The second conclusion is 
that the frequency distribution of quality follows a bell-shaped curve, with a negative 
skewness, indicating scarcity of high quality products, which results in the increasing 
returns to quality (e.g., Mayer 1960; Rosen 1981). Both of these conclusions imply that the 
video game industry is indeed a superstar industry, showing disproportionate returns to 
quality, with a small number of high quality games that are very popular. Other systems 
depict similar patterns. Using software dollar sales instead of software unit sales, does not 
DOWHUWKLVSLFWXUH5HFHQWH[DPSOHVRIVXSHUVWDUYLGHRJDPHVDUHµGrand Theft Auto: Vice 
&LW\¶DQGµ+DOR¶ZKLFKERWKsold over 4 million copies in the U.S. alone, within the first 
three months after introduction. 
In system markets, high quality software titles are likely to have a positive effect 
on hardware unit sales (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003). Superstar software titles are 
so desirable, that they can easily trigger the adoption of the system by consumers. 
Williams (2002) argues that superstar video games entice consumers to spend several 
hundred dollars to buy the video game console and accessories required, to play those 
highly desirable video games. Shapiro and Varian (1998) believe that :DOW 'LVQH\¶V
Wonderful World of Color was the prime reason why consumers invested in color 
television sets. The spreadsheet (e.g., VisiCalc, Lotus 1-2-3, Excel) and the word processor 
(e.g., WordStar, WordPerfect, Word) are credited for selling millions of Personal 
Computers (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Gilroy 1994). Business press has claimed 
that the video game Tetris has been a major driving force behind the success of the original 
Nintendo Gameboy (Allen 2003; Rowe 1999). Therefore, we expect the introduction of a 
superstar software title to increase hardware unit sales in system markets.  
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Moreover, if superstars display increasing returns from software quality to 
software unit sales, then we may expect superstars in system markets, to display increasing 
returns from software quality to hardware unit sales (e.g., Liebowitz and Margolis 1999; 
Mayer 1960; Rosen 1981).   
 
3.2.2  Software Life Cycle 
In many system markets, software titles only have a limited life expectancy, due 
to continuous innovation and changing consumer tastes, thereby limiting the sales potential 
of software titles to only a short period after their introduction. Sales of a software title 
peak during or soon after introduction, and subsequently decline. This sales pattern is 
REVHUYHG DFURVV PDQ\ VLPLODU PDUNHWV &'¶V '9'¶V /3¶V 3& VRIWZDUH DSSOLFDWLRQV
television and radio broadcasts, and video cassettes (e.g., Ainslie, Drèze and Zufryden 
2005; Krider and Weinberg 1998; Luan and Sudhir 2007).  
Video games also have a short life expectancy, approximately 3 months, but this 
life cycle can stretch to 12 months for very successful video games (Gaume 2006). Figure 
3.2 depicts the evolution of software unit sales of superstar and non-superstar software 
titles, from the month of introduction at t, and later. The software unit sales of superstars 
also peak during introduction (291,000 units) and subsequently decline. Superstars achieve 
software unit sales of around 1.3 million units on average, while non-superstar software 
titles achieve unit sales of just 187,000 units. Software unit sales of superstars turn flat 
after 6 months, and subsequently the sales evolution of superstars and non-superstars 
depicts a similar pattern, of slow declining sales over time.  
Because of the limited life expectancy of software, we expect the introduction of 
a superstar software title to positively affect hardware unit sales, during the month of 
introduction and a limited number of months after introduction. In addition, we expect that 
this effect, will peak during the month of introduction, and subsequently decline. 
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Figure 3.2: Software Unit Sales of Superstar and  
Non-superstar Software Titles 
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3.2.3  Software Type 
Software type may influence the effects we posited above. While one can typify 
video games along multiple dimensions, three are particularly salient and relevant, as they 
are often used in the video game industry to describe the differences between individual 
video games (Clements and Ohashi 2005; Venkatraman and Lee 2004; Williams 2002). 
Other software markets, like movies and music use similar software types. 
The first dimension is whether a superstar software title is exclusively available 
for only one system, or is available for multiple systems. Prior literature suggests that 
exclusivity of software (i.e., content) is a valuable commodity in system markets, because 
it creates a competitive advantage (Shapiro 1999). System owners often pay software 
publishers top dollar for the exclusive availability of their attractive software. Sony paid a 
sum in the tens of millions of dollars to software publisher Take-Two to make the 
VXSHUVWDUIUDQFKLVHµ*UDQ7KHIW$XWR¶H[FOXVLYHWRWKH3OD\VWDWLRQ,*17RVKLED
(the system owner of the HD-DVD standard) paid Paramount and DreamWorks Animation 
$150 million in incentives for their exclusive commitment to HD-DVD, and dropping their 
VXSSRUWIRU6RQ\¶VFRPSHWLQJ%OX-ray standard (Barnes 2007). Sony allegedly paid Warner 
%URWKHUV  LQ LQFHQWLYHV WR GURS 7RVKLED¶V VWDndards (Edwards and Grover 2008). 
System owners (e.g., Microsoft) want exclusive content (e.g., Halo 3) because it 
(supposedly) increases hardware sales (e.g., video game console sales) (Gibson 2007). If a 
superstar software title is introduced on multiple systems, the resulting new hardware 
adopters are dispersed across multiple systems. If the introduction of a superstar title is 
exclusively for just one system, the new hardware adopters will all adopt the same system. 
Following this line of thought, exclusive superstar software titles could prove to be a 
crucial factor in positive feedback markets, because of their ability to tip the market 
outcome towards one specific system, during a systems war (i.e., standards war) (e.g., 
Arthur 1989 and 1996; Shapiro and Varian 1998). We therefore expect exclusive superstar 
software titles to have a larger effect on hardware unit sales of the system in question, 
compared to non-exclusive superstar software titles.  
The second dimension is whether the software title is a sequel to a prequel for the 
same system. Research on movies has shown that sequels have an already established 
brand name, and a higher awareness among consumers, and therefore have higher sales 
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than the prequel (Ainslie, Drèze and Zufryden 2005; Basuroy, Desai and Talukdar 2006; 
Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996). As consumers are more aware about superstar sequels 
compared to original superstars (i.e., non-sequel superstars) and sequels have a proven 
record, one may expect the introduction of superstar sequels to have a larger effect on 
hardware unit sales, compared to the introduction of original superstars. On the other hand, 
consumers who buy the superstar sequel are likely to have already bought the prequel, 
which means that they already own the hardware. Also, original superstars are introduced 
earlier in the life cycle of the system, meaning that the hardware installed base is smaller, 
leaving more potential hardware adopters available. In addition, a recent study of Luan and 
Sudhir (2007) finds that sequels in the DVD market perform worse than non-sequels. 
According to this reasoning, superstar sequels may have a smaller impact on hardware unit 
sales, compared to original superstars. Because of these contradictory arguments, the 
direction of the effect is an interesting, empirical matter.  
The third dimension is the genre to which the superstar software title belongs. The 
video game market consists of six different genres. There are two large genres (action and 
platformer), and four small ± niche ± genres (first-person shooter (FPS), racing, role 
playing (RPG), sports). Software titles from the large genres appeal to a very broad range 
of gamers, from hardcore gamers to casual gamers. The small genres serve a smaller more 
specialized niche market. The introduction of software in popular genres helps hardware 
sales grow more rapidly (Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003). We therefore expect the 
introduction of superstars from the large genres to have a larger impact on hardware unit 
sales, compared to the introduction of superstars from the small genres. 
 
3.2.4  Other Variables 
We next discuss other variables that may also affect hardware unit sales. We 
carefully identified which variables are key in determining the attractiveness of the 
hardware and software of a system by examining the prior literature (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar 
and Raj 2003; Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 1996; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal 1994; 
Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Shankar and Bayus 
2003; Shy 2001; Stremersch et al. 2007). We control for these variables in our empirical 
testing. 
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Variables we include, relating to the attractiveness of the software side of the 
system, are software catalog (i.e., all software introduced up to and including t-1) and 
software introductions (in t); we expect both to positively affect hardware unit sales (e.g., 
Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Clements and Ohashi 2005; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; 
Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004). An increase in the catalog of past software 
introductions increases the utility a consumer may derive from the system. In addition, a 
larger number of present software introductions may also increase the utility a consumer 
derives.  The latter effect may be greater than the former as entertainment products 
typically have short life cycles (Luan and Sudhir 2007; Williams 2002); also video games 
typically have short life cycles. We expect software quality (the average quality of all 
video games available to consumers) to positively affect hardware unit sales. While prior 
literature has not examined the effect of the overall quality of the software available on 
hardware unit sales, there are several reasons to expect higher catalog quality to translate 
into higher hardware unit sales. One reason is that higher average quality of the software 
catalog reflects positively on the perceived quality of the system. Another reason may be 
that a high quality catalog increases the probability that consumers have positive 
experiences with the console prior to buying it, e.g. when playiQJDWD IULHQG¶VKRXVHRU
when trying it out in the store. We expect software price, to negatively influence hardware 
unit sales, but we expect the effect size to be small (prices show relatively little variance in 
this industry). The reason is that as the price of software decreases, the attractiveness of the 
hardware increases.  
Variables we include, relating to the attractiveness of the hardware side of the 
system, are hardware price, which we expect to negatively affect hardware unit sales, but 
we expect the effect size to be small in our application (prices show relatively little 
variance in this industry). As the price of hardware decreases, consumers become more 
inclined to adopt the system (e.g. Clements and Ohashi 2005; Shankar and Bayus 2003). 
We also included hardware age, which we expect to negatively affect hardware unit sales. 
7KHKDUGZDUHEHFRPHV OHVVDWWUDFWLYHDV LW DJHVEHFDXVH LWEHFRPHV OHVV ³FXWWLQJ-HGJH´
Hardware age can also be interpreted as the time trend in the hardware unit sales series, 
which is common in this area (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer 1996; Gandal 1994; Shy 2001; Stremersch et al. 2007). 
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We also include a December dummy, which controls for the December holiday 
effect, due to the holiday buying spree that typically drives consumer electronic markets 
(i.e., the video game market). We expect the sign of the December dummy parameter to be 
positive (Christmas and New Year shopping). 
 
3.3  Data 
This section first discusses the video game industry and the sample. Next, it 
presents the data collection procedures, and it ends with providing the measures for our 
variables.  
 
3.3.1  Video Game Industry 
3OD\LQJ YLGHR JDPHV LVQ¶W FKLOG¶V SOD\ DQ\PRUH $PHULFDQ KRXVHKROGV UDWH
playing video games as the most fun entertainment activity, beating watching television, 
surfing the Internet, reading books and going to, and renting, movies (IDSA 2001). Many 
young gamers spend more time playing games than watching TV (Bloom 1982; Funk and 
Buchman 1996). The average game player is 33 years old, has been playing games for 12 
years, and plays games for over 7 hours per week (ESA 2007). The video game industry 
has become a mature industry, dominated by mainstream content (Williams 2002). The 
business of publishing video games is highly similar to that of other software markets like 
&'¶V HERRNV '9'¶V UDGLR VKRZV YLGHRFDVVHWWHV DQG WHOHYLVLRQ VKRZV HJ *UHFR
2000; Komiya and Litman 1990; Williams 2002). 
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Figure 3.3: Hardware and Software Sales of Consoles and 3&¶V 
 
 
 
(Source: Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), NPD) 
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Figure 3.4: Video game and PC game sales according to Game 
Genre* 
 
 
 
* Information on PC Genres is only available from 2004. 
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In 2007, sales of PC and video games, video game consoles, and video game 
accessories exceeded $18.8 billion dollars in the U.S. alone (NPD 2008). During our 
sample period, video game software sales increased from $1.8 billion in 1993 to $5.4 
billion in 2004, a 200% increase, while video game hardware sales increased from $1.0 
billion in 1993 to $1.6 billion in 2004, a 65% increase. Game sales in the PC market also 
show an increase, from $0.5 billion in 1995 to $1.1 billion in 2004, a 137% increase, while 
PC hardware sales increased from $8.2 in 1993 to $17.2 billion, a 110% increase. Figure 
3.3 depicts the evolution of PC and video game sales over time. The dotted line with 
triangles depicts video game sales, the dashed line with circles depicts PC game sales, and 
the dashed line with triangles depicts console hardware sales; all depicted against the left 
y-axis. The solid line with squares depicts PC hardware sales and uses the right y-axis. 
Figure 3.4 decomposes video game sales and PC game sales according to the six game 
genres. 
During our sample period, consumers bought over 127 million video game 
consoles and over 1 billion software titles. Thus, on average a hardware adopter buys more 
than 8 software titles. For every hardware unit sold, for which consumers pay around $152, 
consumers spend around $287 on software, spread out over the entire life cycle of the 
hardware. Thus, consumers spend 65% of their allocation on software, and only 35% on 
hardware. This clearly indicates the importance of software in this system market. This is 
similar to other system markets, like CD-SOD\HU DQG &'¶V RU '9'-SOD\HU DQG '9'¶V
where buyers also spend most of their money on software (e.g., Bayus 1987).  
 
3.3.2  Sample 
The data covers 11 home video game consoles (e.g., 3DO Multiplayer, Atari 
Jaguar, Microsoft Xbox, Nintendo 64, Nintendo GameCube, Nintendo Super NES, Sega 
Dreamcast, Sega Genesis, Sega Saturn, Sony Playstation, and Sony Playstation 2), in the 
U.S. home video game industry during the period January 1993 to December 2004 (144 
consecutive months). The data cover the entire population of home video game consoles 
available to U.S. consumers during this period. The data also cover all information we 
require on the software for these 11 systems, which comprises around 5,800 software titles.  
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The monthly hardware unit sales range between 3 units and almost 2.7 million 
units. However, about a third of these monthly observations, contain very few hardware 
unit sales. 195 observations contain hardware unit sales of less than 5,000 units, because 
hardware unit sales very slowly dry up, after consumers and software publishers have 
abandoned the system. Nintendo sold more than 16 million units of its SNES console in 
the U.S., but during the last 36 months, less than 2,500 units were sold, and no new 
VRIWZDUH ZDV LQWURGXFHG 7KXV WKHUH DUH WZR UHJLPHV WKH µOLIH¶ UHJLPH LH ZKHQ
W\SLFDOO\VXEVWDQWLDOVDOHVRFFXUDQGWKHµGHDWK¶UHJLPHLHZKHQYHU\IHZVDOHVRFFXU 
$VZHDUHRQO\ LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKHµOLIH¶ UHJLPHZHZLOOHOLPLQDWH WKHGDWDREVHUYDWLRQVRI
WKH µGHDWK¶ UHJLPHEHFDXVHXVLQJRQHPRGHODFURVV WKHVH WZRUHJLPHV LV OLNHO\ WRFUHDWH
biases.  
Therefore, we remove all monthly observations at the end of a systHP¶VOLIHDIWHU
which either consumers, or software publishers, have abandoned the system. We assume 
the system to be abandoned, if software providers do not introduce any software titles for 
the next three months, or if hardware unit sales drop below 5,000 units. Using these two 
cutoffs, leaves us with 513 observations (see Table 3.1).12 The number of observations 
reduces by 32%, but the total amount of hardware units sold decreases by less than 4%, to 
120 million units.  
 
  
                                                          
12 Tests indicate that at our cutoff point (i.e., breakpoint) of the dependent variable, a large negative 
structural change (i.e., regime switch) is present (-0.797; P<0.01). The findings in this paper are 
robust to selecting somewhat stricter, or more lenient, cutoffs. 
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Table 3.1: The Video Game Consoles We Study 
 
System Start & End Number of Months 
3DO Multiplayer Sep-93 to Sep-96 37 
Atari Jaguar Nov-93 to Dec-95 26 
Microsoft Xbox Nov-01 to Dec-04 38 
Nintendo 64 Sep-96 to Nov-01 63 
Nintendo GameCube Nov-01 to Dec-04 38 
Nintendo Super NES Jan-93 to Jan-96 37 
Sega Dreamcast Sep-99 to Dec-01 28 
Sega Genesis Jan-93 to Dec-96 48 
Sega Saturn May-95 to Mar-98 35 
Sony Playstation Sep-95 to Dec-04 112 
Sony Playstation 2 Oct-00 to Dec-04 51 
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3.3.3  Data Collection 
The data originated from two databases, which we subsequently integrated. NPD 
provided retail hardware unit sales, hardware price, software unit sales, software price and 
software introductions. NPD is a market research firm that covers the video game industry 
and their data has been previously used by other researchers (e.g. Clements and Ohashi 
2005; Shankar and Bayus 2003; Stremersch et al. 2007; Venkatraman and Lee 2004).  
We collected information on video game quality ratings and software type for all 
5,800 video games in our data set by hand. Gathering these data was a long, labor-
intensive process. We used leading U.S. video game magazines, and websites, like 
Electronic Gaming Monthly (EGM), Gamespot, and the Imagine Games Network (IGN), 
to obtain expert quality ratings of video games. Prior research has also used magazine 
expert ratings, as an indicator for product quality (e.g. Archibald, Haulman and Moody 
1983; Conlon, Devaraj and Matta 2001; Liebowitz and Margolis 1999).   
Besides collecting expert ratings, we also collected consumer quality ratings of 
video games, through these publications. In total, we collected over 132,000 expert ratings, 
and over 3.8 million user ratings. To obtain the quality of an individual video game, we 
average these ratings, giving the same weight to the overall expert rating as to the overall 
user rating.13  
 
                                                          
13 We follow this procedure, as it enhances the quality of the data, by increasing the accuracy through 
averaging individual-level errors and biases that are random (Rousseau 1985). It also fits the 
behavior of consumers as they often combine multiple separate pieces of information into an overall 
evaluation by averaging them (Anderson 1996; Kahn and Ross 1993). From our data, we also learn 
that experts have tastes similar to users (inter-rater reliability = .652; n=5,650). This correlation is 
somewhat depressed, because a large number of software titles are of low quality and achieve only 
very low sales, for which there are only a few expert and user ratings available. Eliminating these 
video games and their ratings greatly increases the inter-rater reliability between expert and user 
ratings. The inter-rater agreement for video games for which there are at least 5 expert and at least 5 
user ratings available is .828 (n=3,748). The conclusion is that experts do not seem to systematically 
rate video games differently from users. This is because experts, have been, and are, themselves 
active gamers. In addition, by publishing the quality rating of videogames, experts and users are open 
to public scrutiny by other experts and users, and this will help to minimize biases (Kane 1981). 
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3.3.4  Measures 
We will now briefly discuss our measures, all of which are at a monthly 
periodicity for the system of interest. We start with the variables at the hardware side. 
Hardware unit sales are the monthly number of video game consoles sold for the system 
of interest. Hardware price for a video game console is the price of the bare bone version 
of the video game console in that month. Hardware age (i.e., the time trend) of a video 
game console is equal to the number of months the hardware has been on the market. 
At the software side, we first discuss the operationalization of our focal construct, 
the introduction of superstars.14 As stated above, superstars are characterized by their high 
quality (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Rosen 1981). Therefore, we have developed 
a heuristic. To be called a superstar software title, a software title must have a quality 
rating of 90 or above. A quality threshold of 90 identifies only the very best software titles 
as superstars. This threshold identifies 89 games out of approximately 5,800 software titles 
as superstars. Typically, these software titles sell over 1 million copies. Software unit sales 
of 1 million is considered to be an important threshold in the video game industry (Cadin 
and Guerin 2006; Pereira 2002). This threshold is also the point at which increasing returns 
to quality kick in. We list all 89 superstars, per system, in Table 3.2. Representatives of the 
NPD video game division perceived our heuristic and our list of superstars as valid. The 
findings in this paper are robust across a wide range of thresholds (see the results section). 
 
                                                          
14 We use superstar introduction and not superstar software sales, to model the effect of superstars on 
hardware unit sales, for a number of reasons. First, in the analytical literature, the introduction of a 
single software title by a software firm has a positive effect on the utility of the hardware, thereby 
increasing hardware sales (Church and Gandal 1992; Katz and Shapiro 1986a). Given this literature, 
there is no reason to assume that superstar software sales should affect the hardware utility. Second, 
the introduction of software titles especially superstar titles, are a clear signal of software developer 
support, whereas superstar sales are not. Third, the strong presence of seasonality in the video game 
industry, as in many other software markets, makes the use of sales less desirable. Fourth, using 
superstar software sales instead of superstar introductions would make this variable highly 
endogenous, due to its dependence on hardware unit sales. 
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Table 3.2: The Superstars We Identify in the Video Game Industry 
 
 
Sega Genesis 
 
     Earthworm Jim 
     Lunar: Eternal Blue 
     Snatcher   
 
Nintendo Super NES 
 
     Xenogears 
     Chrono Trigger  
     Donkey Kong Country  
     Donkey Kong Country 2: Diddy's Quest  
     Final Fantasy 3 
     Secret of Mana 
     Super Mario All Stars 
     Super Mario RPG: Legend of the Seven Stars 
     Super Mario World 2: Yoshi's Island 
     Super Metroid  
 
Atari Jaguar 
 
     Tempest 2000 
      
Sony Playstation 
 
     Castlevania: Symphony of the Night 
     Chrono Cross 
     Final Fantasy 7  
     Final Fantasy 9 
     Gran Turismo 
     Metal Gear Solid 
     Resident Evil 2 
     Tekken 3 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 2 
 
Nintendo 64 
 
     Conker's Bad Fur Day 
     James Bond 007: Goldeneye 007 
     Legend of Zelda: Majora's Mask 
     Legend of Zelda: Ocarina of Time 
     Perfect Dark 
     Super Mario 64 
 
Sega Dreamcast 
 
     NBA 2K1 
     NFL 2K 
     NFL 2K1 
     Resident Evil Code: Veronica X 
     Skies of Arcadia 
     Soul Calibur 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 2 
     Virtua Tennis 
 
 
Sony Playstation 2 
 
     Burnout 3: Takedown  
     Devil May Cry 
     Final Fantasy 10 X 
     Gran Turismo 3 A-Spec 
     Grand Theft Auto 3 
     Grand Theft Auto: Andreas 
     Grand Theft Auto: Vice City 
     Madden NFL 2004  
     Metal Gear Solid 2: Sons Of Liberty 
     Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eat  
     NBA Street Vol. 2 
     NCAA Football 2003 
     NCAA Football 2004 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Ratchet & Clank: Going Commando 
     Ratchet & Clank: Up Your Arsenal 
     Soul Calibur 2 
     SSX 2 Tricky 
     SSX 3  
     Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2004 
     Timesplitters 2 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 3 
     Tony Hawk's Pro Skater 4 
     Tony Hawk's Underground 
     Virtua Fighter 4: Evolution  
     Winning Eleven 6 World Soccer 
     Winning Eleven 7 International 
 
Nintendo GameCube 
 
     Eternal Darkness: Sanity's Requiem 
     Legend of Zelda: The Wind Waker 
     Madden NFL 2004  
     Metroid Prime 
     Metroid Prime 2: Echoes  
     Paper Mario: The Thousand-Year Door 
     Pikmin 2 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Soul Calibur 2 
     SSX 3  
     Super Smash Brothers 2 Melee 
     Viewtiful Joe  
 
Microsoft Xbox 
 
     Burnout 3: Takedown  
     Grand Theft Auto (3 & Vice City)  
     Halo 1: Combat Evolved 
     Halo 2 
     NCAA Football 2004 
     Ninja Gaiden 
     Prince of Persia: The Sands of Time 
     Project Gotham 2 
     Star Wars: Knights Republic 
     Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell 
     Tom Clancy's Splinter Cell: Pandora Tomorrow 
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We operationalize the other software variables as follows. Software catalog is the 
size of the available software catalog, which is equal to the number of video games 
available to consumers and sold at least once, prior to the month of interest for the system 
of interest. Software introductions refers to the number of video games introduced in the 
month of interest for the system of interest (e.g. Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Clements 
and Ohashi 2005; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Nair, Chintagunta and Dubé 2004). 
Software price is the average price of all the software titles available in the software 
catalog for the system in the month of interest. Software quality is the average quality of 
all software titles available in the software catalog for the system in the relevant month.  
Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. 
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Table 3.3: The Descriptive Statistics of the Relevant Variables 
 
 
 
  
 Correlation 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Hardware Unit Sales          
2 Hardware Price -0.09 
3 Hardware Age -0.02 -0.63 
4 Software Catalog 0.17 -0.55 0.80 
5 Software Quality 0.17 -0.25 -0.14 -0.05 
6 Software Price -0.06 0.52 -0.68 -0.76 -0.05 
7 Software Introductions 0.40 -0.06 -0.03 0.23 0.09 -0.11 
8 December Holidays 
Effect 0.58 0.02 -0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04   
9 Introduction Superstar 0.17 -0.01 -0.07 0.08 0.20 -0.09 0.39 -0.04 
          
Mean 223,121 164 35 308 67 34 9.9 0.1 0.1 
Standard Deviation 328,757 102 26 255 4.3 13 9.7 0.3 0.3 
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3.4  Model 
To capture the influence of our explanatory variables on hardware unit sales, we 
specify a dynamic panel data model, taking the log transform of specific effects when 
appropriate, given prior literature (e.g., Basu, Mazumdar and Raj 2003; Cottrell and Koput 
1998; Dranove and Gandal 2003; Gandal 1995; Gandal, Kende and Rob 2000; Stremersch 
et al. 2007). The log-transform functional form of the model is appropriate given the needs 
to pool data across video game consoles that represent different sales volumes. The 
dependent variable is the log-transform of hardware unit sales of console i in month t, 
denoted as SitH . 
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ȝi is a fixed effect that captures heterogeneity across the different consoles i and 
controls for time-invariant, unobserved, console-specific variables. The Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects rejects a random effects model, in favor of a 
fixed effects model. Also conceptually, a fixed effects model is more appropriate than a 
random effects model, as the selection of systems from the population is not random. Next, 
we include the price of video game console i in month t (denoted as PitH ), and the age of 
video game console i in month t (denoted as AitH ). These independent variables model the 
hardware attractiveness of the system. 
At the software side, we include software price of video game console i in month 
t (denoted as PitS ), software catalog of past software introductions of video game console i 
in month t-1 ( 1
CAT
itS  ), present software introductions of video game console i in month t (
INT
itS ), and software quality of video game console i in month t (
QL
itS ). We do not take the 
log of software quality, because we model software quality as increasing returns to quality, 
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as suggested by superstar theory, and as modeled by prior empirical superstar literature 
(e.g. Jones and Walsh 1988). Next, SSitS  denotes the number of superstar software titles 
introduced in month t for console i (0 if no superstar was introduced, 1 if a superstar was 
introduced, 2 if two superstars were introduced, etc.). To examine the persistence of the 
effect superstars have on hardware unit sales over time, we also add N lagged terms of 
this variable. We do not impose a structure on this effect, because we do not know if there 
is an effect, how long this effect lasts, or the shape of this effect over time (e.g., decaying, 
linear, inverted U-shape). This method is widely used in marketing (e.g., see Mitra and 
Golder 2006). These independent variables model the software attractiveness of the 
system. Finally, the model also includes a dummy variable for the December holiday effect 
( DECtC ).  
Estimating this model with OLS is not appropriate, because there is evidence of 
VHULDO FRUUHODWLRQ ERWK IURP :RROGULGJH¶V  WHVW F(1,10) = 35.64; p > .00) and 
Arellano-%RQG¶VWHVWz=8.03; p > .00) for autocorrelation), most likely due to the 
presence of social contagion, and heteroskedasticity (using a modified Wald statistic for 
groupwise heteroskedasticity following Greene (2003) (ݔ2(11) =846.09; p > .00)) in the 
error term.  Therefore, we use a Prais-Winsten model with panel-corrected standard errors 
to estimate equation (1) for all video game consoles jointly (Baltagi and Li 1991). We 
assume panel-level heteroskedastic errors, and a panel-specific first-order autocorrelation 
AR(1), thus capturing the social network exposure (i.e., social contagion) (e.g., Hedstrom 
1994; Strang 1991; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). 
This procedure is also appropriate with unbalanced panel data sets such as ours. The 
required diagnostic tests for descriptive models (Franses 2005) did not reveal any need to 
revise the model.  
 
3.5  Results 
We first discuss how superstar software introductions affect hardware unit sales, 
controlling for the other variables we discussed earlier. Then, we discuss our findings on 
the moderating role of software type on the effect of superstar software introductions on 
hardware unit sales. 
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3.5.1  The Effect of Superstars 
We present the results of estimating equation (1) in Table 3.4, model 1. The 
adjusted R2 shows that the model fits the data very well, which is not surprising, given that 
it also includes software introductions, the December holiday effect, and a time trend 
(through hardwarHDJH:HQH[WGLVFXVVWKHPRGHO¶VSDUDPHWHUHVWLPDWHV 
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Table 3.4: Superstar Introductions Affect Hardware Unit Sales And 
Display Increasing Returns 
 
Variables                Model 1             
  Coefficient (S.E.) 
1D  Hardware Price -1.073** (0.195) 
2D  Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
1E  Software Price  0.345 (0.261) 
2E  Software Catalog -0.019 (0.064) 
3E  Software Introductions  0.274** (0.025) 
4E  Software Quality  0.013* (0.006) 
50E  Superstar  0.058** (0.016) 
51E  Superstar L1  0.081** (0.017) 
52E  Superstar L2  0.077** (0.017) 
53E  Superstar L3  0.064** (0.017) 
54E  Superstar L4  0.040* (0.017) 
55E  Superstar L5  0.015 (0.016) 
    
    
    
    
    
    
1J  December 0.550** (0.023) 
   
Adj-R2                 0.98 
Number of observations                 503 
  
  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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Table 3.4: Superstar Introductions Affect Hardware Unit Sales 
And Display Increasing Returns (ctd.) 
 
Variables       Model 2     
 Coefficient (S.E.) 
Hardware Price -1.109** (0.192) 
Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
Software Price  0.265 (0.262) 
Software Catalog -0.021 (0.064) 
Software Introductions  0.265** (0.025) 
Software Quality  0.013* (0.006) 
Lowest Quality Superstar  -0.009 (0.025) 
Lowest Quality Superstar L1  0.074** (0.028) 
Lowest Quality Superstar L2  0.049 (0.030) 
Lowest Quality Superstar L3  0.058 (0.031) 
Lowest Quality Superstar L4  0.049 (0.032) 
Lowest Quality Superstar L5  0.003 (0.028) 
Medium Quality Superstar   0.098** (0.030) 
Medium Quality Superstar L1  0.083* (0.033) 
Medium Quality Superstar L2  0.090** (0.033) 
Medium Quality Superstar L3  0.056 (0.031) 
Medium Quality Superstar L4  0.004 (0.030) 
Medium Quality Superstar L5  0.033 (0.029) 
Highest Quality Superstar   0.123** (0.028) 
Highest Quality Superstar L1  0.097** (0.031) 
Highest Quality Superstar L2  0.131** (0.033) 
Highest Quality Superstar L3  0.092** (0.035) 
Highest Quality Superstar L4  0.093** (0.036) 
Highest Quality Superstar L5  0.028 (0.033) 
December  0.550** (0.023) 
    
Adj-R2  0.98 
Number of observations  503 
  
  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
  Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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All parameters have the expected sign and are highly significant, except for 
software price and software catalog, which are not significant. The introduction of a 
superstar has a significant and positive effect for the first 5 months, in the month of 
introduction (ȕ50 = 0.058, p < 0.01), and 1 (ȕ51 = 0.081, p < 0.01), 2 (ȕ52 = 0.077, p < 0.01), 
3 (ȕ53 = 0.064, p < 0.01), and 4 months after introduction (ȕ54 = 0.040, p < 0.05). The 5th  
lag (e.g., t+5), and all later lags are not significant.15 We can also reject that the cumulative 
superstar effect at t+5 is equal to zero (ȕ50 + ȕ51 + ȕ52 + ȕ53 + ȕ54 + ȕ55 = 0), at the p < 0.01 
level.   
Using these parameters, we estimate both the monthly effects and the cumulative 
effect of superstar introductions on hardware unit sales, from their introduction at t, until 5 
months after their introduction (t+5). Figure 3.5 depicts this graphically. The monthly 
effect peaks during 1 to 2 months after introduction, and decays afterwards. Remember 
that software unit sales flatten around the same time. A superstar software title increases 
hardware unit sales by 14% (167,000 units) on average, during these first 6 months16 
(29,000 units during the month of introduction (t), 39,000 (t+1), 38,000 (t+2), 32,000 
(t+3), 21,000 (t+4) and 8,000 (t+5)). We report both the percentage increase in hardware 
unit sales, and the size of this effect in hardware unit sales, of a superstar software 
introduction. This allows us to compare the hardware effect, with the software effect, of 
superstars. However, we advise caution when interpreting these hardware unit effects, due 
to the large variance between and within systems. A superstar achieves software sales of 
835,000 units on average, during these first 6 months (See Figure 3.2). Meaning that 
during these first 6 months, on average, 1 in every 5 buyers of a superstar software title, 
also purchases the hardware required to use the superstar software title.  
 
 
  
                                                          
15 We start with a large number of superstar lags (e.g., a large N ) as suggested by Greene (2003), 
and reduce the number of lags until only the last lag (e.g., t+5) is not significant. By including the 
last not significant lag, we make sure that the coefficients are not biased and inconsistent because of 
this (Greene 2003; Judge et al. 1985).  
16 Using only expert ratings or only user ratings, instead of the average of both, to identify superstar 
software titles, also confirms the presence of a superstar effect, while all other estimated parameters 
were highly similar. 
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Figure 3.5: The Effect of Superstars on Hardware Unit Sales over 
Time 
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We also find that software introductions (ȕ3 = 0.274, p < 0.01) and software 
quality (ȕ4 = 0.013, p < 0.05) are significant.  Hardware price (Į1 = -1.073, p < 0.01) has a 
significant and negative effect on hardware unit sales, while the system becomes less 
popular as it ages (Į2 = -0.008, p < 0.01) (i.e., a negative time trend)17. The effect of the 
software catalog (ȕ2 = -0.019) is not significant, because consumers do not seem to value 
old non-superstar software titles. Also the effect of software price (ȕ1 = 0.345) is not 
significant. Reasons for the latter may be that there is little variance in software price or 
that software price shows a high correlation with hardware age and software catalog, 
potentially inflating the standard error. We also find that there is a bump in hardware unit 
sales in December (Ȗ1 = 0.550, p < 0.01), due to the holiday effect.  
We can re-estimate Model 1, using different software quality thresholds to 
identify superstars, in order to examine the relationship between the choice of the threshold 
DQGVXSHUVWDUV¶FXPXODWLYHHIIHFWRQKDUGZDUHXQLWVDOHV7KHQXPEHURIVXSHUVWDUVGURSV
sharply with an increasing quality threshold. Consistent with the superstar theory 
formulated by Rosen (1981), we again find a monotonic increasing returns relationship 
between software quality and hardware unit sales (See Figure 3.6), similar to the one 
between software quality and software unit sales. A software quality threshold of 86 ± all 
games with a quality rating of 86 and above are considered superstars ± identifies 337 
software titles as a superstar. Software titles with a quality rating of 86 and above increase 
hardware unit sales with only 4% (48,000 units) on average during the first 6 months. A 
quality threshold of 92 ± all games with a quality rating of 92 and above are considered 
superstars ± identifies just 32 software titles as a superstar. Software titles with a quality 
rating of 92 and above increase hardware unit sales with 26% (285,000 units) on average 
during the first 6 months (See Figure 3.6).  
  
                                                          
17 Using trends that are even more flexible such as t2 + t, or t2 + t + log t, to estimate equation (1) 
gave similar results. 
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Figure 3.6: Varying the Software Quality Threshold to Identify 
Superstars 
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We subsequently examine if this apparent monotonic increasing returns 
relationship, between software quality and hardware unit sales is significant, by dividing 
the 89 identified superstar software titles into 3 evenly sized groups, according to their 
software quality rating. The lowest quality superstars (N=30) are grouped together, and 
have an average software quality rating of 90.48. The medium quality superstars (N=30) 
are grouped together, and have an average software quality rating of 91.45. The highest 
quality superstars (N=29) are grouped together, and have an average software quality of 
93.25. Model 2 in Table 3.4 shows the estimated parameters of the 3 superstar quality 
groups. Using these parameters, we can again estimate the monthly and cumulative effects 
of these 3 superstar quality groups on hardware unit sales, using a similar methodology as 
before. 
The highest quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with 21% (242,000 
units), the medium quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with 13% (160,000 
units), while the lowest quality superstars increase hardware unit sales with only 8% 
(101,000 units).18 We can reject that the cumulative superstar effect of the low, medium 
and high quality groups are equal to zero. We can also reject that the cumulative effect of 
the lowest quality superstars is equal to the cumulative effect of the highest quality 
superstars. We cannot reject that the cumulative effect of the medium quality superstar 
group differs from the other two effects. All these results support our theoretical rationale 
that superstars display increasing returns of software quality to hardware unit sales, as the 
returns to quality increase over quality tiers (low ± medium ± high). 
 
  
  
                                                          
18 Estimating the cumulative superstar effects presented in this section, using only the first 4 or 5 
months, confirm the findings presented here. 
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Superstar Introductions by Software Type 
 
Variables Model 3   Variables Model 4 
  Coefficient (S.E.)     Coefficient (S.E.) 
Hardware Price -1.076** (0.197)  Hardware Price -1.070** (0.196) 
Hardware Age -0.009** (0.002)  Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
Software Price  0.320 (0.263)  Software Price  0.357 (0.262) 
Software Catalog -0.014 (0.064)  Software Catalog -0.016 (0.063) 
Software Introductions  0.266** (0.025)  Software Introductions  0.274** (0.025) 
Software Quality  0.013* (0.013)  Software Quality   0.013* (0.006) 
Exclusive Superstar  0.096** (0.023)  Original Superstar  0.066** (0.024) 
Exclusive Superstar L1  0.081** (0.025)  Original Superstar L1  0.076** (0.025) 
Exclusive Superstar L2  0.085** (0.026)  Original Superstar L2  0.059* (0.025) 
Exclusive Superstar L3  0.081** (0.027)  Original Superstar L3  0.065* (0.026) 
Exclusive Superstar L4  0.056* (0.028)  Original Superstar L4  0.015 (0.026) 
Exclusive Superstar L5  0.029 (0.025)  Original Superstar L5 -0.003 (0.024) 
Non-excl. Superstar  0.006 (0.024)  Superstar Sequel  0.045 (0.024) 
Non-excl. Superstar L1  0.090** (0.024)  Superstar Sequel L1  0.080** (0.025) 
Non-excl. Superstar L2  0.076** (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L2  0.093** (0.026) 
Non-excl. Superstar L3  0.057* (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L3  0.059* (0.027) 
Non-excl. Superstar L4  0.028 (0.025)  Superstar Sequel L4  0.073** (0.028) 
Non-excl. Superstar L5 -0.004 (0.024)  Superstar Sequel L5  0.027 (0.026) 
       
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
December  0.549** (0.023)  December  0.548** (0.023) 
       
Adj-R2 0.98   0.98 
Number of observations 503     503 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05.  
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Table 3.5: The Effect of Superstar Introductions by Software Type 
(ctd.) 
    Variables Model 5 
  Coefficient (S.E.) 
 Hardware Price -1.065** (0.199) 
 Hardware Age -0.008** (0.002) 
 Software Price  0.400 (0.273) 
 Software Catalog -0.015 (0.066) 
 Software Introductions  0.277** (0.026) 
 Software Quality  0.012* (0.006) 
 Action Superstar -0.007 (0.026) 
 Action Superstar L1  0.077** (0.029) 
 Action Superstar L2  0.050 (0.027) 
 Action Superstar L3  0.047 (0.027) 
 Action Superstar L4  0.038 (0.026) 
 Action Superstar L5  0.038 (0.026) 
 FPS Superstar  0.223** (0.056) 
 FPS Superstar L1  0.127* (0.059) 
 FPS Superstar L2  0.127 (0.067) 
 FPS Superstar L3  0.130* (0.066) 
 FPS Superstar L4  0.003 (0.065) 
 FPS Superstar L5 -0.073 (0.063) 
 Platformer Superstar  0.102** (0.044) 
 Platformer Superstar L1  0.127** (0.049) 
 Platformer Superstar L2  0.044 (0.047) 
 Platformer Superstar L3  0.085 (0.044) 
 Platformer Superstar L4 -0.044 (0.045) 
 Platformer Superstar L5 -0.015 (0.040) 
 Racing Superstar  0.046 (0.063) 
 Racing Superstar L1  0.095 (0.071) 
 Racing Superstar L2  0.163* (0.075) 
 Racing Superstar L3  0.087 (0.075) 
 Racing Superstar L4  0.228* (0.098) 
 Racing Superstar L5  0.125 (0.091) 
 RPG Superstar  0.045 (0.038) 
 RPG Superstar L1  0.074 (0.042) 
 RPG Superstar L2  0.091* (0.044) 
 RPG Superstar L3  0.076 (0.045) 
 RPG Superstar L4  0.038 (0.044) 
 RPG Superstar L5  0.011 (0.039) 
 Sports Superstar  0.146* (0.059) 
 Sports Superstar L1  0.004 (0.062) 
 Sports Superstar L2  0.094 (0.066) 
 Sports Superstar L3  0.028 (0.070) 
 Sports Superstar L4  0.051 (0.074) 
 Sports Superstar L5  0.060 (0.068) 
 December  0.550** (0.024) 
    
  0.97 
    503 
  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
  Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05.  
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3.5.2  The Effect of Software Type 
Models 3, 4 and 5, in Table 3.5, show the effect of superstar introductions on 
hardware unit sales moderated by software type. We first distinguish between superstars 
that are exclusively available for just one system (n=56), and non-exclusive superstars that 
are available for multiple systems (n=33). Model 3 in Table 3.5 shows the estimated 
parameters of the exclusive superstar and non-exclusive superstar effects. Using these 
parameters, we can again estimate the monthly and cumulative effects of exclusive and 
non-exclusive superstars on hardware unit sales, using a similar methodology as before.  
Exclusive superstars increase hardware unit sales with 16% (196,000 units), while 
non-exclusive superstars increase hardware unit sales with only 9% (117,000 units). We 
can reject that both the cumulative exclusive superstar effect and the cumulative non-
exclusive superstar effect are equal to zero. However, we cannot reject that these two 
cumulative effects are statistically equal to one another, due to the large standard errors 
and numerous non-significant parameter estimates. We can therefore not confirm the 
theoretical rationale, that exclusive superstars have a larger effect on hardware unit sales 
compared to non-exclusive superstars.  
Next, we distinguish between superstars that are original titles (n=49) from 
superstars that are sequels (n=40). Model 4 in Table 3.5 shows the estimated parameters of 
the original superstar and superstar sequel effects. Original superstars increase hardware 
unit sales by 12% (146,000 units), while superstar sequels increase hardware unit sales by 
16% (192,000 units). We can reject that both the cumulative original superstar effect and 
the cumulative superstar sequel effect is equal to zero. However, we cannot reject that 
these two cumulative effects are statistically equal to one another. We can therefore not 
confirm any of the two theoretical rationales. 
Last, we distinguish superstars according to their genre. As stated before, there 
are 6 genres. The two large genres are action (n=36) and platformer (n=12). The four small 
genres are first-person shooter (FPS) (n=7), racing (n=5), role-playing (RPG) (n=20), and 
sports (n=9). Model 5 in Table 3.5 shows the parameters of the superstar effects per genre. 
The small size of some genres is likely a contributing factor to a number of insignificant 
parameters. First-person shooter (FPS) (25% (280,000 units)) and racing (26% (286,000 
units)) superstars have the largest (i.e., above average) impact on hardware unit sales. 
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Superstars from the genres role-playing (RPG) (14% (170,000 units)) and sports (16% 
(190,000 units)) have a moderate effect on hardware unit sales. Surprisingly, superstars 
from the two large genres (action 10% (129,000 units) and platformer 11% (142,000 
units)) have the smallest (i.e., below average) effect on hardware unit sales. We can reject 
that the cumulative effect, from each software genre is equal to zero. However, we cannot 
reject that these cumulative effects are statistically equal to one another. We can therefore 
not confirm the theoretical rationale that superstars from a larger genre have a larger effect 
on hardware unit sales.  
We are unable to confirm that software type moderates the effect superstars have 
on hardware unit sales. However, this may be different in other system markets. Take for 
instance, the High Definition DVD market. Superstar movies will likely stimulate sales of 
High Definition DVD players; much like titles such as The Matrix did for the DVD format. 
At the same time, different movie types exist, which may generate different returns. For 
instance, action movies full of computer-generated images (CGI) are likely to have a larger 
impact on hardware unit sales, as compared to drama movies, which depend less on the 
high screen resolution and the large number of sound channels, therefore being less 
suitable to sell High-Definition DVD players. 
 
3.5.3  Robustness and Further Analyses 
Our estimations of various models show stability in parameter estimates. We 
conducted the following analyses to further test the robustness of our estimates.  
We used different estimation methods (than our Prais-Winsten model) such as 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and generalized method of moments (GMM), and different 
sub-samples, to estimate equation (1). All these analyses confirm our findings reported 
above. We also estimated a model that included competition, through contemporaneous 
(0.509, p < 0.01) and lagged competitor hardware unit sales (-0.076, p < 0.01). This model 
again yielded similar findings. Finally, we also estimated a model lagging independent 
variables, which again confirmed our findings. In sum, our findings are highly robust to 
alternate model specifications.   
One could also study the effect of the accumulation of superstar introductions 
over time for a certain system (i.e., the superstar catalog size), on hardware unit sales. We 
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have done so, and found the effect of the accumulation of superstars on hardware unit sales 
to be positive (0.017, p<0.01), while all other estimated parameters were similar.  
The correlation matrix in Table 3.3 shows high correlations between several 
independent variables (i.e., hardware age, hardware price, software quantity and software 
price). We assessed the consequences of these high correlations in two ways.  First, we 
used multiple procedures to assess multicollinearity (e.g., Belsley 1991; Belsley, Kuh and 
Welsh 1980; Marquardt 1970). All these procedures indicate that the weak to moderate 
dependencies between the independent variables do not create harmful multicollinearity. 
The values of the condition indices are below 35, and variance inflation factors are below 
5. In addition, the correlation between the different superstar types and their lags is low 
(i.e., below 0.25). Second, we dropped independent variables that showed a high 
correlation with another independent variable, one by one. The parameter estimates we 
obtained are very similar to the model that included the dropped independent variable, 
parameter estimates do not fluctuate dramatically, and parameter estimates do not change 
sign. Overall, we can conclude that our results are highly robust. 
 
3.6  Discussion 
We find that superstars are as attractive as popular belief suggests, and helped to 
sell over 14.8 million systems, which is around 12.4% of total hardware unit sales. During 
the first 6 months a superstar software title is on the market, 1 in every 5 buyers of a 
superstar software title, also purchases the hardware required to use the superstar software 
title. Systems with no or only one superstar failed miserably. Surprisingly, while superstar 
software unit sales peak during introduction and decline with each month, the monthly 
superstar effect on hardware unit sales peaks in the second to third month, and thus 
displays an inverted U-shape effect over time. Thus, high software unit sales of superstars 
do not automatically translate into a large, or similarly shaped, superstar effect on 
hardware unit sales. This different time pattern is likely because of the relative slower 
diffusion of information about superstars among non-adopters (i.e., potential hardware 
buyers), compared to adopters (i.e., software buyers). Software type, such as the 
exclusivity of a superstar, does not significantly moderate the effect of superstar software 
releases on video game console sales.  
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3.6.1  Implications 
These findings have important implications for theory and research on system 
markets, as they invalidate prior operationalizations of software availability. Using the 
software catalog as an indicator for software availability, which is standard practice in 
network effects literature, may show insignificant indirect network effects (Stremersch et 
al. 2007). Using the number of software titles introduced may paint an incomplete picture, 
as it does not account for increasing returns to quality and thus the abnormal returns on 
superstars. Future research should use a software availability measure, which accounts for 
both software titles of varying superstar power, and varying durability (given the decay in 
effects over time we found with respect to superstars, and the non-significant effect of the 
old software catalog on hardware unit sales).  
We find a monotonic increasing returns relationship, between software quality 
and software unit sales (See Figure 3.1), and between superstar quality and hardware unit 
sales (See Figure 3.6). Thereby, we contribute to the literature on quality by extending the 
relevance and importDQFH RI SURGXFW TXDOLW\ LQ WKH SURGXFW¶V RZQ PDUNHW LH WKH
superstar effect in the software market) to complementary and adjoining markets (i.e., the 
hardware market). 
Software firms should examine their inventory of software titles for potential 
superstars, and negotiate with system owners to receive side-payments for the increase in 
hardware unit sales their superstars cause. Software firms could even initiate a bidding war 
between system owners for the rights to their superstars. System owners should examine 
the forthcoming software titles for potential superstar power. If a software franchise (e.g., 
Take-7ZR¶V*UDQG7KHIW$XWR)UDQFKLVHLVIDPRXVIRUFUHDWLQJVXSHUVWDUVRIWZDUHWLWOHV
system owners should proactively act on this knowledge.19  Microsoft paid $50 million to 
software publisher Take-Two, for producing two downloadable episodes of Grand-Theft 
Auto (Schiesel 2007). As superstars only have a positive effect on hardware unit sales for a 
limited period, system owners must convince consumers that the introduction of a 
superstar is not a fluke, but that there will be a steady supply of superstar software titles. 
System owners should inform consumers early on during the software development 
                                                          
19 We thank a reviewer for this insight. 
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process, that software developers of past superstars are developing new superstars, to 
manage expectations and in order to create positive expectations, which are so crucial in 
positive feedback markets (e.g., Shapiro and Varian 1998).  
However, system owners must remember that when they pay software firms for 
the exclusivity of their superstars, they are not additionally increasing their own hardware 
sales -compared to a non-exclusive superstar software title - but that they are eliminating 
an opportunity for competing systems to increase their hardware unit sales. Eliminating 
FRPSHWLWRU KDUGZDUH VDOHV ZKLOH LQFUHDVLQJ RQH¶V RZQ KDUGZDUH VDOHV PD\ ZHOO EH WKH
deciding factor in a positive feedback market (e.g., Arthur 1989 and 1996; Shapiro and 
Varian 1998). The Sega Dreamcast had plenty of superstars during its first year, and 
subsequently hardware sales exceeded expectations. However, when the introduction of 
superstars dried up during the second year, due to software publishers switching to the 
Sony Playstation 2, so did hardware sales, and Sega was forced to withdraw from the 
PDUNHWDVDV\VWHP¶VRZQHU 
Superstars display increasing returns (both in software unit sales and hardware 
unit sales) to software quality. Cutting corners, while rushing a software title to market, to 
meet a deadline (e.g., the launch of the hardware, or the December holidays), will not only 
have an adverse effect on the software sales of the software title itself. It could also turn a 
SRWHQWLDO VXSHUVWDU LQWR D µPH-WRR¶ VRIWZDUH WLWOHZLWKRXW D VXSHUVWDU HIIHFW RQ KDUGZDUH
sales, just because of the slightly lower software quality. System owners should intervene, 
and pay software publishers to continue development, in order to improve quality. In 
addition, system owners should provide resources (e.g., popular franchises, more advanced 
JDPHHQJLQHVHWFLIDVRIWZDUHSXEOLVKHUGRHVQRWKDYHWKHUHVRXUFHVWRWXUQDµPH-WRR¶
software title into a superstar, because it will increase both software and hardware sales.  
While our empirical test reflected upon the role of superstar introductions in 
system markets, in only one system market, namely the U.S. home video game console 
market, its conceptual conclusions ± numbers may vary ± are likely to be valid in other 
markets as well. In the High-Definition DVD market, the absence or presence of support 
from movie studios who have introduced recent superstar movies proved to be the deciding 
IDFWRU LQ WKH VWDQGDUGV ZDU EHWZHHQ 7RVKLED¶V +'-'9' VWDQGDUG DQG 6RQ\¶V %OX-ray 
VWDQGDUGWKDWWLSSHGWKHPDUNHWWRZDUGV6RQ\¶V%OX-ray standard. In addition, the Satellite 
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radio market in the U.S. is likely to be also such a superstar system market, in which 
multiple incompatible systems fought one another for dominance (Sirius and XM). The 
signing of superstars like Howard Stern, and the exclusive rights to live broadcasts of NFL 
games, are important events that likely increased sales of one of the two competing 
systems. In contrast, the lack of superstars (i.e., NFL games, superstar movies) in the 
HDTV market may well be the cause of the initial sluggish adoption of HDTV sets. 
Therefore, both hardware and software firms should carefully examine the role superstars 
play in their industry, as superstars affect both software and hardware sales. 
 
3.6.2  Limitations and Future Research 
The present paper is the first one to study the role of superstar software titles in 
system markets. Thus, this paper is an important contribution to the literature that may 
provoke further research. At the same time, it also has some limitations that such future 
research may address.  
This paper only examines one system market. Future research could examine if 
the superstar phenomenon also exists outside the video game market, and if the effect 
superstars have on hardware unit sales is similar to that of superstars in the video game 
industry. Markets that may prove fruitful to examine are the High-Definition DVD market 
and the Satellite radio market.  
This paper also only focuses on the hardware adoption side, and largely ignores 
the software provision side, as this is not the focus of the paper. While this is a common 
approach in modeling system markets (e.g. Hartman and Teece 1990; Shankar and Bayus 
2003), it does raise potential endogeneity concerns. However, in our case, these concerns 
cannot be addressed by specifying both a demand and supply model (as in, Nair, 
Chintagunta and Dubé 2004; Sawhney and Eliashberg 1996). The reason is that important 
data in the supply equation is unavailable (e.g. software costs) and possible instruments 
(e.g. from a different geographic area) again are unavailable.  
On the positive side, we have several indications that endogeneity is not a major 
concern in our case. First, prior studies on system markets that explicitly address potential 
endogeneity show the findings from a model that controls for endogeneity to be very 
similar to the findings from a model that does not (e.g. Dranove and Gandal 2003; Gandal, 
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Kende and Rob 2000; Le-Nagard-Assayag and Manceau 2001; Ohashi 2003; Park 2004; 
Rysman 2004). Second, it is unlikely that the variables of focal interest to us, such as 
superstar introductions, software quantity, and software quality, depend upon 
contemporaneous hardware unit sales. The reason is that it takes 12 to 18 months to 
develop an average video game. Superstars can take many years to develop. Thus, while 
price may be endogenous, potentially creating a bias in our price parameters, this is very 
unlikely to occur in the software availability variables. Third, one way to reduce 
endogeneity is to lag all independent variables. We found that this did not affect our 
estimates much, again alleviating endogeneity concerns. 
In addition, we do not study the technological characteristics of the hardware. We 
control for this effect in our model by including a fixed effect. However, the study of such 
technological characteristics may yield interesting managerial insights, as they seem to 
KDYHEHFRPHPRUHLPSRUWDQWUHFHQWO\HJ:KDWLVWKHHIIHFWRI1LQWHQGR¶VXQLTXHJDPH
controller on hardware unit sales? What is the effect of the Blu-ray capability of the Sony 
Playstation 3 on hardware unit sales?).  
Our research may also stimulate further research in this area, which does not 
necessarily focus on addressing shortcomings of the present study. First, the present study 
focuses on the sales gain from superstar introductions. Obviously, superstars may require a 
higher investment and are intrinsically more risky to develop. A study that examines the 
profitability of investments made by system owners in the supply of superstars would be 
intrinsically interesting, but challenging to conduct.  
We have also shown that superstar introductions are an important indicator of 
hardware unit sales. Thus, the supply of superstars may be critical input in determining 
who will win system wars (e.g. the current baWWOH EHWZHHQ 0LFURVRIW¶V ;ER[ 
1LQWHQGR¶V:LLDQG6RQ\¶V3OD\VWDWLRQ+RZHYHURXUVWXG\ODFNVIRUHVLJKWLQWKHVHQVH
that it studies actual introductions, rather than announcements. It would be highly valuable 
to study the effect of superstar announcements on hardware unit sales (foresight by 
consumers) or firm valuations (foresight by investors). The support of third parties (i.e., 
independent software publishers) for a certain system may also be very valuable 
information in this regard. Our approach also lacks foresight in the operationalization of 
superstars. We determine ex post which software titles are superstars, given their perceived 
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quality. Studies that would enable us to determine which software titles have superstar 
potential prior to their introduction would be most valuable. 
In addition, examining the role of horizontal concentration in the software and 
hardware market, as well as vertical integration between the software and hardware 
market, or examining the role side-payments play in system markets, will likely also be 
fruitful areas of future research. 
We hope that these research ideas spark more interest in the phenomenon of 
superstars in system markets, which has remained deprived from academic attention for 
too long. 
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Chapter 4 
Complementor Entry in System Markets20 
4.1  Introduction 
Systems are composed of complementary products (Gandal, Kende and Rob 
2000; Katz and Shapiro 1994; Stremersch et al. 2007). For example, a video game system 
is composed of the video game console (the hardware) and video games (the software). 
System markets are characterized by indirect network effects. In such markets, increased 
adoption of the hardware by consumers, and thereby an increased hardware installed base, 
is said to positively affect the complementors' decision to introduce software products for 
the respective hardware (i.e., supply-side indirect network effects). Larger availability of 
software products is believed to increase the utility of the system to consumers, thereby 
DIIHFWLQJ WKH FRQVXPHUV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR DGRSW WKH KDUGZDUH WKXV LQFUHDVLQJ hardware sales 
(i.e., demand-side indirect network effects) (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Church and Gandal 
1993 and 1996; Katz and Shapiro 1994; Stremersch et al. 2007).  
Demand- and supply-side indirect network effects may lead to a coordination 
problem, cRPPRQO\ UHIHUUHG WR DV WKH µFKLFNHQ-and-HJJ¶ SUREOHP EHFDXVH ERWK
FRPSOHPHQWRUV DQG FRQVXPHUV PD\ WDNH RQ D µZDLW-and-VHH¶ DWWLWXGH *XSWD -DLQ DQG
Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 1994). In essence, independent software firms (i.e., 
complementors) stall entry and thus the introduction of software products, until enough 
consumers have adopted the system, while consumers wait to adopt the system until 
enough software firms have entered and introduced their software products (Caillaud and 
Jullien 2003; Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney 1999; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004; 
Stremersch et al. 2007). In the end, software firms may not even enter at all, leading to the 
V\VWHP¶VIDLOXUH 
While the indirect network effects literature has largely focused on demand-side 
indirect network effects (see Stremersch et al. (2007) for an overview), there are no studies 
we know of, which examine the entry decision of the complementor in a system market 
context. Supply-side indirect network effects are rarely tested empirically, in comparison 
                                                          
20 This work was co-authored with Stefan Stremersch, and is being prepared for submission. 
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to demand-side indirect network effects (see Stremersch et al. 2007 for an exception). At 
the same time, the firm entry literature, while a rich literature (e.g. Agarwal 1998; Agarwal 
and Audretsch 2001; Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Bayus, Kang and 
Agarwal 2007; Gort and Klepper 1982; Gort and Konakayama 1982; Kim, Bridges and 
Srivastava 1999; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Klepper and Miller 1995), has focused on the 
entry pattern of firms in an industry, in a technology, or across industries (Geroski 1995), 
over time, but not on the entry of complementors in industries with indirect network 
effects. This chapter is the first to study the variation in entry timing and likelihood across 
complementors for the same system. 
The omission in the indirect network effect and firm entry literatures that the 
present chapter addresses is important. The (lack of) entry of complementors may 
determine the success (or failure) of the entire system (Binken and Stremersch 2009; 
Church and Gandal 1993 and 1996; Farrell and Saloner 1986; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 
1999; Katz and Shapiro 1986b and 1994). In addition, as the economy becomes more and 
more interconnected, the number of markets that face indirect network effects, and thus, 
the risk of the syVWHP¶V IDLOXUHEHFDXVHRI VORZRUQRQ-existent entry of complementors, 
increases (Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004; 
Yoffie 1997).  
We obtained data on 2,895 entry decisions (of which 775 resulted in entry) in the 
U.S. home video game industry, during the period 1976 to 2008. By the end of 2007, these 
775 entries had generated over $67 billion in software sales alone. This industry is a fitting 
setting to study complementor entry, because prior research identifies it as a system market 
(e.g. Binken and Stremersch 2009; Church and Gandal 1992a; Katz and Shapiro 1994). 
Because complementors enter in less than 27% of the entry opportunities, we use a split-
population duration model (Schmidt and Witte 1989; Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992), as 
it relaxes the assumption that all entry opportunities will eventually experience the event of 
interest (i.e., entry). The split-population duration model uses a logit function to model the 
probability of entry and a hazard function to model the time of entry, which we estimate 
simultaneously. The model allows us to separate out the effects of our covariates on the 
probability of entry, from the effects on the timing of entry.  
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While we find that every pre-entry experience by the complementor itself, the 
system owner or other complementors makes the complementor a faster entrant, the effect 
of these pre-HQWU\H[SHULHQFHVRQ WKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUREDELOLW\RIHQWU\ LVYHU\PL[HG
Especially, the pre-entry relationship between complementor and system owner plays an 
LPSRUWDQW UROH LQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V HQWU\ GHFLVLRQ 2XU ILQGLQJV DOORZ PDUNHWLQJ
managers of system owners to alleviate the 'chicken-and-egg' problem their new system 
faces, by identifying the most probable early entrants (i.e., complementors) early on (even 
before they introduce their new system). In addition, it allows marketing managers of 
complementors and market analysts to early on identify if a system has or has not adequate 
support from complementors (i.e., differentiate between winning and losing systems). In 
addition, we find that the effect of supply-side indirect network effects (i.e., hardware 
LQVWDOOHGEDVHRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VWLPHRIHQWU\H[KLELWVVWURQJKHWHURJHQHLW\7KHUHE\
identifying under which conditions supply-side indirect network effects are, and are not, an 
effective marketing instrument in the strategy of a system owner to win a systems war. 
We organize the remainder of the chapter as follows. Next, we develop the 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. Then we discuss the data and model we use to test 
the hypotheses. We end with presenting the results and a discussion of this chapter´s 
implications and limitations.  
 
4.2  Entry of Complementors in System Markets: Theory 
In this chapterZHVWXG\WZRFRPSRQHQWVRIDFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VHQWU\ZKHWKHUWR
eventually enter or not (a binary outcome; a complementor has entered or not) and when to 
enter (a timing outcome; the time it took the complementor to enter, since introduction of 
the system). We develop theoretical expectations on the variables that may affect both 
FRPSRQHQWV RI WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V HQWU\ GHFLVLRQ 7KH PDLQ GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ ERWK
entry components is that any variable that is explicitly time-varying (e.g. hardware 
installed baVH V\VWHP¶V DJH LV H[FOXGHG IURP WKH ELQDU\ FRPSRQHQW ZKHWKHU RU QRW WR
enter) (Dekimpe et al. 1998; Gupta 1991). The entry-timing component has both time-
varying and time-invariant explanatory variables.  
Entrants differ in their capabilities (Klepper 2002). Examining the effect of pre-
entry experience on firm entry will allow us to better understand the evolution of system 
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markets. In our hypotheses derivation, we focus on the pre-entry experience of the system 
owner ± whether the system owner was present with a system during the previous 
technology generation (i.e., incumbency) and whether it entered the present technology 
generation early or late (i.e., entry timing) ± and pre-entry experience of the complementor 
± whether the complementor already had a relationship with the system owner in the 
previous technology generation, and how many other systems in entered and supported 
with software products in total, prior to the entry decision entry at hand (i.e., pre-entry 
diversification). Figure 4.1 depicts our conceptual framework, and provides an overview of 
the hypotheses we test. 
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Figure 4.1: Conceptual Framework, Hypotheses and Results 
  
(S) indicates that hypothesis is supported, (NS) indicates that hypothesis is not supported. Two-sided 
significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05. 
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4.3  Whether or Not to Enter: Drivers of Complementor Entry 
Probability 
We first theorize on the variables that may explain whether a complementor will 
ultimately supply its complements for a specific system (whether or not to enter). We first 
detail our expectations on the pre-entry experience of the system owner (i.e., incumbency, 
entry timing), after which we turn to the pre-entry experience of the complementor (i.e., 
relationship with system owner, pre-entry diversification). We end with other covariates 
we will control for in our statistical tests.  
 
4.3.1  System Owner 
4.3.1.1  Pre-entry Incumbency 
Initially all system owners are entrants. However, in later technology generations, 
there will be both incumbents and entrants. We define incumbents, as system owners that 
were present with a system during the previous technology generation, similar to prior 
research (e.g. Chandy and Tellis 2000; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004). There 
are 35 systems, of which entrants introduced 23 systems and incumbents 12 (See Table 
4.1).  
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Table 4.1: Complementor Entry Evolution (1976 until April-2008) 
 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 Gen 6 Gen 7 
Total Number of Entry 
Opportunities 
546 501 655 624 387 182 
       
Number of Entries 48 (9%) 99 (20%) 146 (22%) 182 (29%) 212 (55%) 88 (48%) 
Average Time to Entry 
in Months 
60.1 39.4 25.9 22 20.9 9.3 
Number of Pre-entry 
Relationships Between 
Complementor and 
System Owner 
0 (0 %) 38 (8%) 64 (10%) 89 (14%) 100 (26%) 127 (72%) 
New System Owners 
(Entrants) 
10 4 3 4 2 0 
Incumbent System 
Owners 
0 2 2 2 3 3 
Total Systems 10 6 5 6 5 3 
       
Unsuccessful Systems 9 5 3 4 2 0 
Successful Systems 1 1 2 2 3 3 
Total Systems 10 6 5 6 5 3 
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We expect that if a system owner was present during the previous technology 
generation (i.e., has pre-entry experience from the prior generation), it will have a positive 
HIIHFWRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUREDELOLW\RIHQWU\:KHQDV\VWHPRZQHULVDSOD\HULQWKH
previous technology generation (i.e., an incumbent) it may well shape the evolution of the 
industry, greatly influencing future generations of products to its advantage (Schilling 
1999). Incumbents have access to market knowledge, brand equity, and customer 
relationships from the past (Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2004; Thomas 1995), 
which will increase the incumbent's effectiveness in the next technology generation. 
Reputation and brand name are especially valuable in network markets, where expectations 
are pivotal (Shapiro and Varian 1998). In addition, the previous generation gives the 
incumbent additional --financial-- resources to persuade complementors to enter its next 
generation system. On the demand-side, consumers are more inclined to adopt a new 
system from an incumbent from which they purchased their prior system (Greenstein 
1993). Therefore,  
 
H1: Incumbency of the system owner will have a positive effect on the complementor's 
probability of entry. 
 
4.3.1.2  Entry Timing 
System owners that enter early in a new technology generation may have key 
advantages, like preemption of scarce resources, in network markets (Shapiro and Varian 
1998). Being early gives a system owner the opportunity to build a substantial hardware 
installed base and software catalog, and set the tone for future competition (Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1988 and 1998; Tushman and Anderson 1986). In contrast, later systems 
enter the market in a much more competitive environment and face an uphill battle against 
earlier introduced systems. In addition, early adopting consumers and early entering 
complementors have spent --part of-- their resources, and increased their familiarity with 
existing competing systems. For these reasons, systems that entered later within a 
generation may find it more difficult to entice complementors to support their systems. 
Therefore,  
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H2: The later introduction of the system during a technology generation has a negative 
effect on the complementor's probability of entry. 
 
4.3.2  Complementor 
4.3.2.1  Pre-entry Relationship with System Owner 
If a complementor has a pre-entry relationship with the system owner, it may be 
FKHDSHUWRSURYLGHFRPSOHPHQWVIRUWKHV\VWHPRZQHU¶VQHZV\VWHP*UHHQVWHLQ,Q
addition, this pre-entry relationship may have required relationship-specific investments of 
the complementor that would be lost if the complementor does not continue its relationship 
with the system owner towards new generations of systems, thus driving them to long-term 
relationships across technology generations (Katz and Shapiro 1994). Therefore, 
 
H3: The existence of a pre-entry relationship with the system owner has a positive effect 
on the complementor's probability of entry. 
 
4.3.2.2  Pre-entry Diversification  
Some complementors diversify their investment across a large number of systems 
(i.e., a large number of pre-entry entries into prior introduced systems of competing 
hardware sponsors), while others do not and specialize into fewer systems. These pre-entry 
entries create prior generation knowledge and resources, which will become the initial 
building blocks of next generation knowledge and resources (Wheelwright and Clark 
1992; Garud and Kumaraswamy 1993). Diversification also allows complementors to 
leverage their --financial, organizational and technical-- resources (e.g. Bayus and Agarwal 
2007; Teece 1986), across multiple emerging systems. Therefore, 
 
H4: Pre-entry diversification positively affects the complementor's probability of entry.  
 
4.3.3  Other Covariates 
New technology generations may significantly expand the market to new 
consumers as each new technology generation is superior (i.e., more efficient, increased 
functionality) compared to its predecessor (Islam and Meade 1997; Mahajan and Muller 
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1996; Padmanabhan and Bass 1993). Therefore, we expect the probability of 
complementor entry to increase with each new technology generation. We also control for 
DFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUH-entry size (i.e., pre-entry accumulated economies of scale) and pre-
entry age (i.e., pre-entry accumulated learning by doing). We expect larger and older 
complementors to show a higher probability to enter, as they have accumulated more 
knowledge than smaller and younger firms, which enhances efficiency and gives them a 
competitive advantage (i.e., lower costs, higher quality) (Arrow 1962; Gort and 
Konakayama 1982; Levy 1965). In addition, larger firms have cost advantages in 
marketing, distribution, and production, compared to smaller firms (Bayus and Agarwal 
2007; Chandler 1990; Jovanovic and Mac Donald 1994; Sutton 1991). 
 
4.4  When to Enter: Drivers of Complementor Entry Timing 
Next, we theorize on the variables that may explain when a complementor starts 
to supply complements for a specific system (when to enter), for those complementors that 
did decide to enter. We first detail our expectations on system owner pre-entry experience, 
after which we turn to complementor pre-entry experience. Then, we turn to the time-
varying covariates such as the evolution in the hardware installed base and complementor 
support for the respective system. We end with other covariates we will control for in our 
statistical tests.  
 
4.4.1  System Owner 
4.4.1.1  Pre-entry Incumbency 
There are several reasons why complementors will enter systems of incumbents 
faster than systems of newcomers. First, the system owner has already proven once, that it 
KDV WKH UHVRXUFHV DQG NQRZOHGJH WR LQWURGXFH D V\VWHP UHGXFLQJ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V
uncertainty, and consequently, its wait-and-see attitude. Second, incumbent system owners 
can offer complementors a migration path to its next system (Shapiro and Varian 1998), 
and mitigate switching, porting and upgrading costs. Similarly, the backward compatibility 
of the new system with the old system will have additional benefits for complementors 
allowing them to enter faster (Shapiro and Varian 1998; Srinivasan, Lilien and 
Rangaswamy 2004). Therefore, 
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H5: Incumbency of the system owner will have a positive effect on the complementor's time 
of entry. 
 
4.4.1.2  Entry Timing 
Above, we argued that systems that are introduced later have a lower likelihood of 
complementor entry. In contrast, complementors that do enter will typically enter faster in 
case the system is introduced later as compared to when it is introduced earlier. The reason 
is that the time to recoup their investment in the system is shorter, due to the closer 
proximity of the introduction of the next technology generation, as compared to a system 
that was introduced earlier. This shorter time to recoup the investment of entry in the 
system will trigger a faster pace in entering the system and introducing complementary 
software products for it. In addition, as time passes and firms enter, more and more 
information is revealed, about hardware specification, product positioning, system owner 
strategies, etc. This reduces the level of uncertainty, thus enhancing the speed at which a 
complementor can make an entry decision. Therefore,  
 
H6: The later the introduction of the system during a technology generation, the faster the 
complementor enters. 
 
4.4.2  Complementor 
4.4.2.1  Pre-entry Relationship with System Owner 
The existence of a relationship between complementor and system owner will 
allow for faster communication and exchange of information and resources required for 
software development, which will reduce the time of entry. In addition, obligations from 
long-term contracts between complementor and system owner could force complementors 
to enter more quickly due to certain deadlines (i.e., system's introduction). Finally, the 
lower costs (Greenstein 1993) associated with the known system owner's new system will 
make entry profitable earlier on. Therefore,  
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H7: Complementors that have a pre-entry relationship with the system owner will enter 
more quickly than complementors that do not. 
 
4.4.2.2  Pre-entry Diversification  
The more systems the complementor supplies for, the more knowledge the firm 
has gained regarding the entry process itself (i.e., making cost-benefits analyses). This 
increased experience with the entry process itself will likely reduce the time required to 
assess future entry opportunities. The fact that the firm is still supporting prior systems 
indicates that the firm is also very capable of making a correct entry decision (i.e., make 
correct assumptions about future profitability). This will likely reduce the complementor's 
uncertainty about making the wrong entry decision in the future. In addition, with every 
entry the complementor acquires a larger body of knowledge. The larger this body of 
knowledge, the faster the firm will respond to market changes (i.e., needs to acquire fewer 
resources before it can enter) (Kim and Kogut 1996). Therefore, 
 
H8: The more diversified the complementor is pre-entry, the faster the complementor 
enters a new system. 
 
4.4.3  Time-Varying Covariates 
Based on network effects literature (Chou and Shy 1996; Church and Gandal 
1992a and 1993; Clements 2004; Shy 2001; Stremersch et al. 2007), one can expect 
complementors to monitor two key indicators that vary over time in their decision when to 
enter a certain system, namely hardware installed base and support by other 
complementors.   
 
4.4.3.1  Hardware Installed Base 
As is commonly known in the network effects literature, a larger hardware 
installed base increases the potential sales of the complementor's software products upon 
entry. In addition, a larger hardware installed base will decrease the uncertainty a 
complementor has about the potential success of the system, and thus smoothen 
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coordination between system owner and complementor. Thus, the larger the hardware 
installed base, the faster the complementor will enter.  
More interestingly, we expect this effect to be moderated by the V\VWHP¶VDJH, the 
pre-entry relationship between complementor and system owner and the technology 
generation. When the hardware is young, complementors have a long period to recoup the 
investments made, and are therefore expected to be more forward looking (i.e., look at the 
future hardware installed base). However, when the hardware is older, the time to recoup 
the investments made is much shorter, as the next technology generation is closer to being 
introduced, making complementors look more to the present hardware installed base. 
Scholars before us have observed that positive feedback only ignites in later stages of the 
life cycle and may be non-existent, or at least smaller, in the initial stages of the life cycle 
(Clements and Ohashi 2005; Park 2004; Ohashi 2003; Stremersch et al. 2007; Varian, 
Farrell and Shapiro 2004). Numerous pre-launch strategies (i.e., alliances, distribution, side 
payments and licensing agreements) of system owners are likely to reduce the initial effect 
of the hardware installed base. Therefore, 
 
H9: The effect of the hardware installed base on the complementor's time of entry becomes 
larger as the system ages.  
 
In contrast, the effect of the hardware installed base on entry timing is lower if the 
complementor has a pre-entry relationship with the system owner. The reason is that better 
coordination exists between system owner and complementor, thus reducing the 
coordination problem. Therefore, when such pre-entry relationship exists, hardware 
installed base becomes a less important criterion in complementor entry. Therefore, 
 
H10: The effect of the hardware installed base on the complementor's time of entry 
decreases if there is a pre-entry relationship between the complementor and the system 
owner. 
 
Economists often assume coordination between all market participants improves 
(Farrell 1987) ± whether it concerns complementors that supplied software products to the 
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prior generation system or not ±, as with each new generation the opportunities to 
communicate and coordinate with one another increase, due to more and better developed 
trade shows, trade organizations and standard setting bodies. Each successive evolutionary 
technology generation reduces the coordination problem, as it reuses and enhances the 
existing coordination system (Stieglitz and Heine 2007). In addition, there will be a 
general improvement of communication and information channels (Shapiro and Varian 
1998). System manufacturers continue to improve their skills in dealing with 
complementors in general, and such skill development is beneficial also to complementors 
they have never worked with before, alleviating the chicken-and-egg problem. Therefore, 
 
H11: The effect of the hardware installed base on the complementor's time of entry 
becomes smaller across technology generations. 
 
4.4.3.2  Support by Other Complementors 
Entry by other complementors may signal that the system is attractive, in line 
ZLWK6FKXPSHWHU¶V LPLWDWLRQK\SRWKHVLV *RUWDQG.RQDND\DPD.LP%ULGJHVDQG
Srivastava 1999). ThH FRQWDJLRQ EHWZHHQ ILUPV ZLOO DIIHFW D ILUP¶V GHFLVLRQ WR HQWHU
(Debruyne and Reibstein 2005), setting the herd behavior in motion (Choi 1997). In 
addition, an increase in the number of firms can also spur growth in demand and market 
potential due to aggressive product development and promotion, and skills and product 
quality improvements (Agarwal and Bayus 2002; Gort and Klepper 1982; Horsky and 
Simon 1983; Kim, Bridges and Srivastava 1999; Parker and Gatignon 1994). Therefore,  
 
H12: Increased support by other complementors will lead to faster complementor entry. 
 
4.4.3.3  Other Covariates 
:H FRQWURO IRU WKH V\VWHP¶V DJH DQG WHFKQRORJ\ JHQHUDWLRQ ZKHQ WHVWLQJ WKH
above hypotheses. System age and technology generation have been shown to affect 
diffusion of new products (for an overview, see Stremersch, Muller and Peres 2010). 
Likewise, they may affect entry timing of complementors. We also control for a 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUH-entry size (i.e., pre-entry accumulated economies of scale) and pre-
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entry age (i.e., pre-entry accumulated learning by doing). We expect larger and older 
complementors to show a faster entry, due to more resources and increased efficiency, 
because of economies of scale and learning by doing, which gives them a competitive 
advantage over smaller and younger complementors (e.g. Arrow 1962; Bayus and Agarwal 
2007; Chandler 1990; Gort and Konakayama 1982; Jovanovic and Mac Donald 1994; 
Sutton 1991; Lévy 1965). 
 
4.5  Data 
This section first discusses the video game market, data collection, and sample. It 
ends with providing the measures for our variables.  
 
4.5.1  The Video Game Market 
The video game industry has become a large industry, dominated by mainstream 
content (Williams 2002). In 2007, sales of the game market exceeded $18.8 billion in the 
U.S., almost double the $9.6 billion North-American box-office ticket sales, and sales 
grew to over $21 billion in 2008 (Forbes 2008; McGlaun 2008). The business of 
publishing video games is highly similar to that of other complementary products like 
&'¶V '9'¶V HERRNV /3
V YLGHRFDVVHWWHV DQG WHOHYLVLRQ VKRZV HJ *UHFR 
Komiya and Litman 1990; Liebowitz and Margolis 1999; Williams 2002). May of 1972 
saw the introduction of the first home video game console (Magnavox Odyssey), it used 
transistors, because microprocessors were still very expensive (Herman 2001). 
However less than 4 years later, in early 1976, semiconductor firm General 
Instruments introduced its new microchip that cost $5 dollars, and with pong consoles 
selling for $60 to $80 dollars, there was profit to be made, so many hardware firms entered 
the market (Cohen 1984; Herman 2001). After Christmas 1976, the video game market 
crashed. The public was losing interest, Magnavox and Atari sold inventory at reduced 
rates. RCA pulled out entirely. Coleco nearly went bankrupt (Cohen 1984; Kent 2001; 
Schmedel 1978). First generation home video game sales imploded, from $400 million in 
1976, to $15 million in 1979. First generation Pong video games had become a joke, with 
the introduction of the first second-generation system (e.g. Fairchild Channel F) (Cohen 
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1984; Kent 2001). However, it was only after the introduction of the superstar video game 
µ6SDFH,QYDGHUV¶WKDWVDOHVRI$WDUL¶VVHFRQGJHQHUDWLRQFRQVROHUHDOO\WRRNRIILQ 
Activision became the first independent software publisher in 1980, and it soon 
replaced Atari as the fastest growing firm (i.e., achieve sales of over $1 billion) in 
American history. In 1981, 8.5% of U.S. households had bought a console, and this was 
predicted to grow to 50% by 1985 (Landro 1982). This prediction could not have been 
more wrong. The second generation began its decline after the 1982 December holidays 
(Kent 2001). Third generation sales did not pick up fast enough, and total industry sales 
imploded, again. Nintendo introduced its new third generation system in 1985, and 
received numerous prophecies of doom, as industry analysts predicted that Nintendo would 
fail with each coming year (Herman 2001; Kent 2001; Sheff 1999). Even after 15 years, 3 
WHFKQRORJ\JHQHUDWLRQVF\FOLFDO VDOHVSDWWHUQVZLWK WKH LQGXVWU\JRLQJ µEXVW¶ VRIWZDUH
firms had little certainty if the industry would even exist the following year. Let alone 
know which system would fail, and which system would succeed.  
Figure 4.2 depicts the yearly number of hardware firms, complementors, and 
overall sales of home video game hardware, software and accessories combined. Prior 
studies observe that the number of --hardware-- firms initially grows, and then reaches a 
peak, after which it declines steadily (i.e., a shakeout occurs and the industry becomes an 
oligopoly); despite continued growth in industry output (e.g. Gort and Klepper 1982; 
Klepper 1996 and 2002; Klepper and Grady 1990; Utterback and Suarez 1993). The 
evolution of the hardware side of our industry of interest is in line with this prior research.  
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Figure 4.2: Number of Firms and Sales from 1972 to 2007 
 
 
  
110  
4.5.2  Data Collection 
We sourced hardware unit sales data largely from NPD, in line with prior research 
that used the same data source (e.g. Binken and Stremersch 2009; Clements and Ohashi 
2005; Shankar and Bayus 2003; Venkatraman and Lee 2004). We then collected all other 
data, ourselves from public sources, using the historical method (Golder 2000), such as: (1) 
general publications like, Business Week, New York Times, Time Magazine, and the Wall 
Street Journal, (2) trade publications, both online and offline, like Activision Funclub, 
allgame.com, AtariAge, Electronic Gaming Monthly, gamefaqs.com, gameranking.com, 
gamespot.com, and ign.com, and (3) video game books like Cohen (1984), Herman (2001), 
Kent (2001), Santulli (2002 and 2004), Sheff (1999), and Slaven (2002). 
 
4.5.3  Sample 
Our data covers the period May 1972 to April 2008. The first generation did not 
have any independent software firms (i.e., complementors), so we will focus our empirical 
examination on generations 2 to 7 (September 1976 to April 2008). During this period, 
hardware sponsors introduced 35 incompatible systems, across 6 successive incremental 
technology generations. We gathered data on all entry opportunities (2895 in total) of 247 
complementors. In 775 cases, the software firm of interest decided to enter, while in all 
other 2,120 cases the complementor decided not to enter. Complementors can enter from 
the moment the systems is introduced at t=1, until the time series reaches t=102 ± we 
never observed entry after 102 months ± or until the time the relevant system was 
abandoned ± an event widely reported in the media. We never observed entry after 
abandonment. Table 4.1 describes the market we study on the dimensions relevant to this 
chapter. 
 
4.5.4  Measures 
Firm entry is our dependent variable. Entry occurs in the month during which the 
software firm of interest to entry decision i, introduces its first product (i.e., video game) 
for the relevant system. The introduction of its first product is the first credible signal that 
entry has occurred, and identifies the exact month of entry. Prior research almost 
exclusively uses the self-reported yearly entry from the Thomas Register of American 
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Manufacturers (e.g. Agarwal and Audretsch 2001; Agarwal and Gort 1996; Gort and 
Konakayama 1982; Klepper and Graddy 1990; Klepper and Miller 1995; Klepper and 
Simons 2000). We use a newly gathered dataset with data at monthly periodicity, which 
does not suffer from self-report bias.  
Incumbency of the system owner is equal to 1 if the relevant system owner has 
introduced a system during the previous technology generation, and equal to 0 if not. The 
V\VWHP RZQHU¶V HQWU\ WLPLQJ (later-mover (dis-)advantage) during the technology 
generation is equal to the number of months the system relevant to entry decision i is 
introduced after the start of the relevant technology generation.  
For the FRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUH-entry relationship with the system owner, we use a 
time invariant dummy variable to measure if the complementor introduced software 
products for the system owner's prior system (=1) or not (=0). &RPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUH-entry 
diversification is equal to the number of systems (this generation and past generation) for 
which the software firm relevant to entry decision i is still introducing software products at 
t=1.   
The V\VWHP¶V KDUGZDUH LQVWDOOHG EDVH is equal to the cumulative hardware unit 
sales in millions of the system relevant to entry decision i, for the month of interest t. The 
V\VWHP¶VDJHis equal to the age measured in months of the relevant system for the month 
of interest t. System's technology generation. Following Bass and Bass (2001 and 2004), 
we group systems into successive generations with other systems if they are similar in 
customer-perceived functionality characteristics. The system relevant to entry decision i 
belongs to a specific technology generation. For generation 2 this variable is equal to 0, 
and increases with one for each next generation, up to generation 7, which is equal to 5.  
The FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUH-entry age (i.e., pre-entry accumulated learning by 
doing) is equal to the number of months the complementor has been in the game business 
at t=1. Firm age is often used to measure the firm's learning by doing (e.g. Agarwal and 
Gort 1996; Klepper and Simons 2000; Geroski 1995; Gort and Konakayama 1982). The 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUH-entry size (i.e., pre-entry accumulated economies of scale) is equal to 
the number of software products is has introduced in the past 12 months at t=1. This 
measurement should give a good estimate rHJDUGLQJ WKH VL]H RI WKH ILUP¶V UHOHYDQW
resources to develop, publish, and market software products, and its ability to leverage 
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economies of scale. The V\VWHP¶VVXSSRUWE\RWKHUFRPSOHPHQWRUV is equal to the number 
of software firms that have entered the system relevant to entry decision i, and are still 
supporting it with product introductions at t. 
 
4.6  Model 
We use a split-population duration model (Schmidt and Witte 1989; Sinha and 
Chandrashekaran 1992), as this allows for the possibility that entry may never occur. We 
segment the population of entry opportunities into two subpopulations, one that will 
experience entry, and one that will never experience entry.  Models that fail to recognize 
that not all firms will ultimately enter, will overestimate the probability of entry (as their 
long run entry rate is equal to one), and produce biased estimates of the effects of the 
covariates (Hettinger and Zorn 2001; Schmidt and Witte 1989). In marketing this model is 
often applied, to a very similar topic, knowingly to adoption, and non-adoption, of new 
products/innovations (e.g. Kamakura, Kossar and Wedel 2004; Prins and Verhoef 2007; 
Sinha and Chandrashekaran 1992; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 2006). The split-
population duration model uses a logit function for the probability of entry, and a hazard 
function for the time of entry (for those entry opportunities that result in entry). The model 
simultaneously estimates both functions.  
We use a complementary log-logistic parametric form for our hazard function, 
because it allows for a non-monotonic hazard rate as suggested by prior literature (e.g. 
Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990; Rogers 1995; Schmidt and Witte 1989; Sinha and 
Chandrashekaran 1992). It is also frequently used in the relevant literature (e.g. Agarwal 
and Bayus 2002; Bayus and Agarwal 2007; Prins and Verhoef 2007; Schmidt and Witte 
1989). The time of entry is a random variable with a cumulative distribution function F(t), 
and density IW )¶W. The probability that entry has not yet occurred at time t is provided 
by the survivor function S(t)=1-F(t). The hazard rate h(t)= f(t)/S(t) can be defined as the 
conditional likelihood that entry will occur at time t, given entry has not yet occurred. We 
estimate the hazard part of our model including covariates Xi as follows: 
hit = 1 - exp [ - exp (Xi) ]                   (1) 
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We estimate the probability of entry (pi) for every entry decision i. We use a logit 
function of covariates to model the probability of entry. The probability part of our model 
including covariates Xi is as follows: 
pi = 1 / [ 1 + exp (Xi) ]                           (2) 
Thereby making the log-likelihood function of our total model including equation 
(1) and (2) as follows: 
 ܮܮ ൌ σ ܿ௜Ǥ ݈݊ሾ݌௜Ǥ ݄௜௧Ǥ ௜ܵ௧ିଵሿ ൅ ሺͳ െ ܿ௜ሻǤ ݈݊ሾሺͳ െ ݌௜ሻ ൅ ݌௜Ǥ ௜ܵ௧ሿே௜ୀଵ                                      (3) 
In equation 3, hit is the hazard rate from equation 1, and pi is the probability of 
eventual entry from equation 2. The survival rate is denoted by Sit. ci is an indicator that 
denotes whether entry occurred in the interval (1,T). For observed entry (ci =1), the 
contribution to the likelihood function by entry decision i at time t is the probability of 
eventual entry, as given by pi, multiplied by both the conditional probability of entry at t, 
as given by the hazard rate hit, and by the probability that entry has not occurred before t, 
as given by survival rate Sit-1. Censored observations (ci =0), belong to either the entry 
decisions that resulted in non-entry, with probability (1- pi), or those entry decisions that 
will eventually result in entry but have yet to do so at T, denoted by pi.Sit. 
 
4.7  Results 
Table 2 presents the estimations of our model. A positive coefficient of a 
covariate in the logit part indicates that the covariate has a positive effect on the likelihood 
of eventual entry. A positive coefficient of a covariate in the hazard part of our model 
indicates that the covariate increases the hazard rate, and thus reduces the complementor's 
time of entry. Figure 1 depicts which hypotheses are supported (indicated by (S)) and 
which are not supported (indicated by (NS)), followed by the coefficient and significance. 
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Table 4.2: Estimations of our Model 
  Model 
 
 
Logit Part:  
Probability of Entry 
(+: high; -: low) 
Hazard Rate:  
Speed of Entry  
(+: fast; -: slow) 
System Owner Pre-entry Experience   
 Pre-entry Incumbency i  -1.231** 
(0.375) 
 0.483** 
(0.129) 
 Entry timing i  -0.101** 
(0.019) 
 0.018** 
(0.004) 
Complementor Pre-entry Experience    
 Pre-entry Relationship with System Owner i   1.955** 
(0.489) 
 0.658** 
(0.151) 
 Pre-entry Diversification i  -0.331 
(0.254) 
 0.510** 
(0.064) 
Time-varying covariates   
 6\VWHP¶V+DUGZDUH,QVWDOOHG%DVHt-1i  
 
  0.050 
(0.030) 
 6\VWHP¶V+DUGZDUH,QVWDOOHG%DVH t-1i  [6\VWHP¶V
Age t 
  0.001* 
(0.000) 
 6\VWHP¶V+DUGZDUH,QVWDOOHG%DVHt-1i [6\VWHP¶V
Technology Generation i 
 -0.017** 
(0.004) 
 6\VWHP¶VHardware Installed Base t-1i  x Pre-entry 
Relationship with System Owner i 
 -0.053* 
(0.022) 
 6\VWHP¶V6XSSRUWE\2WKHU&RPSOHPHQWRUV t-1i     0.036** 
(0.005) 
Control  variables   
      6\VWHP¶V$JH t-1i    -0.005 
(0.005) 
      6\VWHP¶V7HFKQRORJ\*HQHUDWLRQi  0.416** 
(0.140) 
 0.045 
(0.050) 
      &RPSOHPHQWRU¶V3UH-entry Age i -0.006** 
(0.002) 
 0.005** 
(0.001) 
      &RPSOHPHQWRU¶V3UH-entry Size i  0.079* 
(0.038) 
 0.011 
(0.006) 
      Constant  3.706** 
(0.769) 
-6.501** 
(0.233) 
   
N 92,826 
Log-likelihood -3921.27 
Likelihood ratio test  Ȥ2 (21) = 1099.58 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
Two-sided significance tests: **: p < 0.01; *: p < 0.05 
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4.7.1  Drivers of Complementor Entry Probability 
We find that both covariates relating to the pre-entry experience of the system 
RZQHU KDYH D QHJDWLYH HIIHFW RQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUREDELOLW\ RI HQWU\ 6XUSULVLQJO\
incumbent system owners face a lower likelihood of entry by complementors (-1.231, P 
<.01), compared to newly entering system owners. Complementors do react very different 
to whether the system in introduced by an incumbent system owner, or by a newly entering 
system owner, but not as we expected. We were expecting incumbents to have a higher 
probability of entry by complementors. Therefore, we do not find support for H1. This 
lower probability is likely due to incumbent system owners having a higher level of 
vertical integration (i.e., larger internal development studios, more successful software 
franchises, and a larger back catalog of software products from the prior generation), 
compared to newly entering system owners. Therefore, complementors will face a higher 
level of competition in a system of an incumbent system owner. In addition, because 
incumbent system owner are less dependent on independent complementors to supply 
complementary products (and because their own software products generate a larger part 
of their profits), incumbents will allocate fewer resources to persuade complementors to 
enter. Whereas, system owners that are new to the market, will be more inclined to use 
side payments to persuade complementors to enter, in order to gain a foothold in the new 
market. 
We do find the expected negative effect, of a later introduction of the system 
during the technology generation by the system owner, on the probability of complementor 
entry (-0.101, P < .01). Thus, there is an early mover advantage for system owners. 
Therefore, we find support for H2. 
As hypothesized in H3, we find that the complementor's pre-entry relationship 
with the system owner has a positive effect on the probability of entry (1.955, P < .01). 
7KHHIIHFWRIWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUH-entry diversification on the probability of entry is not 
significant (-0.331, S.E. 0.254). Therefore, we do not find support for H4. Whether or not 
to enter is independent of the knowledge and resources acquired from prior entries into 
systems of competing system owners. More diversified complementors may have acquired 
more knowledge and resources, compared to less diversified complementors, but 
leveraging these assets across systems of different system owners does not look effective. 
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4.7.2  Drivers of Complementor Entry Timing 
If the system is introduced by an incumbent system owner it will increase the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V hazard rate of entry (0.483, P <.01). Incumbent system owners are faster 
at persuading complementors that will ultimately enter, to enter. We thus find support for 
H5. The system's later introduction during a technology generation has the expected 
positivHHIIHFWRQWKHWLPHRIHQWU\3DQGWKXVUHGXFHVWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶V
time to entry. Therefore, we find support for H6.  
As hypothesized in H7, the complementor's pre-entry relationship with the system 
owner, has a positive effect on the time of entry (0.658, P < .01). Thus, we find support for 
H7. Also, the pre-entry diversification (i.e., entries into systems of competitors) by the 
complementor has a positive effect on the complementor's time of entry (0.510, P < .01). 
Therefore, we find support for H8.  
We do not find a negative effect, on either the likelihood or timing of 
complementor entry, of entries into systems of competing system owners (i.e., pre-entry 
diversification). Therefore, we find no evidence of harmful lock-in, due to for example 
exclusivity agreements, thereby providing empirical support to prior observations (e.g. 
Liebowitz and Margolis 1999). In addition, entry by complementors does not decrease 
across technology generations, as the likelihood of entry increases from 9% in generation 2 
to 55% in generation 6. Hardware sponsors do not seem to be able to limit the entry 
behavior of complementors into newly emerging systems of competitors. 
As hypothesized in H9, H10 and H11, we find strong heterogeneity in supply-side 
indirect network effects (i.e., the effect of the hardware installed base on the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V WLPLQJ RI HQWU\ 7KLV HIIHFW LQFUHDVHV DFURVV WKH V\VWHP
V OLIH F\FOH
(0.001, P < .05), while it decreases across technology generations (-0.017, P < .01), and 
with the existence of a pre-entry relationship between the complementor and the system 
owner (-0.053, P < .05). Thus, we find support for H9, H10 and H11. In addition, we find 
the expected positive effect of support for the system by other complementors at the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶VWLPHRIHQWU\37KHUHIRUHZHDOVRILQGVXSSRUWIRU+ 
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4.7.3  Other Covariates 
Finally, we find the effect of the system's age (i.e., time) does not significantly 
affect the hazard rate of entry (-0.005, S.E. 0.005). We find the expected positive 
relationship between the technology generation and the probability of entry (0.416, P < 
+RZHYHUWKHV\VWHP¶VWHFKQRORJ\JHQHUDWLRQGRHVQRWKDYHDVLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQWKH
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V WLPH RI HQWU\  6(  $lthough the average time of entry 
sharply decreases across technology generations (See Table 4.1), the system's technology 
generation did not contribute to the acceleration with which systems diffuse faster among 
complementors.  
The complementor's pre-entry age (i.e., pre-entry accumulated learning by doing) 
has a negative effect (-0.006, P < .01) on the probability of entry. We were expecting a 
positive effect.  Complementors become less likely to enter to more they learn. This is 
likely because, as complementors become better at making entry decisions, they make 
fewer wrong entry decisions, which will reduce their overall likelihood of entry. However, 
the complementor's learning by doing does have the expected positive effect (0.005, P < 
.01) on the time of entry. 
The complementor's pre-entry size (i.e., pre-entry accumulated economies of 
scale) has the expected positive effect (0.079, P < .05) on the probability of entry, while it 
has no significant effect (0.011, S.E. 0.006) on the time of entry. While larger 
complementors are more likely to enter, they are not faster at entering compared to smaller 
complementors. The increased bureaucracy, associate with size increases, prevents them 
from becoming faster entrants. 
 
4.7.4  Robustness and Further Analyses 
We examined possible right censoring data issues. We now cutoff our time series 
after t=102. Using slightly more strict or relaxed cutoffs does not alter the findings 
presented in this chapter. In addition, estimating our model without the shorter time series 
from the last introduced systems (i.e., 7th generation systems) also confirm our findings. 
We could also include the data after abandonment (i.e., orphaning) of the system, and 
include a time varying abandonment dummy variable to the hazard part of our model. The 
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abandonment variable is strongly negative and significant (-4.830, S.E. 0.733) 
(N=167439). The parameters of the other covariates remain similar. Sample selection 
variations should not be an issue, as we use all introduced systems. Finally, the size of our 
dataset compares very favorable to prior studies. 
One could argue that not all incumbent system owners are similar. Incumbents 
can be either successful or unsuccessful during the prior technology generation.21 
Subsequently, their effect may well differ. However, we observe a similar effect of both on 
the entry decision. Both successful (0.494, S.E. 0.135) and unsuccessful incumbents 
(0.795, S.E. 0.192) have a significant positive effect on the time of entry. Similarly both 
successful (-1.296, S.E. 0.412) and unsuccessful incumbents (-3.763, S.E. 0.836) have a 
significant negative effect on the probability of entry. Just being present during the 
previous technology generation, whether successful or unsuccessful, is enough to reduce 
overall complementor entry, and facilitate faster entry, in the next technology generation.  
Similarly, one could argue that not all pre-entry entries by complementors are 
similar, and have a positive effect. Prior entry into systems of direct competitors (i.e., same 
generation systems) may have a negative effect on the entry decision (instead of our 
expected positive effects), as it directly consumes, or at least temporally locks in, 
resources, which subsequently cannot be used for future entry. However, pre-entry entry 
into same generation systems (0.519, S.E. 0.073) and pre-entry entry into prior generations 
systems (0.685, S.E. 0.077) both have a significant positive effect on the time of entry. 
While both have no significant effect on the likelihood of entry. 
In addition, we used multiple procedures to assess multicollinearity (e.g. Belsley 
1991; Belsley, Kuh and Welsh 1980; Marquardt 1970). All these procedures indicate that 
the weak to moderate dependencies between the covariates do not create harmful 
multicollinearity. First, the value of the condition index is below 10, and variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are all below 3 (average = 1.6, maximum = 2.2). Second, we dropped 
covariates that showed a moderate correlation with other covariates one by one. The 
                                                          
21 Successful system owners achieved an economically viable hardware installed base during the 
previous technology generation. While unsuccessful incumbent owners did not achieve an 
economically viable hardware installed base, and subsequently their system is prematurely orphaned. 
The most successful unsuccessful system sold only 1.5 million hardware units, while the most 
unsuccessful successful system sold 11 million hardware unites. Thus, the two groups are easily 
distinguishable from one another. 
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parameter estimates we obtained are similar to a model that included the dropped 
covariates, parameter estimates do not change sign, and do not fluctuate dramatically. In 
all, multicollinearity is not a threat to the validity of our findings.  
We also examined the effect of stepwise addition of covariates to our model. The 
estimated parameters are consistent in term of their signs in the stepwise models, 
indicating that there does not seem to be an issue regarding model misspecification. 
Overall, we can conclude that our results are highly robust. 
 
4.8  Discussion, Implications and Limitations 
In this section, we will first discus our findings and their implications, followed 
by the chapter's limitations and suggestions for future research. 
 
4.8.1  Discussion and Implications 
While we find that every pre-entry experience by the complementor itself, the 
system owner or other complementors makes the complementor a faster entrant, the effect 
of these pre-HQWU\H[SHULHQFHVRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUREDELOLW\RIHQWU\LV very mixed. In 
addition, we find that the effect of supply-side indirect network effects (i.e., hardware 
LQVWDOOHG EDVH RQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V WLPH RI HQWU\ H[KLELWV VWURQJ KHWHURJHQHLW\ With 
each new pre-entry relationship and technology generation reducing the coordination 
problem, alleviating the chicken-and-egg problem new systems face. 
If a system owner was present during the previous technology generation with a 
system, this pre-entry experience will reduce the likelihood of complementors entering its 
next generation system.  Prior research (e.g. Christensen and Rosenbloom 1995; 
Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback 1998; Klepper and Simons 2000; Tushman and 
Anderson 1986; Stieglitz and Heine 2007) has only shown that the pre-entry experience 
can have a negative effect during the next technology generation in industries with 
disruptive technology generations (i.e., radical innovation). We can now extend this 
negative effect to industries with evolutionary technology generations (i.e., incremental 
innovation). Thus, the pre-entry experience of incumbent system owners gives newly 
entering system owners a larger chance to succeed, even in industries with incremental 
innovation. 
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  7KH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V RZQ SUH-entry experience with systems of other system 
owners (i.e., its pre-entry diversification) does not have an effect on its probability of 
entry. Leveraging this pre-entry experience across systems of different system owners is 
not effective. Even in this industry with homogenous products and incremental innovation, 
the acquired knowledge and resources from this pre-entry experience are very relation 
specific (i.e., locked-in to the relationship with the original system owner). 
7KH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUH-entry experience (i.e., relationship) with the system 
owner does have a positive effect on the probability of entry. It also has a positive effect on 
the timing of entry, and decreases the effect of supply-side indirect network effect the 
timing of entry on. Therefore, this relationship it crucial to both complementors and 
system owners, and will to a large part determine the evolution of an industry over 
technology generations. These pre-entry relationships are likely a major contributor to the 
eventual oligopoly market structure we observe. 
Pre-entry relationships will help marketing managers of system owners identify 
the most likely early entrants, even before the system owners has introduced it next 
generation system. This will help decrease the chicken-and-egg problem new systems face. 
In addition, identifying the most probable early entrants early on, will assure a faster return 
on investments, better allocation of resources under resource constraints, better utilization 
of innovators to influence imitators (i.e., later entering complementors), and generally 
increase efficiency throughout the organization (Kamakura, Kossar and Wedel 2004). 
Newly entering system owners will face a barrier to entry that may increase with each new 
technology generation, due to the increase in pre-entry relationships. However, it are late 
entering incumbent system owners who do not have these pre-entry relationships with 
complementors who are worst off, as they will have the hardest time convincing 
complementors to enter. 
The effect of pre-HQWU\ H[SHULHQFHV RQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V WLPLQg of entry is 
straightforward positive. Subsequently, marketing managers of system owners can easily 
differentiate between early entrants and late entrants, among complementors. Market 
DQDO\VWV FDQ H[SHFW FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V WLPLQJ RI HQWU\ WR DFFHOHUDWH RYHU Wechnology 
generations. These findings give marketing managers of both complementors and system 
owners, as well as market analysts the ability to early on detect if a system is going to 
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succeed or fail (i.e., has or hasn't adequate timely support from complementors). Being 
able to quicker identity when systems are failing will create a substantive strategic 
advantage, as pulling the plug on a new product is an important decision, with tremendous 
implications (Foster, Golder and Tellis 2004).  
We find strong heterogeneity in the effect of supply-side indirect network effects 
RQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VWLPLQJRIHQWU\$VWKHPDUNHWHYROYHVWKLVHIIHFWGLPLQLVKHVRYHU
technology generations and with each new pre-entry relationship between complementor 
and system owner. However, his effect increases during the system's life cycle. Combine 
our findings with prior research (e.g. Binken and Stremersch 2009; Clements and Ohashi 
2005; Park 2004; Ohashi 2003; Stremersch et al. 2007) that find strong heterogeneity in --
demand-side-- indirect network effects, and it is clear that the positive feedback cycle of 
indirect network effects is very dynamic, and may be very small under certain conditions, 
giving new systems an opportunity to flourish (i.e., give incumbents only a small indirect 
network effects advantage). Marketing managers and academics may well want to control 
for these sources of heterogeneity in the future. In addition, marketing managers of 
hardware owners should adopt a flexible marketing strategy (i.e., know when, and when 
not, their hardware installed base will have a --large-- HIIHFWRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VHQWU\
decision). 
Markets with network effects are often characterized as winner-takes-all markets 
(e.g. Arthur 1996; Liebowitz and Margolis 1999; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 
2004; Schilling 2002). However, we observe that winner-takes-all outcomes disappear as 
the market matures. The number of winners (i.e., successful systems) in a single 
technology generation increases across technology generations (See Table 1). The decrease 
in the positive feedback of supply-side indirect network effects, across technology 
generations and with each additional pre-entry relationship between complementor and 
system owner, ²partially²explains why the number of winners increases. The smaller 
positive feedback effect may very well allow for the more even distribution of entry by 
complementors and adoption by consumers, among competing systems.  
As the technology generation progresses, it will become increasingly difficult to 
replace the leading system (i.e., market leader). Because later entry during a technology 
JHQHUDWLRQE\D V\VWHPRZQHUQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWV WKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶V OLNHOLKRRGRIHQWU\
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and because the effect of the supply-side indirect network effect on the coPSOHPHQWRU¶V
timing of entry, becomes stronger as the system ages. However, market leaders are in great 
danger to lose their hold on the industry with the introduction of a new technology 
generation. This is at least partially because of the negative effect of their pre-entry 
LQFXPEHQF\ H[SHULHQFH RQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUREDELOLW\ RI HQWU\ ,Q RXU PDUNHW RI
interest, in all but one new technology generation, was the previous market leader 
replaced. This is in line with prior non-system market research that states that the transition 
from the old generation to the new generation is rife with opportunities, and that new 
entrants exploit these technological discontinuities to displace existing incumbents (e.g. 
Bass and Bass 2001; Foster 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Schumpeter 1961; 
Utterback 1994).  
System markets do not seem to be more disposed to inefficiencies, compared to 
their non-system counterparts. We did not find support for strong inefficient path-
dependencies, as first-movers never won a systems war, and the market leader of the prior 
technology generation was usually replaced in the next technology generation. In addition, 
we did not find evidence of harmful lock-in, because system owner do not seem to be able 
to prevent the entry of complementors into newly emerging systems of competitors. 
 
4.8.2  Limitations and Future Research 
The present chapter is the first to examine entry behavior of complementors. 
Thus, this chapter is an important contribution to the literature that may provoke further 
research. At the same time, it also has some limitations that such future research may 
address. 
First, we only examine the entry behavior of complementors in the U.S. home 
video game market. Future research may want to examine if our findings hold for other 
geographical areas, or if our findings hold for other system markets. However, by our 
knowledge, data that is as detailed as the data on the video game industry we obtained is 
unavailable. 
Second, we have no information about costs or switching costs. In addition, we 
have no information about side payments between software and hardware firms. Including 
these covariates in future models, would make an extremely interesting extension. 
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Third, we examine a system market with incremental innovation. It would be 
interesting to see if our findings also apply to markets with disruptive innovation.  
Fourth, we ignore whether a software product was developed internally or 
externally. Future research may want to look if complementors that --partially-- outsource 
the development of software products are more agile (i.e., enter more systems faster).  
Finally, future studies could make model extensions and refinements by 
incorporating other marketing mix variables, like advertising and prices. Future research 
may also incorporate endogenous covariates instead of our exogenous covariates. 
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Chapter 5 
Summary and Conclusion 
5.1  Introduction 
 This last chapter presents the main findings and implications, relating to indirect 
network effects of our empirical studies. I conclude by providing directions for future 
research. Each of the three previous chapters also provides their own specific findings, 
implications and directions for future research, at the end of each chapter. 
 
5.2  Summary of Findings and Implications 
 The positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects is less pervasive, or at 
least more complex, than ³FXUUHQW ZLVGRP´ ZRXOG KDYH XV EHOLHYH 6XSSO\-side and/or 
demand-side indirect network effects, as traditionally operationalized, are often not 
present. When present, they display strong heterogeneity. There is often no positive 
feedback cycle present in WKHLQLWLDOVWDJHRIWKHV\VWHP¶VOLIHF\FOH 
The positive feedback cycle is not automatically present in system markets 
waiting to be harvested. Marketing manager of firms operating in system markets must 
start this cycle, and subsequently manage it. Our empirical studies already identify 
numerous factors marketing manager can manipulate to influence the positive feedback 
cycle (See Figure 5.1). Hardware sponsors must constantly create large events on both the 
demand-side and the supply-side to keep the positive feedback cycle present and running. 
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Figure 5.1: The Positive Feedback Cycle of Indirect Network Effects 
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Marketing managers should first identify which factors could influence the 
positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects. Subsequently, they must identify how 
to manipulate those factors to positively affect their own feedback cycle, while trying to 
disrupt the feedback cycle of competitors. Second, they must understand the temporal 
pattern in demand-side and supply-side indirect network effects, across the life cycle of 
systems and software, and across successive technology generations. Subsequently 
marketing managers must incorporate our findings in their marketing strategy, in order to 
outmaneuver competitors (i.e., competing systems, fellow complementors). Only then can 
marketing managers start to reap the benefits of indirect network effects and positive 
feedback, and alleviate the chicken-and-egg problem. 
Some scholars (Arthur 1989; David 1985) have us believe that insignificant 
events (e.g., small economic shifts, chance, luck, managerial whim) during the initial stage 
RI WKH V\VWHP¶V OLIH F\FOH determine which system wins a systems war. As these 
insignificant events are amplified due to the presence of positive feedback and tip the 
market towards a particular system. Even inferior systems may become locked-in and 
conquer the entire market (i.e., winner-takes-all), as systems cannot coexist indefinitely. 
However, our findings from our empirical studies indicate otherwise. The absence of ±
strong²indirect network effects in the initial stage of the system life cycle makes tipping 
of the market during this stage due to positive feedback highly unlikely. It also helps to 
explain why most first movers do not become the eventual market leaders, even though 
they have a substantial lead in hardware installed base and software availability, over later 
entrants. 
 In Chapter 2, I examine the positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects in 
numerous system markets.  
In only 1 out of 9 system markets do I observe the presence of a positive feedback 
cycle (i.e., both supply-side and demand-side indirect network effects). In 4 system 
markets I observe only the presence of supply-side indirect network effects. Demand-side 
indirect network effects are not present in these 4 markets. While in 4 other system 
markets I do not observe any indirect network effects. The positive feedback cycle seems 
WREHDEVHQWLQPRVWV\VWHPPDUNHWV7KLVFRQWUDVWVVKDUSO\ZLWK³FXUUHQWZLVGRP´WKDWWKH
amount of available software is of critical importance to hardware sales growth (e.g. 
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Church and Gandal 1992a; Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999; Katz and Shapiro 1986a and 
1994). Indirect network effects appear to be less pervasive ±or at least more complex² 
WKDQ³FXUUHQWZLVGRP´ZRXOGKDYHXVEHOLHYH 
In most of the system markets examined, hardware sales (take off) lead software 
availability (take off), whereas the reverse almost never happens. Thus, again contradicting 
³FXUUHQW ZLVGRP´ WKDW VRIWZDUH DYDLODELOLW\ VKRXOG OHDG KDUGZDUH VDOHV %D\XV 
Bucklin and Sengupta 1993; Clements 2004; Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; 
Midgette 1997; Sengupta 1998; Tam 2000; Yoder 1990; Ziegler 1994). Hardware sales 
takeoff often occurs when software availability is still very small. This suggests that a 
considerable segment of consumers (i.e., demand-side adopters) make their decisions to 
buy the hardware, relatively independently of the software quantity available for the 
hardware. It may be that a killer application (i.e., superstar software title) is available, 
which impels a sizeable consumer segment to own the hardware regardless of the sheer 
number of software applications available (Frels, Shervani and Srivastava 2003; Williams 
2002), which would be in line with our findings presented in Chapter 3.  
Given the findings of chapter 2, hardware manufacturers should not overstate the 
importance of software quantity. Subsidizing software firms in order to create a huge 
library of software available may be a very inefficient investment. Investing in a small 
number of high quality software products (i.e., superstars) may have a significant more 
posLWLYHLPSDFWRQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VDGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQ 
 Our findings also question the need for intervention in system markets. In many 
markets, hardware sales take off before software availability does. Lack of available 
software, due to the lack of coordination, does not seem to be an issue in preventing 
hardware sales to take off. If public policy is to intervene, subsidizing the cost of the new 
hardware may be a better alternative to subsidizing software availability, which is now 
often the preferred choice of public policy. As a critical mass of hardware adopters often 
develops before a critical mass of software titles is available. 
 In Chapter 3, I focus on demand-side indirect network effects. I examine the 
effects of the available software on the FRQVXPHUV¶DGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQLHKDUGZDUHVDOHV
Specifically, the effect of superstars (i.e., software titles of exceptional high quality), 
sometimes referred to as killer applications. 
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I again find that software availability (i.e., the software back catalog) has no 
VLJQLILFDQWHIIHFWRQ WKHFRQVXPHU¶VDGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQ&RQVXPHUVGRQRW VHHP WRYDOXH
old software titles. However, the introduction of superstars and the present software 
LQWURGXFWLRQVGRHIIHFWWKHFRQVXPHU¶VDGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQSRVLWLYHO\. Over 97% of software 
titles do not affect the demand-VLGH LH FRQVXPHUV¶ DGRSWLRQ GHFLVLRQ DIWHU WKHLU
introduction. 
The introduction of a superstar software title increases hardware sales by an 
average of 14% (167,000 hardware units) over a period of 5 months. Software type does 
not consistently alter this effect. Superstars display increasing returns of software quality 
to hardware unit sales (they also display increasing returns to software unit sales). Systems 
with no or only one superstar failed miserably. 
Surprisingly, while superstar software unit sales peak during introduction and 
decline with each month, the monthly superstar effect on hardware unit sales peaks in the 
second to third month, and thus displays an inverted U-shape effect over time. Thus, high 
software unit sales of superstars do not automatically translate into a large, or similarly 
shaped, superstar effect on hardware unit sales. This different time pattern is likely because 
of the relative slower diffusion of information about superstars among non-adopters (i.e., 
potential hardware buyers), compared to adopters (i.e., software buyers). Thus, I find 
VWURQJKHWHURJHQHLW\LQWKHHIIHFWRIDVRIWZDUHWLWOHRQWKHFRQVXPHU¶VDGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQ
due to their varying quality, as well as, the temporal pattern observed. 
These findings, consistent with chapter 2, again invalidate, or at least question, 
prior operationalizations of software availability. Using the software catalog as an 
indicator for software availability, which is standard practice in network effects literature 
(see Stremersch et al. 2007), may show insignificant indirect network effects. Using the 
number of software titles introduced may paint an incomplete picture, as it does not 
account for increasing returns to quality (i.e., disproportional high returns of superstars). 
In light of our findings, both hardware and software firms should carefully 
examine the role superstars play in their industry, as superstars affect both software and 
hardware sales. Software firms (i.e., complementors) should examine their inventory of 
software titles for potential superstars, and negotiate with system owners to receive side-
payments for the increase in hardware unit sales their superstars cause. As superstars only 
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have a positive effect on hardware unit sales for a limited period, system owners must 
convince consumers that the introduction of a superstar is not a fluke, but that there will be 
a steady supply of superstar software titles.  
However, system owners (i.e., hardware sponsors) must remember that when they 
pay software firms for the exclusivity of their superstars, they are not additionally 
increasing their own hardware sales -compared to a non-exclusive superstar software title - 
but that they are eliminating an opportunity for competing systems to increase their 
hardware unit sales. Eliminating the hardware sales of competitors ZKLOHLQFUHDVLQJRQH¶V
own hardware sales, may well be the deciding factor in a positive feedback market (e.g., 
Arthur 1989 and 1996; Shapiro and Varian 1998). Cutting corners, while rushing a 
software title to market, to meet a deadline (e.g., the launch of the hardware, or the 
December holidays), will not only have an adverse effect on the software sales of the 
software title itself. It could also turn a poWHQWLDO VXSHUVWDU LQWRD µPH-WRR¶ VRIWZDUH WLWOH
without a superstar effect on hardware sales, just because of the slightly lower software 
quality. System owners should intervene, and pay software publishers to continue 
development, in order to improve quality.  
Our findings of Chapter 3 also question the need for intervention in system 
markets, as I do not find any evidence of market failure. If public policy still wants to 
intervene, it should focus on increasing software quality and not on increasing software 
quantity, as has been the case in prior interventions. 
 In Chapter 4, I focus on supply-side indirect network effects. Whether or not, and 
when, do complementors start releasing complementary products for a specific system? 
Specifically, I examine the effect of the hardware installed base and pre-entry experience 
on the complementor's entry decision.  
I find that the effect of supply-side indirect network effects (i.e., hardware 
LQVWDOOHGEDVHRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VWLPLQJRIHQWU\H[KLELWVVWURQJKHterogeneity. Again, 
indirect network effects exhibit strong heterogeneity. As the market evolves this effect 
diminishes, over technology generations and with each new pre-entry relationship between 
complementor and system owner. However, this effect increases during the system's life 
cycle. Supply-side indirect network effects are small to non-existent during the initial stage 
RIWKHV\VWHP¶VOLIHF\FOH&RPELQHWKHVHILQGLQJVZLWKRXUSULRUUHVHDUFKWKDWILQGVWURQJ
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heterogeneity in --demand-side-- indirect network effects, and it is clear that the positive 
feedback cycle of indirect network effects is very dynamic, and may be very small under 
certain conditions, giving new systems an opportunity to flourish (i.e., give incumbents 
only a small indirect network effects advantage). Marketing managers and academics may 
well want to control for these sources of heterogeneity in the future. In addition, marketing 
managers of hardware owners should adopt a flexible marketing strategy (i.e., know when, 
and when not, their hardware installed base will have a --large-- effect on the 
FRPSOHPHQWRU¶VHQWU\GHFLVLRQ 
7KH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V SUH-entry relationship with the system owner does have a 
positive effect on the probability of entry. It also has a positive effect on the timing of 
entry, and decreases the effect of supply-side indirect network effects on the timing of 
entry. These pre-entry relationships reduce the coordination problem new systems face, 
thereby alleviating the chicken-and-egg problem. Therefore, this relationship is crucial to 
both complementors and system owners, and will largely determine the evolution of an 
industry over technology generations. These pre-entry relationships are likely a major 
contributor to the eventual oligopoly market structure I observe. Newly entering system 
owners will face a barrier to entry that may increase with each new technology generation, 
due to the increase in pre-entry relationships. However, it are late entering incumbent 
system owners who do not have these pre-entry relationships with complementors who are 
worst off, as they will have the hardest time convincing complementors to enter. 
Our findings allow marketing managers of system owners to identify the most 
probable early entrants early on (i.e., before the introduction of its next generation system). 
Marketing managers can thus easily differentiate between early entrants and late entrants, 
DPRQJFRPSOHPHQWRUV0DUNHWDQDO\VWVFDQH[SHFWWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VWLPLQJRIHQWU\WR
accelerate over technology generations, as every pre-entry experience accelerates entry. In 
addition, our findings give marketing managers of both complementors and system 
owners, as well as market analysts, the ability to early on detect if a system is going to 
succeed or fail (i.e., has or hasn't adequate timely support from complementors). 
Markets with network effects are often characterized as winner-takes-all markets 
(e.g. Arthur 1996; Liebowitz and Margolis 1999; Srinivasan, Lilien and Rangaswamy 
2004; Schilling 2002). However, I observe that winner-takes-all outcomes disappear as the 
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market matures. The number of winners (i.e., successful systems) in a single technology 
generation increases across technology generations. The decrease in the positive feedback 
of supply-side indirect network effects, across technology generations, ²partially²
explains why the number of winners increases. With each new technology generation, 
tipping is thus less likely to occur because of the smaller positive feedback, due to 
presence of indirect network effects. The smaller positive feedback effect allows for a 
more even distribution of entry by complementors and adoption by consumers, among 
competing systems. This results in a more even distribution of market share among 
competing systems, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index decreases over technology 
generations. 
As the technology generation progresses, it will become increasingly difficult to 
replace the leading system (i.e., market leader). Because later entry during a technology 
generation by a system owQHUQHJDWLYHO\DIIHFWV WKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶V OLNHOLKRRGRIHQWU\
and because the effect of the supply-VLGH LQGLUHFW QHWZRUN HIIHFW RQ WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V
timing of entry increases as the system ages. However, market leaders are in great danger 
to lose their hold on the industry with the introduction of a new technology generation. 
This is at least partially because of the negative effect of their pre-entry incumbency 
H[SHULHQFHRQWKHFRPSOHPHQWRU¶VSUREDELOLW\RIHQWU\,QRXUPDUNHWRILQWHUHVWLQDOOEXW
one new technology generation, was the previous market leader replaced. This is in line 
with prior non-system market research that states that the transition from the old 
generation to the new generation is rife with opportunities, and that new entrants exploit 
these technological discontinuities to displace existing incumbents (e.g. Bass and Bass 
2001; Foster 1986; Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Schumpeter 1961; Utterback 1994).  
System markets are not more disposed to inefficiencies, compared to their non-
system counterparts. I did not find support for strong inefficient path-dependencies, as 
first-movers never won a systems war, and the market leader of the prior technology 
generation was usually replaced in the next technology generation. In addition, I did not 
find evidence of harmful lock-in, because system owner are not able to prevent the entry of 
complementors into newly emerging systems of competitors. If public policy still wants to 
intervene, it should focus on creating and facilitation relationships between complementors 
and system owners, in order to assist market development. 
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5.3  Directions for Future Research 
I will now present directions for future indirect network effects research. In 
addition, each of the three prior chapters contains its own suggestions for future research.  
First, future research relating to indirect network effects should primarily focus on 
identifying which factors affect the positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects. 
How do these factors affect the positive feedback cycle? How can firms manipulate and 
control these factors? This will allow academics to improve the operationalization of 
indirect network effects in order to increase our understanding of indirect network effects. 
Subsequently, this will allow practitioners to enhance their marketing strategy, and will 
increase the effectiveness of public policy. Factors, which may prove fruitful to 
investigate, are exclusivity, the system life cycle and complementor exit. 
I find that exclusive superstars do not increase hardware sales any differently than 
nonexclusive superstars. However, they are eliminating an opportunity for competing 
systems to increase their hardware sales. This raises the question; do system markets with 
a higher level of software exclusivity display a slower market penetration, compared to 
system markets with a lower level of software exclusivity? Does exclusivity lower the 
combined sales of all system, and thus in addition reduce total combined software sales?  
All findings from our empirical studies indicate that the positive feedback cycle 
of indirect network effects strengthens across the system life cycle. The positive feedback 
is weak (or even absent) during the initial stage of the system life cycle, and strengthens as 
the system ages. However, future research should directly examine the positive feedback 
cycle over the life of systems. In addition, examining why this increase in strength occurs 
will be very fruitful. Is the absence of foresight in our models a possible ±partial²
explanation? Is it a result of survivor bias, as only successful systems remain over time? 
I have already examined why and when complementors enter a system. However, 
why they exit a system (i.e., stop introducing software for a certain system) remains 
unexamined. In addition, the negative feedback effect from complementor exit on the 
consumer adoption decision and their spending behavior, remain unexamined as well. 
Does early exit by complementor ±partially²explain why systems fail? Does 
complementor exit lead or lag disadoption (i.e., orphaning) by consumers? 
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I hope that the weak evidence for the presence of indirect network effects using 
the traditional operationalization, will spur new conceptualizations that may prove more 
powerful. Future research should use a software availability measure, which accounts for 
at least both software titles of varying superstar power, and varying durability. In addition, 
restricting the scope of network effects (Tucker 2006), using software thresholds may be 
impactful future research direction.  
Second, future research dealing with empirical indirect network effects could 
address some of the existing limitations, relating to datasets, expectations and endogeneity. 
Even though our datasets are better (e.g., no proxies), larger and more diverse 
compared to most previous studies, and took close to 3 years to collect, future research 
should do even better, if researchers want to increase their understanding of actual system 
markets. Datasets should span across markets and over technology generations, in order to 
provide a better understanding of the evolution of system markets, and as to why we see 
such strong heterogeneity in positive feedback among system markets. In order to examine 
the heterogeneity of indirect network effects over the system life cycle, future datasets 
should span the entire system life cycle. Using datasets with monthly instead of yearly 
periodicity should make this possible, even in fast pacing high-tech system markets with 
short life cycles, and could additionally be used to further examine the possible tipping 
potential of system markets.  
Similarly, prior studies mainly use datasets consisting of successful systems. Our 
datasets already include successful, less than successful, and unsuccessful systems, but not 
enough to examine the strength of indirect network effects across the success level of 
system products (successful, less than successful, and unsuccessful systems). I hope that 
future research will be able to examine this, and eliminate the survivor bias, which is 
present in many datasets. Because it is not only important to understand why systems 
succeed, but also to understand why they fail. The snob appeal may explain why millions 
of early adopters adopt the hardware when few software titles are available. But why was 
this snob appeal effect not present at the introduction of an eventual unsuccessful product? 
What did these millions of early adopters know that practitioners and we academics do 
not? Finally, examining the strength of indirect network effects across lead and lag 
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countries will be most fruitful. I hope that future research will follow our high standards 
regarding datasets, even though academics prefer to shirk the process of collecting data.  
However, the payoff can be large as we now come close to being able to model 
two-sided market adoption simultaneously, of 230 million consumer adoptions and 2900 
complementor entry opportunities, in a real system market during a 35-year period across 
numerous technology generations and competing systems. These adoptions generated close 
to $120 billion dollar in sales, of home video game hardware, software and accessories, in 
the U.S. alone. 
Including foresight (i.e., expectations) in future models, should also be a focus of 
future research, as expectations are crucial in positive feedback markets (Shapiro and 
Varian 1998). The weak effects of indirect network effects during the initial stage of the 
system life cycle may well be the result from the absence of foresight in our models. Early 
adopters are the most risk seeking and forward looking of all adopters. By using 
operationalizations of key indirect network effect variables that are forward looking, 
besides the present and backward looking indirect network effect operationalizations (e.g., 
present software introductions, software back catalog), may be a good starting point. For 
example, including the number of present complementors will be a good indicator of the 
pool of potential future software releases. Future models could also include the 
announcements of future superstar releases, and the acquisition of popular and proven 
superstar franchises by system owners. Similarly including pre-announcements (e.g. 
Dranove and Gandal 2003) about future system introductions and future complementor 
entries will be valuable model extensions.   
While I did not find evidence that endogeneity issues alter the findings presented 
in this dissertation, future empirical research may want to better address these potential 
endogeneity issues, by simultaneously estimating the demand-side (i.e., consumer 
adoption) and supply side (i.e., complementor entry) of system markets (i.e., two-sided 
market adoption). Future research may also incorporate endogenous covariates instead of 
our exogenous covariates, to better capture the competitive and ever changing market 
environment. 
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Lessons 
Indirect network effects are often not present, and thus the positive feedback 
cycle is absent. The positive feedback cycle in system markets is not automatically 
present, and available for managers to harvest. In addition, it is not self-sustaining. It must 
be explicitly started and subsequently managed by managers and/or public policy. 
Consumer adoption leads complementor entry. When trying to solve the 
chicken-and-egg paradox, managers and public policy should focus on consumers to start 
the positive feedback cycle, instead of the presently preferred complementors. Most of the 
time we observe a takeoff in consumer adoption well before any substantial amount of 
software titles is available. 
Software quantity (i.e., the software back catalog) is of relative little 
importance, whereas software quality (i.e., software superstars) is of the utmost 
importance. Superstar software titles (i.e., software products of exceptional high quality) 
display increasing returns to quality in both software and hardware sales. Managers and 
public policy should not diversify their investment across a number of software products 
(and/or product categories), but concentrate investment into a single superstar. As only 
superstars have a large effect on hardware sales, and are a perfect opportunity for creating 
early take off in consumer adoption.  
When indirect network effects are present, they display strong heterogeneity. 
Indirect network effects increase across the system life cycle, but decrease over technology 
generations. Tipping in the early stage of the system life cycle is not likely, giving later 
entrants plenty of opportunity to flourish. First movers (i.e., the first new system of a 
technology generation) rarely become the eventual market leader. 
The relevance of indirect network effects is limited. Indirect network effects 
are only important during the later stages of the system life cycle. In addition, the 
advantages of large indirect network effects (i.e., a large hardware installed base of users, 
and a large back catalog of software) are limited to this technology generation, and of little 
importance during the next technology generation. The market leader of the prior 
technology generation rarely becomes the market leader of the next technology generation. 
Market inefficiencies are not likely. 
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Winner-takes-all market outcomes disappear. The increased coordination and 
familiarization between hardware manufacturers and software publishers (i.e., the presence 
of pre-entry relationships), reduces the coordination problem underlining system markets. 
As the strength of indirect network effects, and thus the positive feedback cycle, 
diminishes across technology generations, we obverse a more and more even distributed 
market shares among systems. Tipping is less and less likely to occur. In early 
technology generations, public policy should focus on improving coordination between 
hardware manufacturers and software publishers in order to start and facilitate the positive 
feedback cycle. This will result in a speedier and eventually higher market penetration. 
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Summary 
In this dissertation, I empirically examine system markets up close. More 
specifically I examine indirect network effects, both demand-side and supply-side indirect 
network effects.  Indirect network effects are the source of positive feedback in system 
markets, or so network effect theory tells us. Systems are composed of complementary and 
interdependent products, such as hardware and software. For instance, a video game 
system is composed of the video game console, on the one hand, and video games, on the 
other hand. 
³&XUUHQW ZLVGRP´ WHOOV XV WKDW ZKHQ LQGLUHFW QHWZRUN HIIHFWV DUH SUHVHQW WKH
increased adoption of the hardware by consumers, and thereby the larger hardware 
LQVWDOOHG EDVH LQFUHDVHV WKH FRPSOHPHQWRU¶V OLNHOLKRRG WR HQWHU WKH V\VWHP DQG VWDUt 
introducing software (i.e., supply-side indirect network effects). This larger availability of 
software increases the utility of the system to consumers, thereby increasing the 
FRQVXPHUV¶OLNHOLKRRGWRDGRSWWKHKDUGZDUHWKXVLQFUHDVLQJKDUGZDUHVDOHVi.e., demand-
side indirect network effects), and so on. 
I find that the positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects is less pervasive, 
RU DW OHDVW PRUH FRPSOH[ WKDQ ³FXUUHQW ZLVGRP´ ZRXOG KDYH XV EHOLHYH 6XSSO\-side 
and/or demand-side indirect network effects, as traditionally operationalized, are often not 
present. When present, they display strong heterogeneity. Software quantity if often of 
little interest to consumers, while software products of exceptional high quality (i.e., 
superstars) play an important role, in the eventual success or failure of a system. There is 
RIWHQQRSRVLWLYH IHHGEDFNF\FOHSUHVHQW LQ WKH LQLWLDO VWDJHRI WKH V\VWHP¶V OLIHF\FOH In 
addition, when present indirect network effects decrease across technology generations. 
The positive feedback cycle is not automatically present in system markets 
waiting to be harvested. Marketing managers of firms operating in system markets must 
start this cycle themselves, and subsequently manage it. Our empirical studies already 
identify numerous factors marketing manager can manipulate in order to influence the 
positive feedback cycle. These factors are market, pre-entry relationship, software life 
cycle, superstar power, system life cycle and technology generation. Hardware sponsors 
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must constantly create large events on both the demand-side and the supply-side to keep 
the positive feedback cycle present and running. 
Marketing managers should first identify which factors could influence the 
positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects. Subsequently, they must identify how 
to manipulate those factors to positively affect their own feedback cycle, while trying to 
disrupt the feedback cycle of competitors. Second, they must understand the temporal 
pattern in demand-side and supply-side indirect network effects, across the life cycle of 
systems and software, and across successive technology generations. In addition, they 
should focus on improving software quality and not software quality. Subsequently 
marketing managers must incorporate our findings in their marketing strategy, in order to 
outmaneuver competitors (i.e., competing systems, fellow complementors). Only then can 
marketing managers start to reap the benefits of indirect network effects and positive 
feedback, and alleviate the chicken-and-egg problem. 
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INDIRECT NETWORK EFFECTS IN ACTION, OR INACTION?
In this dissertation, I empirically examine system markets up close. More specifically
I examine indirect network effects, both demand-side and supply-side indirect network
effects. Indirect network effects are the source of positive feedback in system markets, or
so network effect theory tells us. Systems are composed of complementary and inter -
dependent products, such as hardware and software. For instance, a video game system is
composed of the video game console, on the one hand, and video games, on the other hand.
Surprisingly, I find that the positive feedback cycle of indirect network effects is less
pervasive, or at least more complex, than “current wisdom” would have us believe.
Supply-side and/or demand-side indirect network effects, as traditionally operationalized,
are often not present. When present, they display strong heterogeneity. There is often no
positive feedback cycle present in the initial stage of the system’s life cycle. Software
quantity is of little importance, while software products of exceptional high quality (i.e.,
superstars) play an important role. Our empirical studies identify numerous factors
marketing manager can manipulate to influence the positive feedback cycle. Subsequently
marketing managers can incorporate our findings in their marketing strategy, and out -
maneuver competitors (i.e., competing systems, fellow complementors).
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